Yale
Law Journal
April,
1998
*1683 RECONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Vicki
Schultz [FNd1]
Copyright
© 1998 Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.; Vicki Schultz
Contents
I. The Prevailing Paradigm ............................................ 1692
A. The Sexual Desire‑Dominance Paradigm .......................... 1692
B. Origins of the Paradigm ....................................... 1696
1. Early Radical Feminist Ideas ................................ 1696
2. Early Quid Pro Quo Harassment Cases ......................... 1701
C. An Illustration from the Case Law ............................. 1706
II. The Sexualization of the Hostile Work Environment .................. 1710
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems .... 1710
B. Disaggregation in the Lower Courts ............................ 1713
1. Hostile Work Environment Versus Disparate Treatment ......... 1714
2. 'Sexual' Versus 'Nonsexual' Conduct ......................... 1716
C. The Harms of Disaggregation ................................... 1720
D. Sexual Paternalism and the Unwelcomeness Requirement .......... 1729
E. The McKinney Rule and Its Lack of Influence ................... 1732
III. The Invisibility of Gender at Work ................................. 1738
A. The Two‑Tiered Structure of Causation ......................... 1739
B. Sexuality as a Bright‑Line Test for Gender‑Based Conduct? ..... 1744
C. The Courts' Failure To Understand the Role of Work in
Producing Gender Inequality ...................................... 1748
IV. An Alternative Account of Hostile Work Environment Harassment: A
Competence‑Centered Paradigm ..................................... 1755
A. The Link Between Job Segregation and Hostile Work Environments 1756
B. The Competence‑Undermining Function of Hostile Work
Environment Harassment ........................................... 1762
C. Reconceptualizing the Harassment of Women Workers ............. 1769
V. Additional Advantages of the Competence‑Centered Account ........... 1774
A. Revealing the Actionable Features of Male‑on‑Male Harassment .. 1774
B. Reducing the Risk of Prohibiting Benign Sexual Expression ..... 1789
VI. Conclusion: Toward Implementing the New Account .................... 1796
*1685 It's a form of harassment every time I pick up a sledgehammer
and that prick laughs at me, you know. It's a form of harassment when a
journeyman is supposed to be training me and it's real clear to me that he does
not want to give me any information whatsoever. He does not want me to be there at all . . . . They put me with
this one who is a lunatic . . . he's the one who drilled the hole in my arm . .
. . It's a form of harassment to me when the working foreman puts me in a
dangerous situation and tells me to do something in an improper way and then
tells me, Oh, you can't do that! It's a form of harassment to me when someone
takes a tool out of my hand and said, . . . I'll show you how to do this, and
he grabs the sledgehammer from my hand and he proceeded to try to show me how
to do this thing . . . you know, straighten up a post . . . it's nothing to it,
you just bang it and it gets straight . . . . It's a form of harassment to me
when they call me honey and I have to tell them every day, don't call me that,
you know, I have a name printed right on my thing. . . . Ah, you know, it's all
a form of harassment to me. It's not right. They don't treat each other that
way. They shouldn't treat me that way. It's a form of harassment to me when
this one asks me to go out with him all the time. You know, all this kind of
stuff. It's terrible. [FN1]
How should we understand sex‑based
harassment on the job? Its existence is now part of the national consciousness.
Over the past twenty years, feminists have succeeded in naming "sexual
harassment" and defining it as a social problem. [FN2] Popular accounts
abound: Newspapers, movies, and television programs depict women workers who
are forced to endure sexual advances and decry the fact that these women must
contend with such abuse. [FN3] The legal system, too, has recognized the
problem. The Supreme Court, on two separate occasions, [FN4] has affirmed that
workplace sexual harassment violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, [FN5]
and the lower federal courts have created a massive *1686 body of doctrine detailing the law's protection. All the
while, public awareness of legal rights has continued to develop, and workers
have filed sexual harassment complaints in increasing numbers. [FN6]
That feminists (and sympathetic lawyers)
have inspired a body of popular and legal opinion condemning harassment in such
a brief period of time is a remarkable achievement. Yet the achievement has
been limited because we have not conceptualized the problem in sufficiently
broad terms. The prevailing paradigm for understanding sex‑based
harassment places sexuality‑‑more specifically, male‑female
sexual advances‑‑at the center of the problem. Within that
paradigm, a male supervisor's sexual advances on a less powerful, female
subordinate represent the quintessential form of harassment.
Although this sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm represented progress when it was first articulated as the foundation
for quid pro quo sexual harassment, using the paradigm to conceptualize hostile
work environment harassment has served to exclude from legal understanding many
of the most common and debilitating forms of harassment faced by women (and
many men) at work each day. [FN7] The prevailing paradigm privileges conduct
thought to be motivated by sexual designs‑‑such as sexual advances‑‑as
the core sex‑ or gender‑based harassment. [FN8] Yet much of the
gender‑based hostility and *1687
abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the desire
for sexual relations nor even sexual in content.
Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of
harassment are actions that are designed to maintain work‑‑particularly
the more highly rewarded lines of work‑‑as bastions of masculine
competence and authority. Every day, in workplaces all over the country, men
uphold the image that their jobs demand masculine mastery by acting to
undermine their female colleagues' perceived (or sometimes even actual)
competence to do the work. The forms of such harassment are wide‑ranging.
They include characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating
women's performance or ability to master the job; providing patronizing forms
of help in performing the job; withholding the training, information, or
opportunity to learn to do the job well; engaging in deliberate work sabotage;
providing sexist evaluations of women's performance or denying them deserved
promotions; isolating women from the social networks that confer a sense of
belonging; denying women the perks or privileges that are required for success;
assigning women sex‑stereotyped service tasks that lie outside their job
descriptions (such as cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting,
pranks, and other forms of hazing designed to remind women that they are
different and out of place; and physically assaulting or threatening to assault
the women who dare to fight back. Of course, making a woman the object of
sexual attention can also work to undermine her image and self‑confidence
as a capable worker. Yet, much of the time, harassment assumes a form that has
little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with gender. As the
female welder quoted above put it,"Ah, you know, it's all a form of
harassment to me. . . . They don't treat each other that way. They shouldn't
treat me that way." [FN9]
In spite of the female welder's intuitive
understanding that all these actions are gender‑based forms of
harassment, there has been little or no recognition of such a perspective in
the law. Most feminists and other scholars sympathetic to working women have
either explicitly advocated or implicitly accepted the prevailing sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm. This is not surprising, for feminists played a prominent role in
creating it. The focus on sexual conduct emerged from an early radical feminist
critique of heterosexual relations as a primary producer of women's oppression.
These early feminists saw rape as a central metaphor for men's treatment of
women, and they compared sexual harassment to rape. [FN10] More recently,
feminist legal scholars have analogized the law governing workplace harassment
to rape law, criticizing harassment law for its disregard of women's
perspectives on sexuality and for its failure to appreciate the unique harm
inherent in the fact that harassment is a sexual *1688 violation. [FN11] Just as feminist analyses have conceived
of harassment as sexual abuse, most scholars who have addressed same‑ sex
harassment have characterized it in sexualized terms, analogizing same‑sex
harassment to heterosexual sexual advances as an argument for legal regulation.
[FN12] Thus, even the most critical accounts of harassment law, like other
accounts of workplace harassment, [FN13] have assumed a sexuality‑centered
perspective that portrays sexual advances and other sexually oriented conduct
as the core of the problem. [FN14] They are rooted in the prevailing paradigm.
[FN15]
*1689 This Article challenges the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm. A comprehensive examination of Title VII hostile work environment
harassment cases demonstrates the paradigm's inadequacy. Despite the best
intentions of its creators, the paradigm has compromised the law's protection.
Principal among its drawbacks, the paradigm is underinclusive: It omits‑‑and
even obscures‑‑many of the most prevalent forms of harassment that
make workplaces hostile and alienating to workers based on their gender. Much
of what is harmful to women in the workplace is difficult to construe as sexual
in design. Similarly, many men are harmed at work by gender‑based
harassment that fits only uneasily within the parameters of a sexualized
paradigm. The prevailing paradigm, however, may also be overinclusive. By
emphasizing the protection of women's sexual selves and sensibilities over and
above their empowerment as workers, the paradigm permits‑‑or even
encourages‑‑companies to construe the law to prohibit some forms of
sexual expression that do not promote gender hierarchy at work. The focus of
harassment law should not be on sexuality as such. The focus should be on
conduct that consigns people to gendered work roles that do not further their
own aspirations or advantage.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I
begins by describing the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm for
conceptualizing hostile work environment harassment. It traces the roots of the
paradigm in early feminist thought and in the reasoning of early cases. As Part
I shows, the major jurisprudential barrier to recognizing a Title VII cause of
action for quid pro quo harassment was some courts' initial reluctance to hold
that supervisors' demands for sexual favors occurred "because of sex"
within the meaning of the statute. Influenced by radical feminist thought that
highlighted the centrality of sexual exploitation in creating women's
inequality, feminists argued, and courts began to recognize, that supervisors'
sexual advances can constitute sex‑ or gender‑based discrimination.
The resulting legal analysis was grounded in sexual desire: A heterosexual male
supervisor's advances toward a female subordinate were based on sex because the
supervisor would not make similar sexual advances toward a man. This desire‑based
reasoninglaid the foundation for the prevailing paradigm.
To some extent, the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm represented progress. It was important for courts to recognize that
gender discrimination can take the form of sexual overtures. But the paradigm
also portended problems. By emphasizing sexual abuse, the paradigm threatened
to eclipse other, equally harmful forms of gender‑based hostility. As
Parts II and III demonstrate, this concern has materialized. Part II documents
the problem of disaggregation: Courts consider only sexual advances or other
sexual conduct for purposes of establishing hostile work environment harassment,
and they consign less sexual forms of misconduct to a separate disparate
treatment analysis (if they consider such forms at all). Disaggregation
obscures a full *1690 view of the
conditions of the workplace and makes both the hostile work environment and
disparate treatment claims look trivial. When severed from a larger pattern of
discriminatory conduct, sexual advances or ridicule can appear insufficiently
severe or pervasive to be actionable. By the same token, when severed from
sexual overtures, nonsexual forms of harassment may appear to be gender‑neutral
hazing that has nothing to do with the victims' womanhood. Indeed, when women
are denied the training or support to succeed on the job, they can easily be made
to appear (or even become) less than fully proficient at their jobs. This lack
of proficiency then becomes the justification for the very mistreatment that
has undermined their performance.
Part III examines the question of causation.
Ironically, courts that once refused to recognize that sexual advances may
occur because of sex now insist on such advances and fail to perceive many
other problems that confront women workers as sex‑based. Courts often
search for deep‑seated sexual motivations for women's adverse treatment
when gender‑based considerations lie close to the surface. Yet the
courts' focus on sexual conduct has not provided judges with a bright‑line
test; their inevitable disagreement about whether challenged conduct is
sufficiently sexual has created as many inconsistencies as it has criteria for
guidance. Thus, I argue that the judicial focus on sexual conduct is not fueled
by a beneficial certainty in line drawing, but by judges' failure to comprehend
the significance of workplace discrimination in creating women's disadvantage.
The courts' traditional failure to
comprehend the magnitude of women's gender troubles at work, in fact, has only
been exacerbated by the prevailing paradigm's emphasis on sexual forms of
harassment. Singling out sexual advances as the essence of workplace harassment
has allowed courts to feel enlightened about protecting women from sexual
violation, while at the same time relieving judges of the responsibility to
redress other, broader gender‑based problems in the workplace. It is not
enough to focus on the harm to women as sexual beings; the law must also
address women's systematic disadvantage‑‑and facilitate women's
equal empowerment‑‑as creative, committed workers. We need an
account of hostile work environment harassment that highlights its dynamic
relationship to larger forms of gender hierarchy at work.
Part IV advances a new account of hostile
work environment harassment that emphasizes its role in reproducing work and
work competence along masculine and feminine lines. In this account, harassment
is not driven by a need for sexual domination but by a desire to preserve
favored lines of work as masculine. By maintaining a hold on highly rewarded
employment, men secure a host of advantages in and outside the workplace. Some
of these advantages are material: Wage superiority over women, for example,
ensures men's position at the head of the household as well as their place at
the helm of most powerful institutions in society. Equally significant are powerful *1691 psychological factors: Both
breadwinning and work competence are central to the dominant cultural
understandings of manhood. By protecting their jobs from incursion by women, or
by incorporating women only on inferior terms, men sustain the impression that
their work requires uniquely masculine skills. Maintaining their jobs as
repositories of masculine mastery, in turn, assures men a sense of identity
(even superiority) as men.
In this new account, hostile work
environment harassment is closely linked to job segregation by sex. Harassment
serves a gender‑guarding, competence‑ undermining function: By
subverting women's capacity to perform favored lines of work, harassment
polices the boundaries of the work and protects its idealized masculine image‑‑as
well as the identity of those who do it. As a female pipefitter explained:
You see it is just very hard for them to
work with me because they're really into proving their masculinity . . . . And
when a woman comes on a job that can work, get something done as fast and
efficiently, as well, as they can, it really affects them. Somehow if a woman
can do it, it ain't that masculine, not that tough. [FN16] This analysis
applies across occupational and class lines to blue‑collar and white‑collar
work, in high and low places. From medicine to sales to construction, from
boardrooms to restaurants to firehouses, from managers to coworkers to
subordinates, male workers have created environments that cast doubt upon the
capability of women who threaten the masculine privilege and personae of their
work.
As Part V shows, such harassment is not only
directed at women, but also targets men who threaten the work's masculine
image. Just as some male workers seek to protect their work from encroachment
by women, so too may male workers seek to denigrate and drive away other men
who detract from the perception of their jobs as the embodiment of an idealized
manly competence. Part V argues that, regardless of whether male harassees are
targeted or taunted on the basis of alleged homosexuality or on the basis of
other characteristics that the dominant male workers see as representing a lack
of manliness (and fear will diminish their own), such harassment is based on
gender within the meaning of Title VII. As the Supreme Court has instructed,
the statute prohibits pressuring people to conform to preconceived notions of
appropriate manhood or womanhood in connection with their work. [FN17] Yet the *1692 law has not yet clearly
recognized that male‑on‑male harassment that exerts such pressure
is a form of gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII. [FN18]
It is time for a reconceptualization of sex‑based
harassment‑‑and harassment law‑‑along more
comprehensive lines. It is time to focus on gender along with sexuality, on the
monopolization of work competence along with sexual abuse. Part VI sketches
some suggestions for how courts and lawyers might implement the new competence‑centered
account of hostile work environment harassment. That task involves returning to
Title VII's original purpose, which was to empower everyone‑‑whatever
their sex or gender‑‑to pursue their life's work on equal terms.
I.
The Prevailing Paradigm
A.
The Sexual Desire‑Dominance Paradigm
The prevailing paradigm defines unwanted
heterosexual sexual advances as the core conduct that constitutes sex‑based
harassment. The quintessential case of harassment involves a more powerful,
typically older, male supervisor, who uses his superior organizational position
to demand sexual favors from a less powerful, typically younger, female
subordinate. Sometimes, his motivation is sexual desire: He wants her, and he
uses his organizational position to get her. Sometimes, it is a desire to
subordinate: He wants to make sure she remains below him in the workplace
hierarchy, and he uses sexuality to reinforce his position. Either way, his
actions are an abuse of his power and an abuse of her sex. Within this
paradigm, heterosexual desire and male dominance are inextricably linked. Men
use their dominant positions at work to extract sex from women, and extracting
sex from women ensures their dominance.
This sexual desire‑dominance paradigm
governs our understanding of harassment. Its influence is reflected in the very
factthat the category is referred to as "sexual" harassment rather
than, for example, "gender‑based" or "sex‑based"
harassment. The most publicized harassment cases have accentuated this
understanding. The Anita Hill‑Clarence Thomas controversy was the first
case to receive widespread public attention, and it solidified the view of
harassment as sexual pursuit and predation. Hill, a reserved woman who was at
the time of the alleged events a novice lawyer in her mid‑twenties, *1693 claimed that Thomas, her then‑supervisor
at the Department of Education and subsequent Chair of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), had pressured her repeatedly to go out with him.
