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From Yochai Benkler - Wealth of Networks

for 7. Political Freedom Part 2: Emergence of the Networked Public Sphere
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[[Table Of Contents]]

== Content ==

* [http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks_Chapter_7.pdf Full text (PDF)]
* [[Sentence-sliced Text Chapter 7|Full text, sentence-sliced (wiki)]]

==Summary of the chapter==

===Overview===
===Basic Tools of Networked Communication===
===Networked Information Economy Meets the Public Sphere===
===Critiques of the Claims that the Internet Has Democratizing Effects===
===Is the Internet too Chaotic, Too Concentrated, or Neither?===
===On Power Law Distributions, Network Topology, and Being Heard===
===Who Will Play the Watchdog Function?===
===Using Networked Communication to Work Around Authoritarian Control===
===Toward a Networked Public Sphere===

==Sources==
===Sources cited in the chapter===
===Other relevant readings===
==Case Studies==
===Supporting examples===
===Counter-examples===
====Thoughts on Link Powerlaws and Blogs====

From The Conversational Middle: Maturing of the Blogosphere

Early on in the development of the Blogosphere, people like [http://shirky.com Clay Shirky] and Joi Ito saw how linking structures led to a powerlaw effect, where bloggers with the most links had more broadcast power than other bloggers, similar to traditional media forms.

Evidence of those kinds of linking patterns can be seen here at [http://www.sifry.com/alerts/archives/000247.html the State of the Blogosphere report from October 2004], where counts for the NY Times and MSNBC were in the neighborhood of 17 or 18 thousand links, and top 100 bloggers like Boing Boing and Instapundit had 6 or so thousand links.  

http://napsterization.org/stories/archives/bigmediavsblogs102004.jpg

At that point in time, [http://www.sifry.com/alerts/archives/000356.html Technorati tracked 4 million blogs and 400 million links].  What has changed over the following year and a half is that the blogosphere has grown to where  [http://www.sifry.com/alerts/archives/000419.html Technorati tracks 33+ million blogs and 2.2 billion links]. As of January, 2006, the NY Times has 55,000+ inbound links and CNN has around 53,000+ but Boing Boing has 18,000+ and Instapundit has 5,600 links (they are no longer the number 2 blog, as that position is now held by Engadget at 15,600+ links) you can see that while the blogosphere has grown 7x and the links 5.5x, the inbound link counts of the top blogs and media has grown 3x.  

http://napsterization.org/stories/archives/bigmediavsblogs022006.jpg

Also, take into account that Technorati changed its methods of link counting last August, 2005, after several things occurred: ([http://radio.weblogs.com/0001011/2005/07/14.html#a10642 Robert Scoble complained about its link counts in comparison to Bloglines] which counts every link since it started counting, [http://napsterization.org/stories/archives/000500.html Mary Hodder reported on how link counting worked across 5 blog search services] as well as other's reports of frustration with the Top 100 and A-list counts where sparce posters' links were favored over frequent posters' links).  So Technorati changed from counting just links on the top pages of a blog (those posts that linked but dropped off the front pages were dropped from front page link counts) to any link that had occurred in the past 6 months. Technorati still counts one link only per blog, no matter it's location on the blog posts or blogroll, no matter how many links come from one blog, but all link types age out after 6 months.  So these statistics for the later time frame are different and not exactly comparable, but let's do it for the sake of argument here.

So, what does this mean?  Well, since there are 5.5 times more links that occured over this 1.5 year time frame but fewer links occuring at the same rate to the top media properties (blogs and traditional media), it means that there are more links made to non-A-list bloggers than bloggers further down the [http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html power law curve].  These links are occuring at a higher rate in what could be called  the "conversation middle of the power law curve" (the curve for link counts), than those A-listers at the top are receiving.  

A year and a half ago, there was far more interest in the top of the power law, or the existence of the power law curve at all. The evidence now in the Spring of 2006, as the blogosphere goes main stream, it that the conversation and power is moving more to the middle, at least as link counts go, to more personal conversations rather than pointers to a few top media sites or the blogs that are act more like broadcasters.  The broadcast model for blogs means that many more links go to a top blog, than they were able to link back to, because it was just physically impossible for a single blogger to link out to an equal number of that blogger's inbound links. Those top bloggers are 1-to-thousands in their distribution. So inbound links counts for those bloggers would have thousands of inbound links as opposed to far fewer outbound links to others. 

From [http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html link February 2003, here is one distribution curve showing bloggers inbound link counts] in the Shirky article on power law curves:

http://napsterization.org/stories/archives/powerlawcurveforlinks022003.jpg

But the conversational middle theory, then, and now, is represented by a model of 12-to-12 for the distribution and receiving of links, or 50-to-50 at higher levels, or for larger blogs, maybe 500-to-200, depending on the size of the conversation verses those listening and linking back.  And now the mainstreaming of the blogosphere supports this hypothesis a bit more.

