An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods: Difference between revisions

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==Full Citation==
==Full Citation==


Bruce H. Kobayashi (2006), ''An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods.'' Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 14. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=708562 SSRN'']
Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods. 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 261 (2006). [http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/05-11.pdf ''Web'']
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=708562 SSRN'']
   
   
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special%3ABibliography&view=&action=&keyword=Kobayashi%3A2006 ''BibTeX'']
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special%3ABibliography&view=&action=&keyword=Kobayashi%3A2006 ''BibTeX'']
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==Categorization==
==Categorization==


Issues: [[Economics of Cybersecurity]]; [[Incentives]]; [[Deterrence]]
*Issues: [[Economics of Cybersecurity]]; [[Incentives]]; [[Deterrence]]


==Key Words==  
==Key Words==  
 
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Crimeware | Crimeware]],
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Crimeware Crimeware],
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_a_Public_Good | Cyber Security as a Public Good]]
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_a_Public_Good Cybersecurity as a Public Good]


==Synopsis==
==Synopsis==
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facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of  
facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of  
information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of  
information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of  
such organizations.
such organizations.
 


==Additional Notes and Highlights==
==Additional Notes and Highlights==
Expertise Required: Economics - High

Latest revision as of 14:28, 10 August 2010

Full Title of Reference

An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods

Full Citation

Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods. 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 261 (2006). Web SSRN

BibTeX

Categorization

Key Words

Crimeware, Cyber Security as a Public Good

Synopsis

This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.

While prior analyses have examined the provision of security goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods.

In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case (a category this paper argues cybersecurity belongs to) can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.

Additional Notes and Highlights

Expertise Required: Economics - High