[FN19] After a while, Thomas "began to use work situations to discuss
sex," regaling Hill with lewd accounts of pornographic films and of his
own sexual proclivities and prowess. [FN20] Hill's testimony at Thomas's
confirmation hearings suggested that she believed the harassment to be driven
by a need for domination: "I never felt that [Thomas] was genuinely
interested in me‑‑only in coercing me." [FN21] Thomas agreed
that the alleged conduct constituted actionable harassment, but described it as
the expression of a perverse kind of sexual desire. According to his
supporters, a person who did what Hill claimed would be a "psychopathic
sex fiend or a pervert." [FN22] This interpretation allowed Thomas to deny
that he had ever engaged in the alleged conduct: "If I were going to date
someone outside of the workplace . . . I would certainly not approach [her]
with this kind of grotesque language." [FN23] Although Thomas stressed
sexual desire and Hill suggested domination, both parties‑‑seasoned
veterans of the EEOC familiar with the legal conception of harassment‑‑took
for granted the prevailing paradigm defining sexual advances as the core
workplace harassment.
Other well‑known harassment cases have
followed the same pattern. In October 1991, the same month that the Thomas
confirmation hearings riveted the nation, the news media broke the Tailhook
story. In a corridor of the Las Vegas Hilton, during the Tailhook Association's
raucous annual convention, seventy Navy and Marine aviators pushed more than
two dozen women, some of them Navy officers, down a gauntlet in which the
drunken men shouted sexually suggestive remarks, ripped at the women's clothes,
and groped at their bodies. [FN24] Widely referred to as a "sex
abuse" scandal, [FN25] Tailhook's lurid details captured the country's
attention: "Tailhook . . . was the scandal that opened the Pandora's box
on a problem that has festered for decades." [FN26] The way the problem
was defined, however, reveals much about the reigning *1694 paradigm. For years, researchers have documented wide‑ranging
forms of discrimination, harassment, and second‑class treatment of women
in the armed forces. Yet public officials have not focused on these broader
practices, but have singled out the problem of sexual abuse. The Senate
Veterans Affairs Committee, for example, heard testimony on the issue of sexual
abuse in the military, while newspapers decried the "armed force[s'
failure] to protect women from sexual exploitation by military personnel whose
orders they are supposed to obey." [FN27] Veterans' centers established
programs for victims of sexual trauma, [FN28] and the Navy set up a hot line
and a system for tracking complaints of sexual harassment, assault, and rape.
[FN29] All the while, newspapers continued to report new incidents of sexual
abuse in the military, [FN30] while devoting far less coverage to other,
equally debilitating forms of discrimination. In fact, some sources cited
sexual exploitation as a reason to question the wisdom of integrating women
into the armed forces, rather than as a sign of the need for broad structural
reforms to facilitate women's integration on more equal and empowering terms.
[FN31]
Press coverage of a lawsuit against Stroh's
Brewery also reveals a fixation on sexual abuse and the neglect of other
discriminatory workplace dynamics. In November 1991, several women who worked
at a St. Paul, Minnesota bottling plant owned by Stroh's filed a lawsuit
alleging a hostile work environment and denial of job advancement. [FN32]
Newcomers to the traditionally masculine preserve of beer making, the women
were subjected to a series of severe acts of hostility. They were told that
women could not hold certain jobs *1695
and that they should go home or get "women's jobs." [FN33] They were
referred to with demeaning epithets, like "bitch" and
"squaw." [FN34] They were physically assaulted in both sexual and
nonsexual ways: One woman was "grabbed . . . on the rear end"; [FN35]
a male coworker "displayed his pubic hair [to a second woman] and grabbed
[her] head and pushed it down to his crotch"; [FN36] a male coworker drove
a forklift toward another woman; [FN37] a fourth woman "was given an extra‑heavy
workload after she injured her back and requested light duty, and was
intentionally exposed by a fellow worker to toxic chemicals"; [FN38]
several other women had their tools and machines sabotaged and their tires
slashed or deflated by male coworkers who "stop[ped] to taunt them with
gutter talk or just to watch their misery" while they "g[o]t . . .
down onto dirt, ice or slush to fix the tires." [FN39] In addition, the
women were subjected to a barrage of sexual comments, graffiti, and pin‑ups
of the sort often thrust upon women in blue‑ collar, male‑dominated
workplaces. [FN40] At Stroh's, the campaign of harassment was both vicious and
successful. Ultimately, it drove all the women plaintiffs away from the plant.
[FN41]
The Hill‑Thomas controversy concerned
sexual advances; Tailhook sexual assault. The Stroh's case had the potential to
clarify that women's workplace troubles do not always assume such sexual forms.
Yet, as Professor Carlin Meyer has shown, the media did not focus on the
broader implications. [FN42] It sensationalized the one element of the case it
found "sexy"‑‑the allegation that Stroh's use of the
"Swedish Bikini Team" in its advertising campaign had contributed to
the harassment. Drawing on the company's traditional slogan, "It doesn't
get any better than this," the advertisements featured a bikini‑clad
quintet of blonde women exclaiming, "It gets better," as they
parachuted Old Milwaukee beer to a group of men out in the woods. [FN43] The
legal challenge to the advertisements invoked the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm: The plaintiffs argued that the ads advanced a company‑wide view
of women as sexual objects, which in turn encouraged male workers to make
sexual advances toward their female coworkers. [FN44] Although the challenge to
the *1696 advertisements was only
one small aspect of a complex case, the press treated the claim about the ads
as if it were the case, announcing the lawsuit with such headlines as
"Bikini Ad Prompts a Sexual Harassment Suit." [FN45] As in the Hill‑Thomas
controversy and the Tailhook incident, the media coverage of the Stroh's case
reflected‑‑and in turn reproduced‑‑the prevailing,
sexuality‑centered paradigm.
B.
Origins of the Paradigm
Where did the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm come from? How did it come to have such a strong hold on our
understanding of harassment? Although the origins of the paradigm are complex,
[FN46] an integral part of the story involves early feminists' struggle to
establish the concept of sexual harassment in Title VII law. Like other
concepts that have mobilized social action, [FN47] the concept of sexual
harassment took root in the context of litigation designed to achieve reform.
1.
Early Radical Feminist Ideas
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the
women's movement gained momentum, two strands coalesced to forge a focus on
sexual harassment in the workplace. First, strong elements of the movement
concentrated on helping women achieve economic independence by opening work and
training *1697 opportunities that
had formerly been closed. [FN48] Although women of diverse political
perspectives embraced this goal, [FN49] the women's rights wing of the movement
turned to legal reform as a central strategy. The National Organization for
Women (NOW) was formed in 1966 to bring public pressure on the EEOC to enforce
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. [FN50] NOW
members filed suits challenging sex‑segregated advertising, lobbied the
Department of Labor to include women in its affirmative action guidelines for
federal contractors, persuaded the Federal Communications Commission to open up
opportunities for women in broadcasting, and helped secure the passage of the
1972 amendments to Title VII to allow the EEOC to fight discrimination more
effectively. [FN51] Other feminists launched their own Title VII lawsuits,
including across‑the‑board challenges to systems of sex segregation
at work. [FN52]
At the same time, radicals within the
women's liberation movement were beginning to focus on gender‑related
problems in the spheres of private life‑‑ including sexual
relations. [FN53] Although radical feminism was the creation *1698 of many groups with varying
views, most agreed that heterosexual sexual relations were fraught with power
dynamics that subordinated women to patriarchal norms. [FN54] Beneath the
unifying umbrella of a challenge to prevailing sexual politics, there were
tensions in early radical feminist thought. Some saw heterosexual sexuality as
redeemable, even potentially empowering, if purged of sexism; others saw it as
intrinsically dominated by men. [FN55] Radical feminists also differed on men's
motivations: They debated whether "men defend[ed] their power in order to
get services [including sex] from women," or "demanded services from
women in order to affirm their sense of power." [FN56] These controversies
translated into competing characterizations of rape: Some feminists asserted
that "rape is violence‑‑not sex," while others challenged
the boundary between rape and "normal" male sexual aggression. [FN57]
As Ellen Willis has shown, these tensions
gave way in the mid‑1970s to a new strand of cultural‑radical
feminism. [FN58] According to this emergent analysis, sexual desire and
domination were inextricably linked in the institution of heterosexuality‑‑which
was central to male superiority. According to this view, women were subordinate
to men and heterosexual sexual relations were the primary mechanism of
enforcing women's oppression: "[A]ll sexist behavior [wa]s an extension of
the paradigmatic act of rape. From this standpoint sexual violence was the
essence and purpose of male dominance, the paradigmatic 'male value,' and
therefore feminism's central concern." [FN59]
Given early feminists' dual focus on
sexuality and work, it is not surprising that feminist activists began to
highlight women's sexual exploitation on the job. In 1975, a group of activists
in Ithaca, New York, formed Working Women United (WWU). They held the first
"Speak‑Out on *1699 Sexual
Harassment," and organized the first survey devoted solely to the issue.
[FN60] The group clearly conceptualized harassment in terms of sexual advances.
An early article by one of the group's founders, Dierdre Silverman, defined
sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual
objects." [FN61] According to Silverman, harassment exists "when job
retention, raises or promotions depend on tolerating, or submitting to,
unwanted sexual advances," the form of which "varies from clearly
suggestive looks and/or remarks, to mild physical encounters (pinching,
kissing, etc.) to outright sexual assault." [FN62]
Lin Farley, another of WWU's founders,
adopted a similar conception in her book, Sexual Shakedown. [FN63] The book
begins with a description of two instances of sexual harassment. [FN64] The
first involves a dentist who repeatedly made sexual advances toward his
receptionist and eventually tried to rape her, all the while telling her that
this was why he had hired her and that it was only a matter of time before he
would have her. [FN65] The second involves a restaurant manager who tried to
extort sex from teenage girls whoapplied for jobs. [FN66] Although Farley's
book hinted at a broader conceptualization by defining harassment as "unsolicited
nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her function
as worker," [FN67] subsequent passages defined the content of the female
role exclusively in sexual terms. Harassment, Farley explained, can be
"any or all of the following: staring at, commenting upon, or touching a
woman's body; requests for acquiescence in sexual behavior; repeated
nonreciprocated propositions for dates; demands for sexual intercourse; and
rape." [FN68] Just as sexual advances lay at the core of sexual
harassment, sexual harassment lay at the core of women's oppression. Farley's
colleague Silverman argued that "the paradigm for interactions between men
and women in our society is that of the prostitute and her customer."
[FN69] To these early feminists, sexual harassment was top‑down and male‑female.
At the same time that feminist activists
were articulating this view, however, there were other commentators who might
have laid a foundation for conceptualizing women's harassment on the job in
more encompassing terms. *1700
Carroll Brodsky's book, The Harassed Worker, [FN70] for example, was one of the
first sources to use the term "sexual harassment." [FN71] Brodsky was
a psychiatrist with a doctorate in anthropology who founded a work clinic at
the University of California School of Medicine. She based her analysis on more
than a thousand cases in which workers sought unemployment compensation on the
ground that harassment had left them unable to work. [FN72] Rather than
defining harassment as a form of sexual exploitation, Brodsky defined the
problem in broad, nonsexualized terms: "Harassment behavior involves
repeated and persistent attempts . . . to torment, wear down, frustrate, or get
a reaction from another. It is treatment that persistently provokes, pressures,
frightens, intimidates, or otherwise discomforts another person." [FN73]
She saw harassment as a means of competing for material resources and for the
respect accorded those who "have it made": "Harassment is a
mechanism for achieving exclusion and protection of privilege in situations
where there are no formal mechanisms available." [FN74] In Brodsky's
conception, harassment takes different forms, which vary with the occupational
setting and with the peculiar vulnerability of those who have been targeted for
victimhood; it includes teasing, joking and horseplay, scapegoating, name‑
calling, physical abuse, social isolation and exclusion, stepping up work
pressures, and sexual harassment. [FN75]
To Brodsky, the term "sexual
harassment" itself referred not only to sexual advances, but to all uses
of sexuality as a way of tormenting those who felt "discomfort about
discussing sex or relating sexually." [FN76] Indeed, sexual harassment by
her account included men teasing other men about sexual potency or interest.
[FN77] As this example makes clear, Brodsky did not see sexual harassment as
rooted in sexual desire or a need for sexual domination, [FN78] but rather in
the same motives as other nonsexual forms of harassment. In Brodsky's
conception, harassment could be directed not only top‑ down, from
supervisor to subordinate, but also horizontally, from peer to peer, and even
bottom‑up, from subordinate to boss [FN79]‑‑because
competition for privilege occurs in all these directions.
*1701 Although there were legal parallels to racial harassment that
would have justified broad conceptualization of sex‑based harassment in
Brodsky's terms, [FN80] early feminist ideas and emerging Title VII case law
worked together to inspire lawyers and activists to articulate the sexual
desire‑ dominance paradigm. Early feminists were unified about the need
to expose and hold men accountable for the intimate violations that for too
long had been rationalized as beyond reach as part of the private sphere.
[FN81] They founded organizations that provided research and support, which
empowered lawyers to initiate litigation challenging workplace harassment.
[FN82] Most of the earliest Title VII cases challenging on‑the‑job
harassment involved precisely the sort of top‑down, supervisor‑subordinate,
male‑female sexual extortion envisioned by feminist radicals. Both the
facts of these cases and the need to refute judges' reasoning contributed
toward shaping the understanding of sexual harassment exhibited in the sexual
desire‑dominance paradigm.
2.
Early Quid Pro Quo Harassment Cases
Women lost some of the first Title VII cases
challenging harassment. [FN83] These
cases involved the by‑now‑familiar fact pattern: Female plaintiffs
complained that they had been fired or mistreated for refusing their male
superiors' sexual advances. Although there were a few doctrinal twists, early
courts tended to reject the plaintiffs' claims by reasoning that the women's
adverse treatment occurred because of their refusal to engage in sexual affairs
with their supervisors and not "because of sex" within the meaning of
the statute. [FN84] This reasoning reflected the view of sexual relations as a
private *1702 phenomenon not
amenable to public scrutiny that feminists were intent on repudiating. By
treating sexual advances as a purely personal matter beyond the scope of legal
inquiry, courts refused to acknowledge that the sphere of sexuality can be
infused with gender discrimination‑‑in other words, that sexual
relations can be an arena in which people are disadvantaged because of their
identities as women or men.
Drawing on feminist ideas, lawyers responded
to this reasoning with arguments explaining why unwanted sexual advances should
be seen as discrimination because of sex. In one of the earliest law review
pieces on sex‑based harassment, feminist Kerri Weisel argued that sexual
harassment was due to gender "based either on the presumption that the
supervisor is heterosexual, or [on] the belief that sexual harassment reflects
a general stereotyped view of women, or both." [FN85] Weisel first argued
that the law should presume that a male supervisor who harasses a female
employee is heterosexual and that the supervisor's heterosexuality supplies an
inference that the harassment is gender‑based. [FN86] This argument
assumed that harassment consists of sexual advances driven by sexual desire.
Otherwise, there would be no reason why a heterosexual man would be any more
likely than a homosexual or bisexual man to harass a woman worker. If harassment
were a means of competing for privilege, as in Brodsky's model, gay or bisexual
men would be just as likely as heterosexual men to harass their female
coworkers.
Weisel's second argument confirmed this
desire‑based interpretation. She argued that the law should presume that
a supervisor's harassment amounts to illegal stereotyping of women as sexual
objects, unless the supervisor shows that he is bisexual. [FN87] Under this
argument, a heterosexual male supervisor's sexual advances toward a woman would
be based on gender because he would not have made such advances toward‑‑and
thereby stereotyped as an object of sexual desire‑‑a male employee.