As modified from [http://www.thelongtail.com/ Chris Anderson]'s [http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html  Long Tail article] here is a representation of what the conversational middle model:

http://napsterization.org/stories/archives/conversationalmiddle.jpg

Some bloggers have been frustrated by Technorati's link counting methods and particularly the [http://technorati.com/ Technorati Top 100], because they have felt that ranking across the entire blogosphere emphasized something that did not favor those further down the power law curve.  Instead those kinds of link rank systems favored the topic blogging activities on tech stuff and politics, and bloggers on other topics and with other linking styles found [http://del.icio.us/tag/linklove there was a lot of interest] in figuring out ways to reveal topic communities lower down that power law curve.  

The maturing of the blogosphere with less broadcast distribution and more conversation between people spread far and wide is even more subversive to tradtional media, and a more democratic way of bringing together people who want to discuss interests they have in common. Certainly there are still bloggers who are more highly read with more inbound links that resemble broadcasters in some ways, and who traditional media will consider to be more like themselves, but still, there is a shift to conversation with more symmetric linking patterns, and that is positive overall.  

The next challenge is how to see how small conversational communities and the attendant tools that sift these conversations can use more than one or two digital gestures, like links and link counts, to create topic awareness of blogger groups with more than just the early adopter or blog-tool favoring metrics that post categories or tag indicators do now. These metrics too are subject to power law curves and the current uses of only one or two at a time still only reflect top bloggers, or early adopters, in these lists, just as link counts did before in  emphasizing the top over the conversational middle.  When the tools of exposure change, the conversational middle will become accessible and apparent not just to those in and around a particular conversation but to those outside it.

==Key Concepts==

==Future research considerations==

===Substantive effects on legislation===

Professor Benkler’s analysis focuses on how the Internet will change the “procedures” of politics – the mechanisms by which politicians and citizens will exchange and debate ideas.  One interesting area for future study will be how the Internet will change the “substance” of politics – the policies enacted by government.  Will the Internet shift politics to the left or to the right?  What types of laws will be enacted as a result of the “new media” that would not have been enacted under the “old media”?  Since the “new media” is, well, new, it is hard to empirically assess the answers to these questions, but one can speculate about the possibilities.  Here are five such speculations (please contribute more!)

1. Greater emphasis on legislative protection of free speech

The Communications Decency Act passed in an era when there were far more Internet content consumers than content contributors.  As more people contribute content to the Internet (consistent with Benkler’s vision), they will be more inclined against Internet censorship.  More generally, as more people acquire the self-affirming ability to propagate their views, they may respect free speech to a greater extent and be less willing to deny it from others.

2. Better technology policy, such as copyright and patent law

In the mainstream media, those who create content (writers) tend to be different from those who are technologically adept (technicians).  On the Internet, the content providers are the same as those with the underlying technological skills to put it online, and thus are perhaps more interested in technological issues.  As a result, there may be more dialogue online than in the mainstream press on issues such as patents, telecommunications, and copyright.  Anecdotally, the Grokster Supreme Court decision last year got as much blogosphere treatment as the Ten Commandments decisions – even though the Ten Commandments commanded (so to speak) much more mainstream media attention.  Given that small interest groups currently drive copyright and patent policy because of the lack of broader public attention, increasing public discourse of these issues might have a salutary effect on technology policy.

3. Less pork

One of the reasons there is so much “pork” in congressional bills is that the “old media” does not have the expertise or interest to carefully evaluate these bills.  As a result, the bills do not get any scrutiny, and Congressmen can feel free to insert these provisions without political recourse.  The Diebold incident noted by Benkler demonstrates how the radically decentralized Internet can analyze complex issues in a way the old media cannot.  Increased scrutiny on pork – leading to less pork – might be the result. 

4. Decreased incumbency advantage leading to more populism.

Currently, 95+% of incumbents get reelected to the House of Representatives, in part because of the inherent cost of running political campaigns.  The Internet undoubtedly makes it easier to advertise and run a political campaign.  This might reduce the incumbency advantage, and might even lead to greater political populism as entrenched incumbents must directly appeal to voters.

5. Less prejudice against stigmatized groups

In the old media, people acquired information from two sources:  first, from people they knew, and second, from TV or radio news anchors, whose physical appearances (in the case of TV), voices, and personal characteristics were calculated to appeal to as many people as possible.  In contrast, when people read blogs, they do not see the faces, or hear the voices, of the bloggers.  Frequently, the blogger is completely anonymous.  

This might reduce prejudice against minority groups, both in politics and in daily life, in two ways.  First, people uncomfortable around members of a minority group might be more willing to read a blog written by one, than watch one on TV or interact with one in real life.  If they then find that the blog is appealing, it may implicitly reduce their prejudice toward people in those groups.  Second, if they read a blog anonymously and then discover it is written by someone from a group which they stereotyped, their views toward that group might shift.  

For instance, Andrew Sullivan is a gay conservative who wrote an influential blog in support of the Iraq war.  Many people, especially in conservative states, might not know any gay people, and no gay person is likely to become a network TV news anchor anytime soon.  Sullivan’s blog might thus have been their only opportunity to read and comment on the views of a gay intellectual.  It’s possible that these interactions unconsciously reduced people’s hostility toward gay people.


