Participant/nives-dolsak

Hi, my name is Nives Dolšak.

I teach public policy with a special emphasis on environmental policy. My primary interest is governance of common pool resources – resources which are rival but non-excludable. These resource characteristics create incentives for “herders” to appropriate the resource first instead of exercising restraint and sustainably exploiting it. This is because they have no credible assurance that other “herders” would exercise restraint. Since all “herders” model each-other’s behavior the same way, defection dominates cooperation. As a result, a social sub-optimum outcome takes place. The challenge is to create institutions (rule structures) that would provide credible assurance to “herders” that others would not exploit the resource if they were to exercise restraint. A computer lab in a university (or public library) can be viewed as a common-pool resource. The use of a computer is such a lab is a rival (if I use it, nobody else can at that point) and it is not excludable—every student has the right to appropriate this resource. Given the access demand for this resource (especially during the exam times), how can rules be devised to ensure equitable access?

I am a political scientist by training, so I am interested in questions of who governs (makes rules, monitors compliance, and sanctions non-compliance) the resource, who decides on the rules to make the rules, who is allowed to appropriate the resource, and who pays for the provision or upkeep of the resource.

I have two broad questions for the symposium. First, if we view the Internet as an “agreement” on how to connect the “ends”, who gets to decide what this agreement is? Who gets to decide if this "commons" can be "enclosed" (Bollier, 2002), and if so, to what extent, by whom, and for how much? Who is included in this decision process? What happens to those who prefer the status quo over the change? What tools do they have to excercise their preferences? If they can block the change, do we then have two agreements with two parallel sub-systems? In a sense, I would like to identify actors involved in this agreement, their incentives, and their power.

If we, on the other hand, view the Internet not only as the “agreement” on how to connect the “ends”, but also include complementary goods required to access it, then the governance question becomes broader. A public good is defined as non-rivalrous, non-excludable good. But this definition assumes that everybody who wants the good has the means to access it. Think of sun light (popular thing in Seattle!). It takes nothing to access it. Now think of the information on the Internet. It takes two complementary resources to access it. It takes a computer and it takes Internet connectivity. Neither of these are public goods, but private goods. It is accessibility of these two complementary goods (private goods) that restrict access to the Internet. It is these two private goods (with non-trivial price) that lead to digital/informational inequity. When we have the resources to equip public places with computers and connect them to the internet, which very few communities can do, then common-pool issues arise. In this case, we need to talk about usage rights. However, it is important to define the governance question regarding Internet to be broad enough to include governance of the complementary goods. Free access to the Internet is in some way an indirect subsidy to the connectivity providers and computer manufacturers. It is like building highways by tax dollars as a subsidy to automobile manufacturers. Hence, I would like us to critically investigate public policy implications of providing free access to the Internet.

I am looking forward to two days of stimulating and productive conversations.

CONTACT INFO:

e-mail: ndolsak@uwb.edu

home page: http://faculty.washington.edu/nives