Similarly, a homosexual male supervisor's sexual advances toward a man would be
based on gender because the supervisor would not have made such advances toward‑‑and
sexually stereotyped‑‑a female employee. Weisel's tying of the
supervisor's presumed heterosexuality to the presumed illegal stereotyping
reveals that, in her *1703 analysis,
heterosexual male sexual desire was closely aligned with male domination. Thus,
even though her analysis included the possibility of harassment by a gay
supervisor, what she really had in mind was harassment of a woman by a
heterosexual male supervisor. [FN88] Like most feminists of the day, Weisel
assumed that heterosexual male sexual advances were the core of sexual
harassment, that such advances were driven by sexual motivations, and that such
motivations supplied an inference of gender discrimination.
This line of reasoning was soon adopted by
the courts. Barnes v. Costle [FN89] was
one of the first cases to adopt it. Paulette Barnes was stripped of her job
because she refused her supervisor's sexual advances. The district court rejected
her claim and held that she was discriminated against, "not because she
was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her
supervisor." [FN90] The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed. Writing for the court, Judge Robinson concluded that Barnes's
firing had occurred "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII
because Barnes's "job was conditioned upon submission to sexual relations‑‑an
exaction which the supervisor would not have sought from any male." [FN91]
In a puzzling passage, Judge Robinson
claimed that his conclusion "stemmed not from the fact that what [her
boss] demanded was sexual activity‑‑which of itself is
immaterial," but solely from the fact that "but for her gender she
would not have been opportuned." [FN92] Yet, Robinson proceeded to justify
his conclusion with the observation that "there is no suggestion that
[the] allegedly amorous supervisor is other than heterosexual." [FN93]
Thus, his *1704 analysis came full
circle: That the conduct was sexual in nature was irrelevant, he claimed,
because the salient inquiry was whether it was directed toward one sex but not
another. Yet, the only basis for inferring that the conduct would not have been
directed at a male employee was precisely the fact that the conduct consisted
of sexual advances, advances which the court coded through a matrix of
heterosexual desire. Had Barnes's supervisor yelled at her or insulted her
intelligence, the court would have had a much more difficult, if not
impossible, time concluding that such conduct would not have been directed at a
man. Thus, in spite of the court's own effort to ground the decision in
analysis based on gender rather than on the sexual content of the conduct, the
decision equated the pursuit of heterosexual sexual relations with gender
discrimination.
Barnes ushered in the new legal paradigm.
Its reasoning formed the basis for recognizing quid pro quo harassment‑‑a
supervisor's attempt to condition employment benefits on sexual favors‑‑as
a violation of Title VII. Within three years, at least two other courts of
appeals had followed its reasoning. [FN94] In addition, the EEOC issued a
comprehensive set of guidelines on sex‑based harassment. [FN95] These
guidelines not only prohibited the quid pro quo harassment involved in Barnes,
but also approved the notion of hostile work environment harassment. [FN96]
These trends established a paradigm for
understanding workplace harassment. To the extent that this paradigm
acknowledged that gender discrimination can take the form of sexual advances
and exploitation, it represented progress. But to the extent that it went
beyond this recognition to define sexual advances and gender‑based
harassment as coextensive, it portended problems. The EEOC guidelines, for
example, could be read to limit the universe of gender‑based harassment
to sexual conduct. According to the guidelines, harassment involved:
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature." [FN97] Published around the same
time as the EEOC guidelines, Catharine
*1705 MacKinnon's book on sexual harassment law further conflated sexual
exploitation and gender inequality. [FN98] Articulating the new line within
cultural‑radical feminism, MacKinnon argued that harassment is problematic
precisely because it is sexual in nature‑‑and because heterosexual
sexual relations are the primary mechanism through which male dominance and
female subordination are maintained. [FN99] In MacKinnon's words, "A major
substantive element in the social meaning of masculinity, what men learn makes
them 'a man,' is sexual conquest of women; in turn, women's femininity is
defined in terms of acquiescence to male sexual advances." [FN100] To
MacKinnon, gender and sexuality were coextensive: The inequality between men
and women was constructed primarily through sexual relations, and sexuality had
no significant existence outside gender hierarchy. [FN101]
With these developments, the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm was firmly in place. Forged of noble intentions by feminists and
sympathetic legal reformers, the paradigm would have serious consequences for
the development of Title VII harassment law‑‑and for the women and
men who needed the law's protection from forms of harassment that did not fit
easily within its parameters.
*1706 C. An Illustration from the Case
Law
The Seventh Circuit's decision in King v.
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System [FN102] provides an
illustration of how courts have utilized the prevailing paradigm to limit Title
VII law. Katherine King was an assistant professor of occupational therapy who
was denied tenure at the University of Wisconsin‑Milwaukee (UWM). The
very first semester King began teaching, her assistant dean, Steven Sonstein,
"began making suggestive innuendoes as well as leering at her in a
sexually suggestive fashion." [FN103] As the semester wore on, he
"became progressively more bold and offensive with respect to his sexual
behavior toward King. He repeatedly leered at King and would from time to time
touch her, rub up against her, place objects between her legs, make suggestive
remarks and comment upon various parts of her body." [FN104] Sonstein's
behavior, which "was blatant enough for other faculty members to notice
and comment upon," [FN105] culminated in a sexual assault. At the
department's annual Christmas party, Sonstein followed King into a bathroom,
told her he "had to have her," and forcibly kissed and fondled her.
[FN106] After King "discussed the problem with Sonstein," he falsely
accused her of using UWM photocopying equipment for personal use, a serious
charge of which King was eventually cleared. [FN107] She later filed a formal
complaint of sexual harassment against Sonstein within the university; as part
of the settlement, Sonstein was to abstain from voting on matters relating to
King's appointment. [FN108]
King also alleged that the director of the
occupational therapy program, Franklin Stein, had contributed to the hostile
work environment at UWM. Stein's hostility, however, took a nonsexual form:
Over the course of a six‑year period, he created conditions that
undermined her ability to do her job and made it difficult for her to get
tenure. According to King, Stein gave her a heavier workload and a lower
salary; he subjected her to an unprecedented number of teaching evaluations; he
gave her poor appraisals; he mistreated her during faculty meetings; he
interfered with the tenure process; and he attempted to limit her research time
and increase her teaching load. At trial, "King supported these
allegations with a variety of incidents occurring over the six year period she
was with UWM." [FN109] For example, Stein sought to defund *1707 a grant she had received to
allow her to buy time for research by hiring a substitute to teach her courses.
Subsequently, Stein insisted on presenting King's file to the tenure committee
over King's objection that Stein would fail to present it in a favorable light.
King's concern appears to have been well‑founded, for Stein voted against
her on the tenure committee. The committee found that she had failed to meet
the department's tenure standards, "whether it was because of
discriminatory treatment or her own failings." [FN110]
Although a jury held Stein, Sonstein, and
UWM liable for engaging in discriminatory treatment of King and creating a
hostile work environment based on her sex, [FN111] the district court
overturned the jury's verdict on all but the harassment claim against Sonstein.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals distinguished Sonstein's
sexual misconduct from the other nonsexual mistreatment directed at King. For
purposes of King's hostile work environment harassment claim, the court
considered only the sexual conduct: "Sonstein repeatedly verbally assaulted
King, fondled her, and at one point, physically attacked her. His advances were
unwelcome and he was so told." [FN112] By contrast, the court analyzed the
nonsexual hostility directed at King‑‑ including Stein's imposition
of "workload and salary disparities, lack of guidance, and unequal
treatment during the tenure/contract renewal process," [FN113] and
Sonstein's false accusation of personal photocopying and interference with
King's ability to satisfy the tenure requirements‑‑not under the
hostile work environment claim, but under a separate discriminatory treatment
claim. [FN114]
According to the court, the difference
between disparate treatment and hostile work environment harassment is that
whereas "claims of disparate treatment must affect the terms or conditions
of employment," [FN115] in a hostile work environment claim, "a loss
of a tangible job benefit is not necessary since the harassment itself affects
the terms or conditions of employment" (so *1708 long as it is sufficiently severe or pervasive). [FN116] Yet
this doctrinal distinction provided no reasoned basis for distinguishing the
sexual conduct from the nonsexual conduct. Neither class of conduct‑‑from
Sonstein's sexual assault on King to Stein's efforts to limit her research time‑‑in
and of itself effected a formal job loss like the decision to deny King tenure.
Moreover, King alleged that both sets of conduct created conditions that
undermined her status and performance on the job and made it difficult for her
to satisfy the tenure requirements. The court simply took for granted that
hostile work environment harassment refers to "sexual" harassment,
which the court envisioned as sexual advances. As a result, the court had
little difficulty concluding that Sonstein's sexual overtures constituted
hostile work environment harassment that violated Title VII. [FN117]
The King court made explicit the implicit
premise of Barnes v. Costle and other early quid pro quo harassment cases: It
is the presence of heterosexual desire that indicates an allegedly harassing
action was taken "because of sex" within the meaning of the law.
Sonstein argued that "his actions were merely the result of his desire for
King as an individual and, therefore, were not sex‑based
harassment." [FN118] Although the Seventh Circuit might have responded to
this argument in any number of ways, it responded as the D.C. Circuit had in
Barnes, by defining sexual desire as the sine qua non of gender‑based
harassment:
This argument . . . misses the point.
Sonstein wanted to have an affair, a liaison, illicit sex, a forbidden
relationship. His actions are not consistent with platonic love. His actions
were based on her gender and motivated by his libido.
. . . Sonstein's sexual desire does not
negate his intent; rather it affirmatively establishes it. [FN119]
The court's analysis foreshadowed that it
would rule against King on her other claims. Once the court had disaggregated
the sexual advances from the other offending conduct, it became difficult to
envision the discriminatory character of the nonsexual conduct. Even though a
jury found in King's favor on her disparate treatment claims, the court of
appeals upheld the lower court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
rejecting the finding that Stein had subjected King to workload and salary
disparities based on her gender. The appellate court acknowledged being
"troubled" by King's "other, more nebulous" allegations of
discriminatory treatment by Stein‑‑such as his limiting her
research time and negatively presenting her tenure case‑‑but *1709 concluded that "no term,
condition or privilege of employment was affected as a result of these
actions" [FN120] because King had failed to prove that any of them
"caused her failure to meet the requirements for contract renewal."
[FN121] Similarly, even if Sonstein's false accusation that King had engaged in
personal photocopying did amount to discrimination, "King did not prove
that she lost a job benefit . . . as a result of this incident." [FN122]
Although King protested that all the discriminatory treatment‑‑taken
together‑‑had psychologically and materially disabled her from
satisfying the tenure requirements, the court rejected this argument as well.
[FN123]
The court's analysis placed King (and other
plaintiffs) in a Catch‑22. The concept of a hostile work environment was
developed out of an awareness that some actions by supervisors or coworkers can
create an atmosphere that undermines "'the right to participate in the
work place on [an] equal footing,"' [FN124] even though these actions may
not affect any tangible job benefit. [FN125] Many of the nonsexual actions
against King fell within this category. Yet, because the court envisioned
conduct driven by sexual desire to be the quintessential harassment, it refused
to consider the nonsexual actions under a hostile work environment framework.
Once it had relegated such actions to a disparate treatment framework, the
plaintiff was bound to lose: The court assumed that incidents must affect a
tangible job benefit in order for a plaintiff to prevail under a disparate
treatment framework, yet it had consigned to that framework incidents that on
their face failed to qualify. The only basis the court had for consigning those
incidents to a disparate treatment framework was their lack of sexual content.
Had the court considered both the sexual and
nonsexual conduct under an integrated framework, it might have seen the truth
through King's (and the jury's) eyes. From King's perspective, the assistant
dean's sexual advances and his eventual retaliation against King were only some
of the many manifestations of the UWM occupational therapy department's failure
to take women seriously as scholars and equals. Through a variety of actions,
both subtle and obvious, King felt she was denied the research support,
mentoring, collegiality, and respect that signal a faculty's belief in an
assistant professor's promise. Taken together, Sonstein's and Stein's actions
communicated to King that she was "different" and not quite good
enough. In the end, these actions became a self‑fulfilling prophecy: King
claimed that they had "caused her to be permanently psychologically
disabled, thereby preventing her from fulfilling *1710 the tenure requirements or obtaining another job elsewhere
in academics." [FN126] By undermining her ability to meet the tenure
standards and driving her out of the department, Sonstein's and Stein's actions
reinforced the notion that women are less capable intellects who do not belong
in their department.
The Seventh Circuit's decision is
characteristic of the way in which the federal courts have handled claims like
those made by King. Wittingly or unwittingly, judicial embrace of the sexual
desire‑dominance paradigm has led courts to envision sexual advances as
the quintessential harassment. This view, in turn, has led to doctrinal
developments that have distorted the law and limited its capacity to address
very real forms of gender‑based hostility experienced by women at work. I
discuss these developments in the next two parts.
II.
The Sexualization of the Hostile Work Environment
To a large extent, the courts have
restricted the conception of hostile work environment harassment to male‑female
sexual advances and other explicitly sexualized actions perceived to be driven
by sexual designs. In doing so, courts have created a framework that is
underinclusive. By defining the essence of harassment as sexual advances, the
paradigm has obscured‑‑and excluded‑‑some of the most
pervasive forms of gender hostility experienced on a day‑to‑day
basis by many women (and men) in the workplace. I begin with a description of
the influence of the paradigm at the Supreme Court level, and then analyze its
development within the lower federal courts. [FN127]
A.
The Supreme Court's Decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., [FN128]
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to expand the legal understanding of
hostile work environment harassment. Theresa Harris was the rental manager in a
company that sold, leased, and repaired forklift equipment. She was one of only
two female managers; the other was the daughter of the company president,
Charles Hardy. During Harris's tenure, Hardy subjected her to various treatment
undermining her authority as a manager, such as denying her an individual
office, a company car, and a car allowance; paying her on a different basis
from the other managers; refusing to give her more than a cursory annual
review; and forcing her to bring coffee into meetings, which he never asked male
managers *1711 to do. Hardy made it
plain that he considered women inadequate as managers. He frequently denigrated
the plaintiff in front of other employees with such remarks as, "You're a
woman, what do you know"; "You're a dumb ass woman"; and "We
need a man as the rental manager." [FN129] Hardy made other comments that
demeaned Harris as a professional, suggesting that the two of them go to the
Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise and intimating that she must have promised
sex to a client in order to obtain an account. In addition, Hardy denigrated
Harris's managerial role by subjecting her to the same sort of sophomoric,
sexually oriented conduct that he directed at lower‑level women employees
(but not male employees), such as asking her to retrieve coins from his front
pocket and making suggestive comments about her clothing. [FN130]
Despite Hardy's conduct, the district court
adopted the magistrate's conclusion that the harassment did not rise to the
level of a hostile work environment. [FN131] The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Harris's appeal to the Supreme Court emphasized only one aspect of the case:
Harris urged that the lower court had erred in requiring her to prove that the
harassment had seriously affected her psychological well‑being or
otherwise caused her psychological injury. The Supreme Court found for Harris,
rejecting the lower court's narrow subjective psychological harm requirement
and holding that a plaintiff need show only that a reasonable person would have
perceived, as Harris did, that the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment. [FN132]
In focusing on the abstract standards,
however, both the Supreme Court and the lawyers failed to address the real
problem in the case: the lower court's application of those standards from an
overly narrow, sexualized perspective. The magistrate made the classic
analytical move made by courts that have adopted the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm: disaggregation. He began by parceling out the sexual and nonsexual
conduct into separate claims. The nonsexual conduct, such as denying Harris a
car, car allowance, office, and annual review, was not considered part of the
harassment claim, but was examined under a separate claim of disparate treatment.