===Thoughts on File-Sharing, Transnationally===

“Wealth of Networks” discusses in some depth the unique opportunities created by the internet for speech and collaboration, two vital ingredients to individual engagement with the political process.  Americans generally regard the internet as a free and open space, but regulation of the internet could limit the utility of cyberspace for political activities.  America and other nations have enjoined peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing programs such as Napster and Grokster under copyright infringement theories.  These measures may restrict future activities and innovations important to political activism through the internet, yet it seems that few Americans have viewed the file-sharing decisions as more than just the prevention of music file exchange.  This American attitude is not universal and is strongly influenced by several basic facts about American society: first, that America continues to experience a significant “digital divide,” and second, that America has a relatively mature democracy in which political activism is not widespread and internet freedoms are not closely associated with basic notions of political liberty.  In contrast, South Korea has an unusually high rate of internet access and a relatively young democracy.  We should expect that Korea will take a different and more permissive approach to its regulation of online file-sharing technologies.

America and Korea have both seen steady litigation over popular P2P file-sharing programs.  In America, Napster, Aimster, and Grokster were all enjoined from distributing their programs by the courts.  (A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 25 S.Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005))
Though the details of America’s regulatory regime for online file-sharing may be subject to change in the future, there seems to be little doubt that the United States will continue to regulate these programs and perhaps even stiffen punishments for file-sharing offenders.  (See “Protecting Intellectual Rights against Theft and Appropriation Act,” http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:s2237is.txt.)
In Korea, Soribada emerged as the most popular domestic file-sharing program.  Despite lengthy and ongoing litigation, Soribada remains operational, though Soribada’s founders have chosen to limit its features.  The United States has applied considerable pressure on the Korean government to follow its lead in the enforcement of IP copyright online, but Korea’s future regulation of P2P technologies remains in doubt.  (The United States Trade Representative recently placed Korea on its intellectual property “watch list,” citing concerns about its protection of American popular music copyright interests.  See USTR press release, available at http://seoul.usembassy.gov/e010804.html.)

Why do the United States and Korea differ, perhaps dramatically, in their prospects for future file-sharing regulation?  As long as the American focus remains on free music, the debate will continue to center around the proximate question of copyright management.  The imposition of civil and criminal penalties on file-sharers has a deeper significance in Korea because it raises the specter of oppressive government power infringing on the basic political liberty of citizens.  In Korea, the internet is not just a resource regularly accessed by a bare majority of the society, but rather a part of everyday life for most Koreans.  Due in part to the fact that Korea has the highest rate of internet access of any nation in the world, the internet is a major source of alternative news.  (“Lessons from broadband development in Canada, Japan, Korea and the United States,” Frieden, Rob, Telecommunications Policy, Sept. 2005, Vol. 29(8), p. 595.)  For instance, at the popular site OhmyNews, registered users, “news guerillas,” submit stories based on their actual experiences and observations, which collectively cover more events and a broader spectrum of opinions than are conveyed through Korea’s conservative mainstream news outlets.  (Gillmor, Dan.  We the Media, O’Reilly: Sebastopol, pp. 125-29.)  The rise of the internet corresponds closely with the birth of Korean democracy; Korea has had an elected civilian government for only the last 13 years after decades of military dictatorships.  The internet has been a political forum for much of the history of Korea’s still malleable democracy.  Korea’s national elections have been meaningfully impacted by the prevalence of online access in Korea and the zeal with which Koreans have used cyberspace to participate in the political process.  In 2002, underdog Korean presidential candidate Roh Moo-Hyun was narrowly elected in a campaign that was fueled not only by online fundraising, but by internet-facilitated brainstorming and the coalescence of politically motivated individuals in Korean society on the internet.  (Gillmor at 93.)  

The controversy surrounding Soribada may, at first glance, appear to be rather unrelated to Korean political democracy.  However, restrictions on what programs can be provided to internet users, especially programs that foster networking and exchange, impose real limitations.  The broad dissemination potential through P2P networks, which are established and viral communities, creates unique opportunities to contribute and share information and to shape the cultural context for political action.  File-sharing can relate directly to politics as well.  Professor Benkler discusses an apt American example: Diebold’s voting machines, used in numerous U.S. elections, were known by the company to malfunction; Benkler mentions that incriminating Diebold e-mails continued to circulate on P2P networks using eDonkey and BitTorrent even after the documents were removed from websites under the threat of legal action.  (Wealth of Networks, Chapter 7, p. 230.)  In America, this may be regarded as a rare counter-example to the “piracy” that has been found by American courts to illegitimatize several file-sharing programs.  Korea, as a nascent democracy and the most “wired” nation in the world, may balance the costs and benefits of file-sharing regulations quite differently and may already value file-sharing technology as a fundamental part of the fabric of a free and politically engaged society.
Return to 7. Political Freedom Part 2: Emergence of the Networked Public Sphere.
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