[FN133] For purposes of the hostile work environment claim, the magistrate
concluded that only *1712 Hardy's
"sexually crude comments" met the EEOC guidelines' definition of
actionable harassment. [FN134] After limiting his focus to these comments, the
magistrate then trivialized them by emphasizing that they did not sufficiently
resemble the sexual advances at the core of the sexual desire‑ dominance
paradigm. The Holiday Inn comment, for instance, was a bad joke, "but it
was not a sexual proposition." [FN135] According to the magistrate,
Harris's harassment was similar to that of another Sixth Circuit plaintiff who
had also been subjected to harassment that was "vulgar and crude,"
but who lost because "the sexual conduct was not in the form of sexual propositions
or physical touching." [FN136] Winning cases "involved sexual
harassment . . . in the form of requests for sexual relations or actual
offensive touching." [FN137] Thus, it was the comparison of Harris's
mistreatment to an imagined case of sexual advances that led the magistrate and
the lower courts to conclude that the mistreatment was not sufficiently
injurious to be actionable.
Harris provided a clear opportunity to
transcend this unduly restrictive focus. The case presented a chance to expand
the concept of hostile work environment harassment to include allconduct that
is rooted in gender‑based expectations about work roles and to recognize
that harassment functions as a way of undermining women's perceived competence
as workers. From such a perspective, Charles Hardy's conduct looks like the
central sex discrimination that Title VII was intended to dismantle. Taken
together, Hardy's conduct‑‑from the "sexual" conduct that
reduced Harris to a sexual object as she struggled to fulfill her work role, to
the nonsexual but gender‑biased conduct that denigrated her capacity to
serve as a manager, to the facially gender‑neutral conduct that denied
her the perks, privileges, and respect she needed to do her job well‑‑had
the purpose and effect of undermining Harris's status and authority as a
manager on the basis of her sex. These actions fit a classic pattern of
harassment often directed at women who try to claim male‑dominated work
as their own. [FN138] Yet, neither the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, the
district court, Harris's counsel, [FN139] nor most amici curiae [FN140] saw the
case in these terms or even perceived the magistrate's *1713 narrow obsession with the lack of direct sexual advances on
Harris as problematic.
B.
Disaggregation in the Lower Courts
The lower court's decision in Harris and the
Seventh Circuit's decision in King v. Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System exemplify the most prominent feature of hostile work
environment jurisprudence: the disaggregation of sexual advances and other
conduct that courts consider "sexual" in nature from other gender‑based
mistreatment that judges consider nonsexual. Although disaggregation of the
sexual from the nonsexual occurs in different doctrinal contexts, [FN141]
typically it arises in connection with allocating the challenged conduct to
different claims for purposes of deciding
*1714 whether the conduct violates Title VII. Courts decide, explicitly or
implicitly, that only overtly sexual conduct counts toward establishing hostile
work environment harassment and that nonsexual conduct must be considered‑‑if
at all‑‑as a separate form of disparate treatment.
1.
Hostile Work Environment Versus Disparate Treatment
The disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual
conduct was not inevitable, for hostile work environment harassment emerged as
a variant of disparate treatment. [FN142] The essence of a hostile work
environment claim is that actions for which the defendant is responsible have
made the work environment more difficult for women (or men) because of their
sex. Indeed, the original impetus behind creating the cause of action was to
ensure that the prohibition against discrimination extended to actions that did
not in and of themselves effect a tangible job detriment. The first decision
that articulated the concept of hostile work environment harassment, Rogers v.
EEOC, [FN143] demonstrates this point. In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit held that a
Hispanic worker's allegation that her optometrist employers had discriminated against
her on the basis of national origin by segregating patients along ethnic lines
stated a Title VII violation sufficient to support an EEOC investigation.
Although the optometrists' actions toward their patients did not affect the
complainant's or any other employee's job in any tangible economic sense, the
court recognized that working in a place where members of one's group are
subjected to discriminatory service may create an atmosphere of inferiority and
discrimination for minority workers. In a passage that laid the conceptual
foundation for the hostile work environment harassment claim, the court
concluded that
employees' psychological as well as
economic fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse,
and that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
[in Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination. [FN144] The
Supreme Court extended this reasoning to cover sex‑based hostile work
environments in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. [FN145]
Despite the origin of hostile work environment harassment in the law of
disparate treatment, courts have developed analyses that distinguish the two
causes of action and endow each with a life of its own; to many courts, the *1715 two claims have become
"factually and legally distinct." [FN146] Although Rogers was meant
to clarify that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" covers any type of employment‑related
action, regardless of whether the accompanying harm is psychological, economic,
or otherwise, some courts have held that disparate treatment claims are
confined to supervisor actions that effect a tangible job detriment. [FN147]
Other courts have gone even further to demand proof that the alleged misconduct
constituted an "ultimate employment decision," [FN148] such as
hiring, firing, pay, or promotion denial. The cause of action for hostile work
environment harassment, however, was devised precisely to cover situations that
do not affect the plaintiffs' jobs in any tangible or ultimate sense. As a
result, there is no requirement that alleged hostile work environment *1716 harassment affect an ultimate
employment decision. Instead, plaintiffs are required to prove two alternative
elements: First, they must show that the harassment is "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment"; [FN149] and second, they must also
prove that the employer is responsible legally for the challenged misconduct.
[FN150]
Judges
have also created another distinction between hostile work environment
harassment and disparate treatment: They have sexualized the hostile work
environment claim by singling out sexual advances and other sexually oriented
conduct as the essence of harassment. To establish a hostile work environment,
most courts have required proof not only that the harassing conduct occurred
"because of sex"‑‑the standard causation inquiry that is
essential to any Title VII discrimination claim including disparate treatment
[FN151] ‑‑but also that the conduct is sexual in nature.
2. "Sexual" Versus
"Nonsexual" Conduct
Many
courts have relied explicitly on the nonsexual character of the alleged
misconduct to dismiss altogether plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims.
In Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., [FN152] for example, a court granted summary
judgment against the hostile work environment claim of a woman who complained
that her foreman harassed her by "picking on [her] all the time" and
treating her differently from the male employees. [FN153] According to the
judge, "[T] here [were] no facts which would support a finding of sexual
harassment as that term has come to be used in employment discrimination *1717 law." [FN154] The court
rested this conclusion on the fact that the "[p]laintiff was not subjected
to harassment of a sexual nature. The foreman did not demand sexual relations,
he did not touch her or make sexual jokes." [FN155] Although not bound by
them, the court cited the EEOC guidelines, which define harassment as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature." [FN156] According to the court:
[T]he guidelines provide insight into the nature of a sexual harassment
theory. The theory rests upon conduct which can be characterized as sexual.
"Sex" in this instance does not mean gender. Rather, it is used
pursuant to its more popular meaning. Thus, while the harassment may be
directed at a member of the female sex, it is a harassment which plays upon the
stereotypical role of the female as a sexual object. [FN157] To buttress its
conclusion, the court appealed to the authority of Professor MacKinnon:
"Sexual harassment has been defined as 'the unwanted imposition of sexual
requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."' [FN158]
Turley
exemplifies the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm with exceptional
clarity. Other cases, however, have adopted similar reasoning. In Walker v.
Sullair Corp., [FN159] for example, the court dismissed a hostile work
environment claim with this explanation:
Sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment exists where there are sexual advances, fondling or a sexually
suggestive workplace atmosphere that the claimant finds unwelcome. . . . Walker
has offered no proof of an unwelcome touching or fondling. . . . Rather, the
conduct alleged included close monitoring of the attendance of the plaintiff,
monitoring of personal phone calls, public reprimands for poor job performance
and various other nonsexual harassment. [FN160] Likewise, in Hosemann v.
Technical Materials, Inc., [FN161] the court dismissed the plaintiff's
allegations that one of her coworkers had sabotaged her work and "always .
. . tried to make her do her work poorly," [FN162] that another had
"'embarrassed [her] every work day . . . by not talking very good about *1718 females,"' [FN163] and that her supervisors
had badgered her with daily phone calls about when she would return to work
while she was recovering from an injury, even though her male coworkers had
been permitted reasonable disability leaves. [FN164] The court concluded that
the plaintiff had not alleged "sexual harassment as that term has come to
be defined." [FN165]
Many other cases have held expressly that
conduct that is not sexual in nature does not‑‑and cannot‑‑constitute
hostile work environment harassment. [FN166] Indeed, in a number of circuits,
an element of the cause of action for hostile work environment harassment is
proof of unwelcome sexual advances or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature. [FN167] In other cases, the emphasis on sexual conduct is less
explicit. Instead of dismissing plaintiffs' claims before trial, some courts
have ruled against plaintiffs after trial on the ground that the challenged
conduct is not sufficiently sexual to comprise a hostile work environment.
[FN168] In these cases, plaintiffs lose on the *1719 severity or pervasiveness element rather than on the sexual
conduct element.
The underlying reasoning of these cases is
that the conduct does not sufficiently resemble sexual advances‑‑or
does not seem sufficiently motivated by sexual interest‑‑to be
actionable. In Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc., [FN169] for example, five former
waitresses alleged that their manager, Zavonar, and some of their male
coworkers had subjected them to grossly abusive conduct because of their sex.
Concluding that "only shocking and pervasive sexually oriented misconduct
amount[s] to a Title VII violation," [FN170] the court did not consider
whether all the alleged misconduct together had created a hostile work
environment. Instead, the court analyzed each incident separately and ruled
against the plaintiffs on all but one of their claims. The plaintiffs claimed,
for example, that Zavonar had a habit of putting his arm around them and
letting his arm and hands fall close to their chests. The court dismissed such
conduct based on Zavonar's statement that "[i]f he did it, . . . it was
done without sexual designs." [FN171] One woman complained that she had
been inadequately trained and had therefore received a poor performance report.
When she cried about this in Zavonar's office, he allegedly pulled her close
and said he "would train her his way" [FN172] in a "tone of
voice [that] was anything but comforting." [FN173] Although Zavonar
conceded that he did "grasp [ this plaintiff] by the shoulders in an
attempt to calm her down and stop her crying," the court dismissed
Zavonar's assault, ratifying his claim that "he never intended it to be a
sexual proposition." [FN174] The plaintiffs also claimed that Zavonar
"had a 'filthy' mouth, . . . often calling waitresses 'bitches,' [and]
telling them to 'get off their lazy damn asses."' [FN175] Although the
plaintiffs clearly objected to this conduct, the court dismissed their
objections with the observation that "none of the plaintiffs testified
that Zavonar's profanity was sexually abusive." [FN176] Finally, with
respect to three of the plaintiffs, the court emphasized that Zavonar had not
committed quid pro quo harassment. As the court explained in reference to one
of these women, "Plaintiff admitted that *1720 Zavonar never demanded sex from her as a condition for
keeping her job. . . . [He] neither propositioned her nor talked explicitly
about sex to her." [FN177]
Other courts have been even more subtle. In
perhaps the largest group of cases, courts have simply taken for granted that
nonsexual conduct cannot contribute toward establishing a hostile work
environment. These courts have merely proceeded, without analysis, to examine
only the sexually explicit conduct for the hostile work environment claim and
to consider the nonsexual conduct, if at all, under a separate disparate
treatment analysis‑‑each in isolation from the other. [FN178] As I
discuss more fully below, such approaches drain harassment law of its ability
to address the full range of gender‑based hostility at work.
C. The Harms of
Disaggregation
The problem with disaggregation should be
obvious by now. It weakens the plaintiff's case and distorts the law's
understanding of the hostile work environment by obscuring a full view of the
culture and conditions of the workplace. Both the hostile work environment and
the disparate treatment *1721 claims
are trivialized. When removed from the larger discriminatory context, the
sexual conduct can appear insignificant. For this reason, courts often conclude
that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive work environment.
[FN179]
By the same token, when women are denied the
training, information, and support they need to succeed on the job, or when
they are subjected to threatening or alienating acts that undermine their
confidence and sense of belonging, they can easily be made to appear (or even
become) less than fully proficient at their jobs. This lack of proficiency then
becomes the nondiscriminatory reason that justifies the hostile treatment that
has undermined their competence. Furthermore, when separated from sexual
advances and other sexual conduct, the nonsexual actions may appear to be
gender‑neutral forms of hazing with which the law should not interfere.
For these reasons, courts frequently rule against plaintiffs on the ground that
acts were not directed at them because of their sex. [FN180]
What is more, some nonsexual forms of
hostility escape judicial scrutiny altogether. They appear as insufficiently
sexual to be analyzed as hostile work environment harassment, and too remotely
related to a tangible job benefit to constitute disparate treatment. [FN181]
Harmful acts of hazing and harassment frequently fall between the cracks of
legal analysis altogether. [FN182]
*1722 Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center [FN183] provides
an illustration. Margaret Reynolds, a female journeyman electrician, claimed
that she had been subjected to a campaign of constant harassment after she was
named subforeman for a construction job at Atlantic City's convention center.
The harassment did not take the form of sexual advances or other sexually
oriented conduct. Instead, it consisted of conduct that challenged Reynolds's
authority and right to be subforeman. The men refused to work for her and stood
around laughing while she unloaded heavy boxes. They engaged in a work stoppage‑‑some
even quit their jobs‑‑so as not to submit to the authority of a
woman. She not only was "harassed constantly with verbal abuse and obscene
gestures," [FN184] but also complained of "the tenseness of the job,
looks we were getting, people not talking to us, leaving the room, things of
that effect." [FN185] Reynolds's shop steward was also part of the
problem. He refused to obtain locks for the shower she and her lone female
coworker shared; and when Reynolds and the other woman complained to the shop
steward about the lack of disability benefits, he "told them the men had
not complained to him about benefits, and the women should quit if they did not
like the lack of benefits." [FN186] Finally, when a client exhibitor
demanded that Reynolds and the other female electrician be removed from the
floor during the Miss America Pageant‑‑apparently the incongruity
between the images of the pageant contestants and the tradeswomen was too much
for the exhibitor‑‑Reynolds and her colleague were replaced by a
male coworker. At the end of the pageant, the convention center's director
fired the whole crew and hired all but the plaintiff and a few others back the
next day, with a man as the new subforeman. Reynolds alleged "that the
entire crew was fired to enable the Center to . . . fire her because she was a
woman and the Center wanted a male subforeman." [FN187]
Although Reynolds herself considered all
these actions to be forms of harassment that established a hostile work
environment, [FN188] the court relied on the EEOC guidelines to conclude that
only conduct of a "sexual nature" could count. The court first
bifurcated the "obscene gestures and words" it considered
"sexual harassment" from the incidents it characterized as
"other *1723 harassment."
[FN189] Because the "sexual harassment" included only one coworker
giving the plaintiff the finger, another shaking his crotch at her, and two
others calling her offensive names, the court concluded that it was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. [FN190] The court next
examined the "other harassment," analyzing "each incident individually
to determine first whether it was sexual in nature." [FN191] According to
the court, none of the challenged incidents provided evidence of a hostile work
environment: [FN192] "While her male co‑workers may have refused to
work for her because she was a woman, such refusal is not 'verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature' and so does not figure into the calculus of a
sexually offensive working environment." [FN193] The court examined each
of Reynolds' allegations one by one and rejected them all based on this line of
reasoning.
Given the court's approach, it was a
foregone conclusion that the court would grant summary judgment against
Reynolds on her hostile work environment claim. Further, even though the court
held that the nonsexual incidents were not part of a hostile work environment
claim, it did not address any of these incidents, other than the plaintiff's
firing, under a separate disparate treatment analysis. The nonsexual
mistreatment evaded legal analysis and liability‑‑ despite a concession
by the court that some of this conduct may have been directed at Reynolds
because of her sex. [FN194]
The court also granted summary judgment
against Reynolds on her discriminatory discharge claim, holding that no
reasonable jury could conclude that the crew had been let go out of a desire to
get rid of the plaintiff as subforeman because of her sex. [FN195] In light of
the court's approach, this result is not surprising: Only by considering the
decision to fire Reynolds in the context of the earlier actions to undermine
her position as subforeman could the firing have emerged as part of a gender‑based
pattern to drive her away from the job. Yet, the court not only failed to link
her discharge claim with these earlier incidents of harassment, but it also
deemed a previous statement by the union business manager too remote to count
as direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Only a year earlier, when the
foreman who eventually named Reynolds as subforeman had proposed naming her to
that position, the business manager proclaimed: "[N]ow is not the time,
the place or the year or will it ever be the year for a woman foreman."
[FN196]
*1724 Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. [FN197] provides another
example of this disaggregation. Maxine Scott was hired as an auto mechanic
trainee by Sears as part of a program initiated by the Chicago Alliance of
Business and Employment Training to train women in nontraditional fields; her
position was subsidized by federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) funds. After a brief twelve‑week training course, she was placed
under the supervision of a senior mechanic, Eddie Gadberry, who was to give her
on‑the‑job training in repairing brakes. Gadberry treated her as
his plaything and did not train her: He "repeatedly propositioned her,
would wink at her and also suggested he give her a rub‑down."
[FN198] Moreover, "when she asked for advice or assistance, Gadberry would
often reply, 'what will I get for it?"' [FN199] Other mechanics followed
Gadberry's lead: One slapped her on the rear end, and another speculated about
her demeanor while having sex. When Scott's CETA subsidy ended, she was
dismissed (along with the only other female mechanic). Sears argued that Scott
was dismissed because she was less productive than the men. Scott argued that,
if so, her lower productivity stemmed from her inadequate training for brake
jobs (she had often been assigned to do more menial tire and battery work
instead).
The district court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff. [FN200] In an
analysis that resembled the approach in Reynolds, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals first considered Scott's hostile work environment claim,
and began by citing approvingly the EEOC guidelines' definition of harassment
as "conduct of a sexual nature." [FN201] More subtly, the court
trivialized Scott's experience by comparing it to a situation involving sexual
advances: "Scott admitted in her deposition [that] Gadberry never
explicitly asked her to have sex and never touched her. . . . Additionally,
there is no evidence of Gadberry becoming bitter due to Scott's refusal to
entertain his advances." [FN202] Measured against this standard, and
severed from Scott's allegation that the automotive department's failure to
take her seriously had led them to deprive her of appropriate training, the
conduct of the male mechanics appeared relatively inconsequential. The
appellate court therefore had little difficulty affirming the conclusion that
the "sexual" harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
establish a hostile work environment. [FN203]
Scott's complaint of inadequate training
also escaped review under a disparate treatment analysis. The court did not
analyze Scott's training allegation as a separate claim, but mentioned it only
in connection with her *1725
discriminatory discharge claim. [FN204] In response to Scott's contention that
any low productivity on her part was attributable to Sears's lack of training,
the court concluded simply that the "argument does not cut in her
favor." [FN205] The court's attempted explanation was circular: Scott's
claim of inadequate training did not excuse her lower productivity, said the
court, because Sears had "a legitimate business purpose in terminating the
underproductive . . . Scott." [FN206] Yet Scott had alleged that her
apparent underproductivity was the result of the discriminatory training and
harassment. The court's approach allowed it to avoid inquiring into this
allegation. For purposes of Scott's hostile work environment claim, the court
disregarded the alleged denial of training because it was not sexual in nature.
For purposes of the discriminatory firing claim, the court disregarded the
sexual overtures and what they may have signaled about the seriousness with
which Scott's coworkers took their responsibility to train her.
In fact, the court disregarded evidence
suggesting that the company's motives may have been less than pure. Sears did
not dispute that Scott's department manager, in discharging her, had commented
that "he didn't want to pay a woman $7 an hour when he could get a man to
do three brake jobs for that." [FN207] This comment suggested that the
manager held a stereotyped preconception of Scott as inherently less competent‑‑and
hence worth less in wages‑‑than a man. What is more, the comment
suggested that Sears was willing to employ Scott (and her female coworker) only
so long as CETA was footing the bill; when that funding ended, the woman's
worth was cast in a different light. Despite these implications, the court
dismissed the comment as an "isolated statement" that was
"insufficient in itself to indicate Scott was wrongfully terminated due to
her sex." [FN208]
As in Reynolds, Scott's disaggregation
worked to the plaintiff's disadvantage by portraying each challenged event as
an isolated and relatively innocuous incident. Had the court put all the pieces
together, Scott's story, like Reynolds's, would have emerged as familiar
examples of the problems frequently experienced by women in the trades: They
are rarely taken seriously as workers, and they are harassed in myriad ways in
order to remind them that even though they are doing a "man's job,"
they are still "different" and less competent. [FN209]
*1726 This dynamic also occurs in white‑collar settings.
[FN210] In such settings, courts may have even more difficulty comprehending
the significance of nonsexual harassment. We have already seen how the court in
King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System failed to
perceive the importance of nonsexual actions taken against an assistant
professor, even though it easily found sexual advances against her to be
actionable. [FN211] Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc. [FN212] provides a second
illustration. Sheila Stoudenmire was hired as a salesperson for Double Diamond,
a company that developed and sold property in a Texas lakeside community.
During Stoudenmire's interview, the manager, Larry Womack, told her he was
looking for a part‑time receptionist and secretary; Stoudenmire recommended
her younger sister, Beverly Ross. Womack hired Ross, and during her first hour
on the job, began to subject her to unwelcome sexual advances. He asked her if
she "fooled around," lined her up against a wall and told her to pull
up her dress so he could take her picture, and asked her to "pant"
for him on the telephone. [FN213] Later that evening, in a meeting with a group
of salespeople, Womack stood by while one of the men took a picture up Ross's
dress. The next day, Womack pulled Ross onto his lap and refused to let her go
until someone else entered his office. Later, after she refused an order to
"bend over" and clean up some mustard on the wall, he trapped her
against the closed door of his office. [FN214] The next day, Ross, Stoudenmire,
and another female salesperson complained about Womack's actions to the local
sheriff. The sheriff told them there was nothing he could do, but advised them
that they could complain to Womack's boss, to the district attorney, or to the
EEOC.
During this period, Stoudenmire was training
as a salesperson. Before Stoudenmire went to the sheriff, Womack had made only
one unseemly overture to her, commenting that "he bet she liked to wear
black boots and carry a whip in the bedroom." [FN215] After going to see
the sheriff, Stoudenmire approached Womack's boss, Robert Gray, to complain
about Womack. [FN216] Gray confronted Womack. Womack subsequently berated
Stoudenmire for going over his head and went after her by making it difficult
for her to *1727 complete her training:
"Womack required Stoudenmire to continue her studying as a sales trainee
in a separate room, away from the male trainees. In addition, Stoudenmire could
not take her training material home at the end of the day. She had been allowed
to take the material home in the past." [FN217] A few days later, when
Stoudenmire showed up for work, Womack told her that Ray Wylie, the vice
president of sales, wanted to speak to her on the telephone. Wylie told her
that she was "barking up the wrong tree" and that "we know how
to handle girls like you." [FN218] He threatened that if she pursued the
matter any further "she would lose her home and [her] husband would lose
his job." [FN219] He also threatened to "say that she tore off her
blouse . . . and tried to have Gray make love to her if she 'did anything
about' the . . . harassment." [FN220] Womack fired Stoudenmire and Ross
later thatday when, after calling the sheriff about Wylie's threats, they left
without permission.
The court's analysis of the two sisters' hostile
work environment claims reveals the influence of the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm. The court's discussion of the relevant precedent singled out sexual
advances as the most troubling type of harassment. [FN221] Against this
backdrop, the court had no difficulty finding that Ross's mistreatment
constituted actionable harassment. The court relied on the fact that Ross was
an innocent, young woman who had been subjected to sexual advances by an older,
more powerful male supervisor. [FN222] Indeed, the court's description of the
harassment emphasizes the extent to which a modest young woman like Ross would
experience humiliation and shame at the hands of experienced sexual predators
like Womack and the other men:
The Court is mindful that the sexual abuse
began on Ross' very first day on the job. Along with the general insecurity and
awkwardness that accompanies anyone's first day on the job, Ross was forced to
deal with the lewd comments and actions of her superiors. . . . Ross did
nothing to provoke or encourage such a comment. Womack had just met Ross for
the first time. . . .
During the same morning, Womack forced Ross
into another uncomfortable situation by telling her to pull up her dress so
that he could take a picture of her. Ross stated that she was scared of Womack
. . . and tried to pacify [[him] while retaining her dignity by just pulling
the dress up two inches to her knees. . . .
. . . .
*1728 . . . The torment which Ross experienced continued . . . .
Womack refused to give [this picture and the other picture taken up Ross's
dress by one of the salesmen] to Ross and refused to even allow Ross to see the
pictures. This caused Ross great torment. She did not know how revealing the
picture was that the salesman took up her dress. . . .
. . . .
. . . In addition, many of [Womack's and the
other harassers'] victims were young, between the ages of seventeen and twenty
three. The plaintiffs were twenty and twenty three years old. However, the
[men] who committed the acts were in their thirties or forties. This type of
situation lends itself to a finding that there was an abusive work environment.
[FN223]
In contrast to this extended analysis of
Ross's horror and degradation, the court refused even to speculate about how
Stoudenmire felt about her mistreatment. With notable lack of passion, the
court dryly recounted the incidents of which Stoudenmire complained and
concluded in summary fashion: "Title VII is not a shield which protects
people from all sexual discrimination. The type of conduct listed above does
not rise to the level of harassment which is actionable. It is not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment or create an abusive
work environment." [FN224]
From the tone of the opinion, it seems clear
that a number of facts blinded the court to the harm of the hostile and sexist
gestures directed at Stoudenmire. Stoudenmire's mistreatment did not consist of
sexual advances and other conduct the court could recognize as shame‑inducing;
Stoudenmire presented herself with an assertiveness that prevented the court
from seeing her as a hapless victim of worldly predators; and she had attempted
to join Double Diamond as a competitor to the men in the salesforce, unlike
Ross who had taken a job as an underling to Womack and the other men.
"From viewing the witnesses on the stand," observed the court,
"this Court finds that Stoudenmire was much more assertive than Ross.
Stoudenmire is Ross' older sister, and she was resolved to protecting both
herself and Ross." [FN225]
Although Stoudenmire won on her retaliation
claim, the court missed an opportunity to understand her mistreatment as sex‑based
harassment. That *1729 Stoudenmire's
situation strayed too far from the sexual desire‑ dominance paradigm
prevented the court from perceiving that Womack's campaign to undermine her
ability to pursue her chosen career alongside her male colleagues was as
harmful to her aspirations‑‑and to the larger aspiration of
integrating women into the workforce as full equals‑‑as the more
familiar sexual abuse experienced by her sister.
D. Sexual
Paternalism and the Unwelcomeness Requirement
Ross v. Double Diamond exemplifies another,
related problem engendered by the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm. By
focusing on sexual advances as the quintessential harassment, the paradigm
encourages courts to extend protection to women for the wrong reasons. Rather
than emphasizing the use of harassment law to promote women's empowerment and equality
as workers, it subtly appeals to judges to protect women's sexual virtue or
sensibilities.
This sexual paternalism is deeply
conservative; its benefits are limited to women imagined to possess the sexual
purity that renders them deserving of protection. Such protection historically
has been reserved for white, middle‑ class women who did not upset the
settled gender order by abandoning the domestic sphere for wage work or
politics. [FN226] Contemporary case law sometimes reproduces this legacy by
requiring plaintiffs to conform to the image of the "good victim" if
they are to receive legal protection. Ross v. Double Diamond suggests that, in
the eyes of some judges, even being an older, married woman who aspires to a
male‑dominated occupation is sufficient to remove a woman from the
court's protection.
The courts' application of the requirement
that sexual harassment be
"unwelcome" provides an even clearer illustration of this
exclusionary dynamic. [FN227] Reed v. Shepard, [FN228] for example, involved a
woman who worked as a civilian jailer. Her position was created by the
sheriff's department in 1976 as a step down from the male‑only deputy
sheriff position, allegedly for the purpose of conserving funds. In addition to
alleging the "customary complaints concerning discrimination in pay,
promotion and benefits," Reed alleged that she was discriminatorily denied
locker and restroom facilities and that "she was required to perform
onerous duties in addition to . . . tasks relating to the management of the
jail." [FN229] These claims were consigned to a separate disparate
treatment analysis. For purposes of the hostile work environment claim, the
Seventh Circuit focused on the behavior of Reed's male coworkers:
"Plaintiff contends that she was
handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors, that she was subjected to
suggestive remarks . . ., that conversations often centered around oral sex,
that she was physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head was
grabbed and forcefully placed in members' laps, and that she was the subject of
lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that she had chairs pulled out from under
her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was placed between her legs, and
that they frequently tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket,
handcuffed inside an elevator, handcuffed to the toilet and her face pushed
into the water, and maced." [FN230]
The Seventh Circuit's analysis
simultaneously professed its own horror at Reed's coworkers' activities and
placed Reed herself outside the community of women deemed capable of being
harmed by such horrific treatment: "By any objective standard, the
behavior of the male deputies and jailers toward Reed . . . was . . .
repulsive. But apparently not to Reed." [FN231] The court reached this
conclusion based on evidence that Reed used profanity, told off‑color
jokes, engaged in sexual horseplay and flirting, and failed to wear a bra
underneath her T‑shirt. [FN232]
Whether Reed participated in sexualizing the
atmosphere because she felt pressure to do so in order to be accepted, as she
testified, [FN233] or even because she enjoyed contributing to the sexual
ribaldry, the court could have concluded that Reed's behavior justified her
coworkers' conduct only by viewing the case through the lens of sexual
paternalism. For even if Reed displayed a sense of bawdy sexuality‑‑or,
to go even further, even if she had "welcomed the sexual hijinx [sic] of
her co‑workers" [FN234]‑‑this in no way implied that she
had invited nonsexual violent physical assaults, such as being hit and punched
in *1731 the kidneys, shocked with a
cattle prod, or pushed facedown into the toilet. Yet, in the court's eyes,
Reed's own conduct had branded her as a bad girl outside the bounds of legal
protection. Indeed, the court stressed that "other female employees testified
that the male jail employees did not behave in this manner around women who
asked them not to." [FN235]
Other courts have rejected the claims of
women who appeared to them to be too bawdy, too worldly, too old, or too strong
to need sexual protection. In Weinsheimer v. Rockwell International Corp.,
[FN236] for example, the court concluded that a female thermal protection
inspector, whose job involved evaluating the work of plant technicians, had
welcomed a series of abusive acts by a male technician. The technician had held
a knife to her throat, shoved her into a file cabinet, threatened to bang her
head into the ground, and grabbed her pelvic area and breasts. Because the
victim had engaged in sexual banter and joking and had used "abusive and
vulgar language" in speaking to her boyfriend on the telephone at work,
however, the court concluded that the technician's treatment was not actionable
harassment. [FN237] In Kirkland v. Brinias, [FN238] the court ruled against two
waitresses who had been repeatedly abused by a fifty‑year‑old male
busboy who warned that he would not take orders from a woman. The busboy had
sexually propositioned and groped the waitresses, in addition to hitting,
kicking, and threatening them. The court found "that [ although] some
misconduct was of a sexually offensive nature, that would create a hostile and
intimidating working environment for a reasonable person . . ., there is no
hint that it had any harmful psychological effect on the plaintiffs."
[FN239] Apparently, the court based this finding on the fact that the
plaintiffs were "both capable, outspoken women," [FN240] indeed,
"married women with years of waitressing experience who were quite able to
take care of themselves." [FN241]
Similarly, in Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., [FN242] the court rejected a challenge of both nonsexual conduct and
sexual misconduct (including rape) with the observation: "Perkins is not
the downtrodden victim she attempted to portray throughout the trial; Perkins
is an intelligent, articulate, aggressive, ambitious, tough and friendly person
who has good people skills. She was and is a strong person, well able to fend
for and defend herself." [FN243] As the court bluntly stated, "The .
. . conduct about which Perkins complains was *1732 welcomed and encouraged by her. [She] was an active and
encouraging participant in sexually explicit conversation and actions."
[FN244]
To conform to the image of the proper
victim, women must comport themselves as sexually pure, even passive, beings
who have been violated by their coworkers' sexual predation. This requirement
is not only sexist, but also class‑biased in nature, for working‑class
women are less likely than more privileged women to be perceived as pure; and
they may even be more likely than other women to engage in the sexual give‑and‑take
with their male colleagues that courts deem to strip women of their virtue.
[FN245] Regardless of their backgrounds or their underlying motivations, women
who participate in sexual joking and ribaldry become fallen women, no longer
capable of finding harassment unwelcome‑‑even when that harassment
consists of nonsexual actions with the purpose of driving them away from the
job or undermining their competence or authority on the job. Within the sexual
desire‑dominance paradigm, the focus on protecting women from sexual
violation deflects attention away from such nonsexual assaults on their
capabilities as workers.
E. The McKinney
Rule and Its Lack of Influence
At a formal level, the judicial emphasis on
sexuality is surprising. Even though the EEOC guidelines focus on sexual
conduct, the EEOC has long recognized that nonsexual, gender‑based
harassment may violate Title VII. [FN246] Even more importantly, there is
nothing in the language or purpose of the statute itself that requires or
intimates an emphasis on sexual conduct.
*1733 Some courts of appeals have recognized this point. In 1985, in
McKinney v. Dole, [FN247] the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that harassment need not take the form of "sexual
advances or of other incidents with clearly sexual overtones." [FN248] The
court held that "any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee
or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or
employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal
condition of employment under Title VII." [FN249] In the wake of
McKinney's 1985 pronouncement, other appellate courts issued similar
statements, some more than a decade ago. [FN250]
But McKinney has had little influence on the
law. Many courts of appeals have simply ignored the case. In these circuits,
courts continue to define harassment as unwelcome "sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." [FN251] They continue to exclude conduct they do not consider
sexual from the hostile work environment claim and to consider it, if at all,
only under a separate disparate treatment claim. [FN252] King v. Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, [FN253] Scott v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., [FN254] Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., [FN255] as well as the lower
court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., [FN256] were all decided
after McKinney.
Even in some of the circuits that have
adopted the McKinney rule, subsequent cases have ignored or undermined it.
Without discussion, some judges have simply considered only sexual conduct for
purposes of the hostile work environment claim and relegated any nonsexual
misconduct to a separate disparate treatment analysis or disregarded it
altogether. [FN257] Such an approach subverts the spirit of the McKinney rule,
as a pair of cases from the Tenth Circuit illustrates.
In 1987, the Tenth Circuit adopted the McKinney
rule in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. [FN258] Three years later, in Ramsey v. City
of Denver, [FN259] the court undermined the McKinney and Hicks reasoning by
affirming the lower court's disregard of nonsexual harassment. Ramsey was a
municipal engineer who was subjected to a familiar pattern of sexual and
nonsexual treatment to undermine her professional status. James Brown, the
director of the traffic division, who hired Ramsey, "was known to believe
that certain jobs were more suitable for women than others." [FN260]
Ramsey claimed that upon being hired, she was given inadequate supervisory
assistance and inappropriate assignments. Her most immediate supervisor
Mitchell, for example, allegedly asked to be relieved of supervising her,
"due to his not getting along with her." [FN261] She was also
assigned to supervise a man named Jurado, whom she characterized as an
"overt sexist." [FN262] After an argument with Jurado, she was
stripped of her supervisory duties over him. In addition, Ramsey charged that she
was subjected to "comments, drawings, sexually‑charged physical
conduct, and publications found in the work area." [FN263] Eventually, the
city extended her probation rather than making her a permanent employee, and
she resigned.
The analysis by the court of appeals
embodied the typical disaggregation approach. For purposes of Ramsey's hostile
work environment claim, the court *1735
considered only the comments, drawings, suggestive physical gestures, and
"publications." [FN264] Having severed the few overtly sexual
incidents of harassment from the larger discriminatory context, the court of
appeals held in conclusory fashion that the sexual conduct was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute an actionable hostile work environment.
[FN265] The court analyzed the nonsexual actions as disparate treatment and
ruled against Ramsey on the ground that she failed to prove that they occurred
because of her sex. The court refused to consider as direct evidence of
discrimination the director's statement that her job was inappropriate for
women‑‑even though the director confirmed at trial "his
feelings about women being better suited to some jobs than to others."
[FN266] According to the court, Ramsey failed to show that the director's
attitude was connected to her supervisors' refusal to work with her or her
assignment to work with a sexist colleague. Instead, the court accepted the
traffic division's allegation that Ramsey brought all her problems on herself
because she lacked "interpersonal skills." [FN267] Thus, it was
Ramsey's personality, rather than her sex, that accounted for her mistreatment.
As a technical matter, it may be possible to
square the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Ramsey with its earlier adoption of the
McKinney rule in Hicks. The Ramsey opinion suggests that the plaintiff may have
failed to plead the nonsexual incidents as part of her harassment claim.
[FN268] Thus, the court did not expressly rule, contrary to Hicks and McKinney,
that such incidents could not count toward establishing a hostile work
environment. Nonetheless, there is nothing that would have prevented the court
of appeals from considering the nonsexual conduct for purposes of evaluating
the hostile work environment claim on appeal‑‑or at least directing
the trial court to do so on remand. At a minimum, it seems obvious that the
director's discriminatory comments should have been considered evidence of a
hostile work environment. The court's failure to take such nonsexualized evidence
of bias into account violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Hicks and
McKinney.
More recently, a number of other courts of
appeals have begun to undermine McKinney‑‑while purporting to
follow it‑‑through a new route. These courts of appeals (and
district courts in these circuits) cite McKinney approvingly for the
proposition that nonsexual conduct may be included in a hostile work
environment claim. Informally, however, these courts continue to single out
sexual advances and other sexually explicit actions as the "real"
harassment, concluding that the nonsexual harassment did not occur because of
the plaintiff's sex. [FN269] Thus, in addition to the severity or pervasiveness *1736 element, causation has become a
key element on which plaintiffs lose hostile work environment claims.
Furthermore, some cases apply a heightened causation standard: Rather than
requiring plaintiffs to show simple but‑for causation‑‑that
the harassment occurred because of sex‑‑some courts demand a
showing that the harassment was motivated by "gender animus." [FN270]
Although evidence of nonsexual misconduct sometimes meets the causation hurdle‑‑
particularly, conduct that on its face reveals a derogatory attitude toward
women on the job‑‑other nonsexual conduct of the type that is so
commonly directed at women by their male coworkers fails to register as gender‑
based.
Another Tenth Circuit case provides an
example of this trend. In Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., [FN271] the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment against a female truck driver on her
hostile work environment claim. Patricia Gross worked for a road construction
company under the supervision of George Anderson, who had a poor track record
working with women: Only two of the forty women who worked under his
supervision completed the 1990 construction season. Gross believed Anderson's
treatment of her was part of a larger pattern of discrimination. She claimed
that Anderson had "subjected [ her] to a hostile work environment because
she was a 'woman working at a man's job."' [FN272] Anderson's conduct did
not assume a sexual form. Instead, he humiliated Gross, denigrated her ability,
and forced her to submit to abusive authority. In front of Gross's male
coworkers, for instance, Anderson repeatedly referred to her as
"dumb." [FN273] He "embarrassed and humiliated her *1737 in the presence of other
employees" by threatening to fire her if she ruined the transmission on
her truck. [FN274] On one occasion, as Gross got out ofher truck, Anderson
yelled: "What the hell are you doing? Get your ass back in the truck and
don't you get out of it until I tell you." [FN275] When Anderson could not
reach Gross on the company radio, he broadcast to one of her coworkers:
"Mark, sometimes, don't you just want to smash a woman in the face?"
[FN276] Ultimately, when Anderson heard rumors that Gross was thinking of
filing an EEOC charge, he threatened her that "if anyone" were to
leave the company, it would be her because of her "bad attitude."
[FN277] He told her that "he could talk to her any way he wanted, regardless
of whether it embarrassed or humiliated her in front of her co‑
workers." [FN278]
The Tenth Circuit's analysis began
promisingly: The court's citation of its earlier decision in Hicks acknowledged
that harassment need not assume a sexual character. [FN279] Yet, even though
Anderson's actions amounted to precisely the sort of harassment typically
directed at women in the construction trades in an effort to drive them out of
the job, [FN280] the court of appeals concluded that, as a matter of law, all
but one of Anderson's actions were not gender‑based. The court considered
each incident, one by one, each time dismissing the gender dynamics involved.
According to the court, the only potential problem was Anderson's use of the
word "ass," a word that, although "vulgar," is "gender
neutral" as it "refers to a portion of the anatomy of persons of both
sexes." [FN281] Gross also "failed to demonstrate that [Anderson's
threat to fire her if she damaged the transmission] was motivated by gender
discrimination." [FN282] Unlike other cases in which women had been called
such explicit epithets as "fucking cunt," "bitch," and
"whore" and had been told that they were going to be stripped naked
to see if they were "real," Gross had not "presented any
evidence that [Anderson's] criticism of her driving was sexual or gender‑specific."
[FN283] In the court's eyes, even Anderson's admission that he hired Gross only
because of federal affirmative action requirements and the undisputed evidence
that only two of the forty women who worked under Anderson remained on the job
at the end of the season failed to cast a gendered light on Anderson's actions.
[FN284]
*1738 In the absence of sexual advances or other core conduct
defined as harassment within the sexual desire‑dominance model, the Tenth
Circuit could not perceive the hostile gender dynamics of Gross's workplace.
[FN285] Other courts similarly have failed to perceive nonsexual forms of
hostility against women as gender‑based. The invisibility of the gender‑based
character of such harms is apparent in judicial decisions on causation, as the
next part demonstrates more fully.
III.
The Invisibility of Gender at Work
From the beginning, the question of
causation‑‑whether the alleged misconduct occurred "because of
sex"‑‑has been a central issue in harassment law. As we have
seen, early quid pro quo decisions concluded that sexual overtures occurred
because of sex by presuming that such advances were driven by sexual desire.
[FN286] A male supervisor's heterosexuality supplied an inference that he would
not have made such advances toward a man (or a female supervisor toward a
woman); a supervisor's homosexuality would supply a corresponding inference
that he would not have made advances toward a person of the opposite sex.
Before harassment emerged as a recognizable
cause of action, however, there was little or no recognition that sexuality
could form the basis for sex‑based discrimination. The Title VII inquiry
was always: Did the alleged misconduct occur because of sex (or gender)?
Outside the realm of harassment, Title VII's traditional focus has been to
prohibit employer policies and practices that treat workers differently based
on gender‑based expectations of who men and women are supposed to be. The
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, [FN287] which
construed Title VII to forbid employers from incorporating into the criteria
for successful job performance preconceived notions of suitable feminine or
masculine behavior, [FN288] provides clear support for this proposition. Price
Waterhouse was the logical culmination of earlier law; the thrust of most major
developments in Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence has been toward
dismantling employers' settled understandings of appropriate work roles for men
and women. [FN289]
*1739 With harassment law, this traditional focus has shifted. Over
time, and ironically, the courts have cast sexuality to the foreground and
consigned gender to the background. Harassment cases have highlighted the harm
of conduct considered sexual, while the larger gender‑based processes
once deemed the principal focus of Title VII have faded from view. As a result,
this part shows, judges often fail to perceive the gender‑based quality
of the actions through which male workers create environments that sustain
their definition of masculine competence‑‑to the detriment of
women, who are defined as incapable of such competence.
A. The Two‑Tiered
Structure of Causation
Even though the McKinney v. Dole line of
cases acknowledged that conduct need not be sexual in content to constitute a
hostile work environment, it did not provide a serious break with the
assumptions of the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm. Indeed, even courts
that approved McKinney have continued to treat sexual advances as the
quintessential sex‑based conduct: Borrowing from the quid pro quo
harassment model, the courts have presumed that sexual advances (at least when
made by a man upon a woman) are based on sex. Yet, when presented with evidence
of nonsexual misconduct, judges have tended to miss any harmful gender dynamics
involved. This trend has served to accentuate the analytical separation of
sexual hostile work environment harassment from nonsexualized disparate
treatment that McKinney promised to dissolve.
In Henson v. City of Dundee, [FN290] an
influential early case, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the different standard
of proof needed to establish causation in a hostile work environment harassment
case as opposed to an ordinary disparate treatment case. In disparate treatment
litigation, the focus is on "'the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination"' [FN291]‑‑whether the adverse treatment
occurred because of the plaintiff's sex or instead because of some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. "In contrast, the case of sexual harassment that
creates an offensive environment does not present a factual *1740 question of intentional discrimination which is at all
elusive. Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it
should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex."
[FN292] Indeed, in a hostile work environment case, causation may be presumed:
"In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to
a female worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees
in a similar fashion." [FN293] Thus, following Barnes v. Costle [FN294]
and other quid pro quo harassment cases, the Henson court's assumption that
hostile work environment harassment consists of sexual advances driven by
sexual attraction enabled it to presume the existence of causation, which had
to be proven in other discrimination cases. This reasoning, which introduced a
subtle distinction between hostile work environment harassment and disparate
treatment, was endorsed rapidly by other courts. [FN295]
In fact, the D.C. Circuit accepted such a
distinction in McKinney itself. The case was brought by a female budget analyst
for the Federal Aviation Administration, who alleged a combination of sexual
and nonsexual harassment by her second‑line supervisor. After McKinney's
boss exposed himself to her, rubbed up against her, and asked her for sexual
favors, he forced her to sign a letter agreeing to be laid off without pay. She
signed the letter, then dropped it, and he ordered her to pick it up. Instead,
she fled into her office, where he followed her. When she tried to escape, her
boss "forcefully prevented her from doing so by grabbing her arm and
twisting it." [FN296]
The D.C. Circuit held that McKinney's timely
complaint about this physical assault sufficed to sustain her hostile work
environment claim, even if the assault was not driven by sexual motivations. In
emphasizing that harassing conduct need not be sexual in character, the court's
language stressed that hostile work environment harassment is coterminous with
disparate treatment: "[A]ny harassment or other unequal treatment of an
employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the
employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an
illegal condition of employment under Title VII. . . . Clearly, then,"
concluded the court, "if a supervisor consistently uses physical force
toward an employee because of that employee's sex, the use of such force may,
if pervasive *1741 enough, form an
illegal 'condition of employment.' . . . In fact, any disparate treatment, even
if not facially objectionable, may violate Title VII." [FN297]
Although this logic tended to break down the
distinctions between hostile work environment harassment and disparate
treatment and between sexual and nonsexual conduct, other language in the
court's opinion tended to resurrect these distinctions. "It is true,"
conceded the court, "that proving that a pattern of physical force is
illegally discriminatory might be significantly more difficult than proving
that a pattern of explicitly sexual advances is illegally discriminatory
because the latter are more obviously caused by the sex of the employee."
[FN298] The court did not elaborate on why explicitly sexual advances are
"more obviously" based on sex. Given a legal landscape that included
Barnes and Henson, however, it seems clear that the court was assuming that
sexual overtures are gender‑related because they are rooted in sexual
desire, while other forms of mistreatment directed at women workers‑‑even
at the hands of their male supervisors‑‑are less likely to be
rooted in gender. Indeed, one may wonder whether the D.C. Circuit would have
had the foresight to extend the concept of hostile work environment harassment
to nonsexual conduct if the supervisor's physical assault on the plaintiff had
not been the culmination of an earlier pattern of harassment that included
sexual overtures.
Subsequent cases have accepted a two‑tier
structure of causation in which sexually explicit advances are presumed to be
sex‑based while other problems must be proven to be so. In Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, [FN299] for example, the Third Circuit held that conduct
other than sexual advances may form the basis for a hostile work environment.
"To constitute impermissible discrimination," the court stated,
"offensive conduct is not necessarily required to include sexual overtones
in every instance . . . ." [FN300] So long as the conduct meets the other
criteria for a hostile work environment, an employee need only have
"suffered intentional discrimination because of [her] sex." [FN301]
Nonetheless, the court distinguished the probative quality of sexual and
nonsexual forms of conduct, just as the courts had in Henson and McKinney:
The intent to discriminate on the basis of
sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials,
or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a
matter of course. A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary where the
actions are not sexual by their very nature. [FN302] A more recent Third
Circuit case, Spain v. Gallegos, [FN303] demonstrates how this two‑tiered
system of causation can lead right back to pre‑McKinney reasoning
requiring explicitly sexual conduct to establish a hostile work environment.
Ellen Spain, a white, female investigator in the Pittsburgh office of the EEOC,
claimed that the director of that office, Eugene Nelson, had "a history of
passing over her for promotions . . . in favor of allegedly lesser qualified
male African‑American applicants." [FN304] After she filed an
internal EEOC complaint alleging that the failure to promote her amounted to
sex and race discrimination, Nelson "induced her not to proceed with the
EEOC complaint by promising that she would receive the next available
promotion, so long as she agreed to lend him money periodically." [FN305]
Nelson continued to extort loans from Spain over the next several years, even
though internal EEOC regulations prohibited officials from soliciting or
accepting loans from their subordinates. Because these exchanges between Nelson
and Spain required private meetings, rumors began to circulate around the
office that the two were involved sexually. As a result of these rumors, Spain
was ostracized by her coworkers and evaluated negatively by her more immediate
supervisors. On the basis of these evaluations, Nelson refused to promote her
further. He also refused to try to stop the rumors.
The district court dismissed Spain's hostile
work environment claim, and the Third Circuit reversed. The appellate court's
analysis began with the statement that "an employee can demonstrate that
there is a sexually hostile work environment without proving blatant sexual
misconduct." [FN306] Under this principle, the court might have concluded
that Nelson's extortion of loans from Spain‑‑even without the
resulting rumors‑‑provided sufficient evidence of a hostile work
environment to survive a motion for summary judgment. The extortion appeared to
be gender‑based, for Nelson extorted the money by promising to give Spain
a deserved promotion that he had withheld because of her sex (and race). Surely
it is as discriminatory for a male supervisor to extort money from a female
subordinate by withholding a promotion on the basis of her sex as it is for the
supervisor to extort sexual favors from a subordinate by threatening to
withhold a promotion or other job benefit, as is the case with quid pro quo harassment.
In each case, the supervisor uses his power to grant a job benefit in a
discriminatory way; he attempts to gain something he would not be able to
obtain in the absence of sex discrimination.
Despite the simplicity of such an analysis,
the Third Circuit did not adopt it. Instead, the court identified the crux of
the hostile work environment harassment claim as Nelson's failure to stop the
rumors that he and Spain were having an affair, and strained to characterize
the problem as "sexual" as a basis *1743 for concluding that the alleged misconduct was based on
Spain's sex. Concluding that "the [causation] element is satisfied because
the crux of the rumors and their impact upon Spain is that Spain, a female,
subordinate employee, had a sexual relationship with her male superior,"
[FN307] the court ignored the fact that the focus of the claim was on Nelson's
failure to stop those rumors, which itself was not sexual in content. Apart
from that problem, the court's approach required stretching the meaning of the
term "sexual" to a breaking point by extending it to cover rumors
that two people were having an affair. This necessitated a lengthy defense of
why evidence of Nelson's extortion of money from Spain was even relevant for
the purpose of shedding light on the resulting rumors.
Why did the court take such a complicated
approach to establishing the sex‑ based nature of the challenged conduct
when basing the harassment claim on the extortion itself would have provided a
simpler route to this end? The court conceded that the impetus for its approach
lay in the two‑tier structure of causation established in Andrews:
In reaching our conclusion . . . we have
paid particular attention to the distinction we drew in Andrews between sexual
misconduct in which the intent to discriminate "is implicit, and thus
should be recognized as a matter of course" and "actions [which] are
not sexual by their very nature." . . . Accordingly, where an employee
claims sex discrimination predicated on sexually neutral conduct it may be
necessary for the employee to establish that the employer's motives for its
actions were sexual. If the discrimination of which Spain complained was
predicated merely on the demands for loans, her case might be of that nature.
However, Spain's allegations are not predicated on sexually neutral conduct.
Rather, she alleges that the harassment resulted from the rumors that she was
having an affair with Nelson. Thus, the harassment directed against her as a
woman had a sexual orientation by its very nature. [FN308] In this passage, the
court returned to the pre‑McKinney reasoning it purported to reject.
Where a worker seeks to ground a hostile work environment claim on
"sexually neutral conduct"‑‑such as her supervisor's
extortion of loans in exchange for ceasing discriminatory promotion practices‑‑she
must not only prove that the conduct occurred because of her womanhood; she
must also prove that the motives for the conduct were "sexual."
[FN309] Thus, sexuality remained the specter haunting the case. The power of
the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm drove the court to look for deep‑seated
sexual *1744 motivations, even as it
looked right past gender‑based considerations that were closer to the
surface.
B. Sexuality as
a Bright‑Line Test for Gender‑Based Conduct?
Why have the courts struggled to define
harassment as sexual, as opposed to sex‑ or gender‑based? One
possible explanation is that judges believe sexuality provides a bright‑line
test for delineating when harassment is gender‑based. In the absence of
clear criteria for determining whether harassment is directed at workers
because of their identities as men or women, judges may look to sexual conduct
as a proxy.
Although some judges may be seeking such
clarity, the emphasis on sexual conduct has not provided a bright‑line
test for determining whether harassing conduct is based on sex. To begin with,
there is no consensus on what counts as sufficiently "sexual." Even
Judge Posner, who has thought a great deal about sexuality, [FN310] has
expressed some uncertainty. "Drawing the line is not always easy,"
acknowledged the judge:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other
physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent
express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts;
obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the
occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish
workers. [FN311] Nor has Judge Posner escaped controversy in applying such
concepts. According to Posner, a boss who referred to his secretary as a
"pretty girl," made grunting sounds when she wore a leather skirt,
commented on how "hot" the office was once she entered, and related
that his wife had told him he had "better clean up [his] act" and
"think of [his secretary] as Ms. Anita Hill" had not crossed the line
to become a "sexual harasser." [FN312] "He never touched the
plaintiff," stressed Posner. "He did not invite her . . . to have sex
with him, or to go out on a date with him. He made no threats. He did not
expose himself, or show her dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that
could not be repeated on primetime television." [FN313]
As this passage suggests, even though the
courts have envisioned sexual advances as the core "sexual" conduct
prohibited as sex‑based harassment, judges have not been able to agree on
what counts as a sexual advance. Like
*1745 some other judges, [FN314] Posner has mentioned nonconsensual
physical touchings. Yet the cases are full of conflict over when such touchings
constitute sexual harassment. In one case, for example, a court concluded that
a man's seemingly sexual acts of placing his hands on a female coworker's hips,
touching her breasts, and "playfully" choking her when she complained
[FN315] were "not as aggressive or coercive as that underlying a number of
hostile sexual environment claims that have been unsuccessful in court."
[FN316] To this court, the problem lay in the fact that the conduct was not
sufficiently threatening. Yet, in another case, a man's plainly menacing
actions of grabbing a woman's crotch and breast, forcing a penis into her hand,
holding a knife to her throat, shoving her into a file cabinet, and threatening
to "bang her head into the ground" [FN317] were also found
insufficient to ground a hostile work environment claim. [FN318]
In another case, Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc.,
[FN319] the fact of physical touching was deemed less important than whether
such touching reflected sexual intent. The court found that a restaurant
manager's acts in shaking a waitress by the shoulders and letting his arms and
hands fall over her breasts were insignificant because they were "done
without sexual designs upon her." [FN320] Discerning when sexual designs
underlay physical touchings, however, has proven to be a daunting task to which
the courts have brought little consistency. To one court, the isolated act of
slapping a woman on the rear end was a sexual act: "[A] slap on the
buttocks in the office setting has yet to replace the hand shake." [FN321]
To another, however, the act of "bagging," unexpectedly grabbing a
male worker's genitals, was not a sexual activity. [FN322] And to a third
court, the act of stroking a woman's hair, even in the context of admiring her
body and speculating about her sex life, was not a sexual gesture. [FN323]
*1746 If delineating when physical touchings are actionable has
proven to be an uncertain endeavor, determining when other types of conduct
amount to prohibited sexual advances has proven to be an equally ambiguous
undertaking. One court, for example, was willing to characterize a supervisor's
comment that his "penis stretches from here to District 1" [FN324] as
a "sexual advance," [FN325] but held that the advance was too insignificant
to constitute sexual harassment because it did not include any "offensive
touching or threats." [FN326] Other courts have been less willing to
characterize similar sorts of verbal conduct as sexual advances. In one case,
for instance, a recruiting official claimed that her boss subjected her to
"outright sexual propositions," "a lewd practice of fondling his
genitals in her presence," and the use of "vulgar language and
innuendo"; [FN327] he also "'gawked' at [her]" and crawled under
a table where she was seated "in a public display of sexual
behavior." [FN328] The court, however, found that none of this behavior
was sexually motivated. The boss had not leered at the plaintiff; instead, he
had a "wander[ing]" eye. [FN329] He had not fondled himself; he
"had a bad habit of itching himself in the groin," which,
"though perhaps unbecoming of a gentleman," was not "sexually
offensive." [FN330] His act of crawling under the table in an "effort
to look up [the plaintiff's] dress" had nothing to do with sexuality, but
instead had been done "as a playful event." [FN331] According to the
court, "no incidents of physical or verbal conduct of a sexual nature ever
occurred in any degree whatsoever." [FN332] In another case, the court
found absurd the plaintiff's perception of her boss's conduct as a sexual
advance. In the court's eyes, the older man's lavishing attention on his female
subordinate, having dinner alone with her numerous times, assuming physical
intimacies toward her (such as caressing her hands and placing his hands on her
knee), and conferring gifts on her, were in no way sexually or romantically
motivated. [FN333] According to the court, the plaintiff was a naive woman,
hypersensitive to men, who had fantasized her boss's attentions. [FN334]
Once the facts move beyond the realm of
alleged sexual advances, courts have had even greater difficulty agreeing on
whether the behavior amounts to forbidden conduct of a sexual nature. Verbal
taunts and suggestive or crude comments (sometimes accompanied by acts of
physical hazing) have proven *1747
to be particularly divisive in the courts. In one case, for example, a court
held that a collection manager's calling a female employee
"Syphilis," telling her she looked like a "streetwalker,"
and monitoring her bathroom breaks were not "harassment of a sexual
nature," even when accompanied by crude speculations about the plaintiff's
sex life at home. [FN335] In another case, however, a court held that an
assistant manager's inviting a car saleswoman to join his sexual exploits with
his wife, flicking his tongue at the saleswoman in the showroom, and bragging
about having looked up another saleswoman's dress constituted "sexual
humiliation and degradation"‑‑indeed, they amounted to
"severe and pervasive sexual misconduct." [FN336]
Courts also have embraced capricious and
contradictory characterizations of derogatory epithets aimed at women workers.
To one court, a police lieutenant's reference to a female police officer as
"that broad" constituted the use of a "sexually‑oriented
epithet." [FN337] To another court, however, a male coworker's
"statement calling [a female auto worker] a 'sick bitch' was not overtly
sexual in nature." [FN338] A third court had no difficulty concluding that
a casino blackjack dealer's reference to a female floorperson as a
"cunt" and "dumb fucking broad" [FN339] were "sexually
explicit and offensive terms." [FN340] To this court, the dealer's use of
such terms was "fundamentally different" from his calling men
"asshole[s]" and "jerk[s]." [FN341] Although the dealer may
have denigrated both men and women, concluded the court, his abuse of women was
distinctive because it "relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit
reference to women's bodies and sexual conduct." [FN342] In the court's
analysis, "It is one thing to call a woman 'worthless,' and another to
call her a 'worthless broad."' [FN343]
Far from providing a bright‑line test,
the courts' focus on conduct that is sexual in nature has proven to be an
indeterminate proxy for whether harassing conduct is based on sex within the
meaning of Title VII. Instead, the focus on sexual conduct has opened up as
many questions as it has answered, embroiling judges in tension‑filled
rulings that create a patchwork of justice.
*1748 Although judges may long for a clear standard, it seems unlikely that
most are unaware of the lack of precision offered by the current paradigm.
Thus, there must be another reason why courts have focused on sexual conduct as
the foundation for hostile work environment harassment.
C. The Courts'
Failure To Understand the Role of Work in Producing Gender Inequality
There is a deeper explanation for the
courts' emphasis on sexual conduct as the core of sex‑based harassment.
Highlighting sexual abuse has allowed judges to feel enlightened about
protecting women from sexual violation while relieving them of the
responsibility to redress broader gender‑based forms of disadvantage at
work. Even though a sexuality‑based standard has not yielded predictable
results, singling out sexual abuse may permit judges the illusion that they are
addressing a problem that can be isolated from other workplace conditions.
Indeed, the disaggregation of sexual harassment from other forms of sex
discrimination presumes precisely such a separation. To confront the fact that
sexual misconduct may be only one‑‑indeed, perhaps only a
relatively minor‑‑manifestation of a larger pattern of nonsexual
harassment and discrimination raises the disquieting prospect that the world of
work is systematically gender‑biased. Judges may understandably wish to
avoid confronting such a problem.
The larger political and cultural
environment has placed little pressure on judges to do so. The courts' focus on
protecting women from sexual abuse was inspired by a cultural‑radical
feminist tradition that characterized heterosexual sexual relations as a
central force creating gender inequality. [FN344] That feminist tradition may
have resonated with more conservative political tendencies to create a climate
that enabled judges to perceive that women, more than men, are routinely
subjected to sexual advances and assaults that may endanger and harm them.
Courts have not understood, however, that
the gender stratification of work‑‑ who does what type of work,
under what conditions, and for what reward‑‑is at least as
influential as sexual relations in producing women's disadvantage. Although
judges understand that women are victimized as sexual objects, they have not
been able to see that women are also systematically harassed, discriminated
against, and marginalized as workers in ways that render them unequal on the
job and, as a result, in many other realms of life. The assumptions underlying
the two‑tier structure of causation may seem natural, but they are the
product of larger political currents. To most judges, sexual advances seem
intuitively gender‑based because cultural‑radical feminists, and
the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm they inspired, have *1749 articulated how women are harmed
through sexual relations. Yet, in part because no political tradition has
expressed with the same force the ways in which women are rendered unequal
through workplace relations, judges have difficulty perceiving the
characteristic problems that confront working women as gender‑ based.
In case after case in which nonsexual
harassment predominates, in both hostile work environment claims and the
disparate treatment claims from which they are disaggregated, the courts have
rendered decisions on causation that reveal a fundamental lack of understanding
of the gender‑based quality of harassing and harmful actions directed at
women in the workplace. In the most egregious group of cases, courts seem to be
engaged in outright denial: They refuse to characterize conduct as sex‑based
even when it is accompanied by expressions of resentment or unease directed at
women workers who try to make it in traditionally male occupations or jobs.
Recall that in Ramsey v. City of Denver,
[FN345] the court failed to designate as sex‑based the mistreatment of a
female engineer, even though her boss had stated openly that he believed the
plaintiff's job was unsuitable for women. According to the court, the engineer
had brought her troubles upon herself through her lack of "interpersonal
skills," including being "overbearing" and "over‑demanding."
[FN346] Or recall Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center, [FN347] in which
the court rejected a claim that a female electrical subforeman's dismissal and
other mistreatment were sex‑based, even though the record included a
number of gender‑based comments‑‑including an earlier remark
by the union business agent that there would never be an appropriate time to
have a woman in her position. [FN348] Or consider a third case, in which a
female construction technician alleged that her supervisor had discriminatorily
denied her the opportunity to obtain experience in a construction position; she
claimed that the inability to do so had hindered her from advancing or earning
overtime. [FN349] The court found that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima
facie case of sex discrimination, even though her supervisor had denied her a
sought‑after temporary assignment shortly after exclaiming, "Fucking
women, I hate having fucking women in the office!" [FN350] According to
the court, the supervisor's statement did not evince discriminatory intent. It
showed only that he "unprofessionally offered his private negative view of
women during a display of bad temper at work." [FN351]
*1750 In other cases, courts have found that women workers'
mistreatment was prompted by their own shortcomings rather than by their sex‑‑even
as judges disregard signs that the evaluation of the plaintiffs' competence may
not have been free from gender stereotyping. In a case with facts eerily
reminiscent of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, [FN352] for example, a female
executive director who had dramatically increased the receipts of a nonprofit
organization was replaced by a man. [FN353] Her troubles began when she fired a
male staff member liked by members of the Board of Directors; the troubles were
exacerbated when she filed a sexual harassment charge against a Board member,
who then placed her on probation. Even though Board members had told her that
the best kind of woman is a "Honey‑Do" and "suggested that
she take a Dale Carnegie course" to learn how to deal with the Board,
[FN354] and even though one member of the Board had ripped a feminist poster
off her wall and told her "it's thinking like this that got you
fired," [FN355] the court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the Board
had mistreated and eventually fired her because of her sex. Instead, the court
accepted the Board's explanation that the director was too "abrasive"
to do her job well, without inquiring into whether gender stereotyping had
affected the Board's perception. [FN356] As the Supreme Court has recognized,
however, strong women managers are often perceived to be unduly abrasive.
[FN357]
Indeed, in numerous cases in which women
work in male‑dominated settings, courts have overlooked evidence that the
denigration of women's competence, authority, or entitlement to the job is
itself a core component of what makes the work environment sexist and hostile.
Recall Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., [FN358] in which the court failed to
characterize as gender‑based discrimination a female construction
worker's deprecation at the hands of an authoritarian supervisor who conceded
that he had hired the plaintiff only to comply with perceived affirmative
action requirements and who had a record of driving women away from the job. In
another case, a female firefighter alleged that she was subjected to many forms
of differential treatment, much of which was designed to undermine her
competence. [FN359] Her superiors made remarks about her lack of professional
ability, denied her the opportunity to attend training seminars, disciplined
her for accompanying the deputy fire chief
*1751 on an investigation, and even required her to do secretarial work
when the secretary was out. In addition, her fire chief called her a "dumb
blonde," and her supervisor accused her of having an affair with a
coworker. [FN360] Despite the plaintiff's allegation that this conduct
"affected her attitude toward work and made her feel that she wasn't
respected and wasn't going to get anywhere while these people were her
superiors," [FN361] as well as her offer to prove that nine other women
had experienced the same types of harassment, the court dismissed her hostile
work environment claim on summary judgment for insufficient proof that the
harassment occurred because of her sex. [FN362]
As part of this overall pattern, courts have
also failed to comprehend the opportunity for discrimination in the provision
of training. Denying women the training or learning opportunities they need to
master the work is a problem that is particularly prevalent in male‑dominated
settings, where much of the learning is acquired informally on the job. Women's
complaints about inadequate training are legion, in both the literature and the
case law. [FN363] For example, recall Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
[FN364] in which an auto mechanic trainee at Sears alleged that she was denied
the opportunity to perform brake jobs and, as a result, never learned how to do
them as quickly as the more senior male mechanics. The court ignored this
aspect of her claim, concluding that she was fired because of her lack of
productivity at brake work, without examining whether the training process was
itself discriminatory. [FN365] In another case, the first female firefighter in
Wichita, Kansas received demeaning remarks from her fellow recruits. [FN366]
One man predicted that the plaintiff would last only a month; several said that
she was not strong enough to do the job; another refused to take orders from a
"damn bitch"; and another said that she should join the men in the
shower since she was "doing a man's job." [FN367] As part of the
general pattern of discrimination, the plaintiff claimed that she was given
inadequate hands‑on experience on fire engines and their equipment, and
that when she was transferred to a dispatcher position, she was "rushed
through the training and put on the . . . dispatch board before she felt . . .
ready for that responsibility." [FN368] After severing plaintiff's
training claims from the recruits' derogatory remarks and holding that the
remarks alone did *1752 not create a
hostile work environment, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown
that any training deficiencies were based on her sex. According to the court,
the "[p]laintiff's subjective feelings of being rushed through her
training and of not being ready to handle the position in which she was placed
do not constitute even circumstantial evidence of . . . discriminatory gender‑based
acts." [FN369]
Courts have also neglected the potential
gender dynamics underlying acts of work sabotage, including physical attacks.
In one case, for example, a woman who moved up from a job as a brusher to
become a laboratory trainee alleged that her new male colleagues greeted her
with efforts to destroy her work. [FN370] One male coworker left a note telling
her there were no problems with her equipment; upon inspection, however, she
found two serious problems that, if left unattended, would have shut down the
mill and caused her to be fired. According to the plaintiff, this man
"always complained and tried to make her do her work poorly." [FN371]
Another "embarrassed [her] every work day . . . by not talking very good
about females." [FN372] After ruling that these incidents were
insufficiently sexual to be actionable, the court concluded that the plaintiff
failed to show that she was fired because of her sex. Not only did the facts
fail to reflect "discriminatory animus," said the court, but it was
"impossible to conclude that plaintiff was 'harassed' at all."
[FN373] In the court's eyes, the alleged acts of work sabotage showed only that
the plaintiff "was a more careful employee than [her coworker], not that
[he] was purposefully harassing her." [FN374]
In addition, recall Weinsheimer v. Rockwell
International Corp., [FN375] in which the court rejected a female thermal
protection inspector's challenge to her coworker's crude sexual demands and
physical violence. The court concluded that the man's behavior was not
traceable to the plaintiff's sex, but "to general causes that were not
sexually motivated," including the plaintiff's "confrontational and
abusive personality." [FN376] According to the court, the plaintiff and
her assailant "engaged in frequent and heated fights," and
"these altercations usually grew out of work or personal issues, rather
than having a sexual animus." [FN377] As an example of a fight that was
"based not upon sex, but rather upon work or personal disputes,"
[FN378] however, the court cited an incident in which the plaintiff's coworker
shoved her into a file cabinet after
*1753 she reprimanded him for handling tiles with his bare hands. Even
though the court conceded that the reprimand "was a proper exercise of her
duties as an inspector," [FN379] it did not occur to the judge that the
coworker's animosity may have stemmed from his difficulty in submitting to the
authority of a woman. Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff's
problems with this man and the other technicians stemmed from the fact that she
was argumentative and slothful on the job.
In a similar vein, courts sometimes fail to
see that the withholding of perks and privileges needed to succeed on the job
can be part of a gender‑based campaign to discredit women workers' competence.
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., [FN380] for example, Vivien Rabidue, the
sole female manager in an oil refinery, was excluded from activities she needed
to perform her duties and progress in her career:
[U]nlike male salaried employees, she did
not receive free lunches, free gasoline, a telephone credit card or
entertainment privileges. Nor was she invited to the weekly golf matches. . . .
After plaintiff became credit manager defendant prevented plaintiff from
visiting or taking customers to lunch as all previous male credit managers had
done. . . . Plaintiff's . . . supervisor . . . stated to another female worker
. . . that "Vivienne . . . is doing a good job as credit manager, but we
really need a man on that job," adding "She can't take customers out
to lunch." Aside from this Catch‑22, [ [the supervisor] also
remarked plaintiff was not forceful enough to collect slow‑paying jobs.
[FN381]
As this case shows, the denial of perks and
privileges can be difficult to distinguish from other conduct designed to
undermine a woman's authority and undercut her performance on the job. Indeed,
as the dissenting judge observed,
[P]laintiff was [also] frequently told to
tone down and discouraged from executing procedures she felt were needed to
correct waste and improve efficiency as her job required. Not only did
plaintiff receive minimal support, but she was repeatedly undermined. For
example, [one male supervisor] once directed his employees to ignore
plaintiff's procedures for logging time and invoices, a particularly damaging
directive given plaintiff's responsibility of coordinating the work of [that
supervisor's] staff. In another example, plaintiff returned from her vacation
to find that none of the check depositing procedures agreed upon had been
implemented and that some of her duties had been permanently transferred to the
male who filled in during her vacation. [FN382] In spite of the blatant nature
of these actions, and in spite of the fact that Rabidue was also subjected to
denigrating obscenities and surrounded by pornographic displays, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings against the plaintiff. After
disaggregating the sexual and nonsexual behavior, the court of appeals upheld
the finding that the plaintiff was not subjected to a hostile work environment
or disparate treatment. [FN383] According to the court, Rabidue was not fired
because of her sex, but because of her "irascible and opinionated
personality and her inability to work harmoniously with co‑ workers and
customers." [FN384]
Courts also frequently fail to comprehend
that forcing women to perform stereotypically female tasks that are not part of
their regular job duties signals a derogation of their work competence that is
rooted in gendered expectations of what types of work are suitable for women to
perform. In one case, a civil service secretary who took a pay cut to move into
a technical engineering aide position specifically sought assurance, before
transferring, that she would not be required to perform secretarial duties in
the new job. [FN385] Notwithstanding assurances to the contrary, the executive
director of the agency demanded that she substitute for his secretary, twice a
day, on a permanent basis. Even though the director had ordered only two people‑‑the
plaintiff and another woman who possessed no secretarial skills whatsoever‑‑to
relieve his secretary, and had never asked a male worker to do so, the court
failed to perceive the assignment (and the plaintiff's subsequent firing for
failing to carry it out) as sex‑based. [FN386]
The facts of these cases are not unique.
They are representative of the types of harassment and discrimination
experienced by many women at work. Every day, in workplaces all over the
country, women are pressured to conform to their employers' and coworkers'
images of who and what type of workers "women" are supposed to be.
Yet, as the results and reasoning of such cases show, the courts have not
understood the magnitude of gender discrimination and marginalization experienced
by women in the work world. Nor have they understood the extent to which
hostile workplace relations contribute to shaping jobs and people along
gendered lines. As these cases suggest, and as I explain more fully below,
characterizing women as incompetent at certain types of work is a central
component of the harassment *1755
that contributes to stratifying work along gender‑based lines. We need a
new account of hostile work environment harassment that places such gender‑based,
competence‑ undermining conduct at its center, one that does not reduce
all harassment to sexual objectification or desire.
IV. An
Alternative Account of Hostile Work Environment Harassment: A
Competence‑Centered
Paradigm
To begin constructing a more accurate
account of hostile work environment harassment means recognizing the importance
of the realm of paid work in creating women's second‑class status.
Contrary to the assumption of the cultural‑radical feminist tradition
that inspired the development of harassment law, men's desire to exploit or
dominate women sexually may not be the exclusive, or even the primary,
motivation for harassing women at work. Instead, a drive to maintain the most
highly rewarded forms of work as domains of masculine competence underlies many,
if not most, forms of sex‑based harassment on the job. Harassment has the
form and function of denigrating women's competence for the purpose of keeping
them away from male‑dominated jobs or incorporating them as inferior,
less capable workers.
This part develops an alternative account of
hostile work environment harassment that is rooted in these realities. I refer
to the new account as a "competence‑centered" paradigm, for it
understands harassment as a means to reclaim favored lines of work and work
competence as masculine‑identified turf‑‑in the face of a
threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser men) who seek to claim these
prerogatives as their own. [FN387] This account provides a more comprehensive
understanding of the customary cases of male‑ female harassment by
supervisors and coworkers and also allows us to understand some less
conventional forms of harassment, such as harassment of female supervisors by
their male subordinates.
*1756 A. The Link Between Job
Segregation and Hostile Work Environments
Both scholarly research and everyday
experience reveal that the world of work plays a pivotal role in producing
gender inequality between men and women. This is not surprising. In advanced
industrial societies, wage work is a primary source of material security and
psychological well‑being: A job provides both the means to meet life's
concrete needs and a position that confers a sense of place in the world.
[FN388] As scholars have begun to recognize, work not only bestows a livelihood
and sense of community, but also provides the basis for full citizenship,
[FN389] and even for personal identity. Like it or not, we are what we do.
[FN390]
If the job makes the person, experience in
the job world molds people along gendered lines. [FN391] As numerous
researchers have documented, one of the most striking features of the world of
work is the extent to which it is stratified by sex. [FN392] Almost
universally, men and women work at different jobs. [FN393] At each level of the
occupational and educational ladder, the jobs *1757 women do tend to pay less and to offer lower status and less
opportunity for advancement than those that men do. [FN394] Especially at the
lower ends of the economic spectrum, women work at jobs that offer fewer
prospects for challenge, creativity, and physical mobility. Jobs traditionally
occupied by women are more likely to be governed by petty, paternalistic forms
of authority. [FN395] Women's inferior position in the world of work confers
disadvantages that burden women throughout other realms of life.
The linkages between work and gender are
deep‑‑so deep that we tend to think of most types of work as
essentially "masculine" or "feminine." [FN396] These
linkages may run especially deep for men. At least since the onset of
industrialization, paid work has provided a main source of authority and
identity for men. Not only have they struggled to earn a wage that would allow
them to head families, [FN397] but they have also sought to defend their work
from deskilling and the encroachment of women (and less powerful men) by
defining their work competence in idealized masculine terms. Work competence
has been contested terrain, one on which male jobholders have formed and fought
for their interests‑‑both as workers and as men‑‑against
perceived threats from women and less privileged men (and often too against
threats from their employers, whom they have viewed as trying to use these
other groups to undercut them). [FN398]
*1758 Today, as in times past, men can retain some measure of
economic superiority over women by holding on to the most prestigious, highly
paid jobs. Economic superiority, in turn, ensures men's head‑of‑household
status, which confers the ability to attract women who will clothe, feed,
house, and nurture them and their children. Economic power also breeds greater
political power, which assures men's continued edge in controlling most public
institutions. Mastery over the most challenging work ensures the means to
create the dominant forms of knowledge and culture. In addition, economic
superiority and monopolization of the most challenging work assures men a sense
of identity as men. Breadwinning, mastery, and mobility are central to
mainstream masculinity. [FN399] Without them, it is difficult to see what
"separate [ s] . . . the 'men' from the 'girls."' [FN400]
It is not surprising, therefore, that
numerous studies have shown that men tend to define their manhood in terms of
their status as breadwinners and as masters of uniquely masculine skills.
[FN401] Nor is it surprising that incumbent male workers have sought to defend
their occupational turf from incursion by women by branding them as
incompetent. [FN402] The long history of entrenched sex segregation of work has
encouraged male workers to adopt proprietary attitudes toward their jobs. The
major purpose of Title VII was to dismantle sex segregation by integrating
women into work formerly reserved for men. [FN403] Yet, desegregating the
workforce has proved to be a daunting task,
*1759 for men can create hostile and sexist work environments as a way to
retain the better types of work for themselves. Indeed, research shows that
women who work in male‑dominated settings are more likely than other
women to experience hostility and harassment at work. [FN404] Not all the men
in a work setting‑‑nor even the majority‑‑need to
participate in the harassment. It takes only a few, particularly if they are
able to secure the acquiescence of supervisors, to make the job environment
hostile and alienating to any woman who dares to upset the "natural"
order of segregation.
Research also confirms what the earlier
analyses of the hostile work environment harassment cases suggest: For many, if
not most, women workers, neither sexual desire nor sexual advances are the core
of the problem. [FN405] Where sexual misconduct occurs, it is typically part of
a broader pattern of harassment designed to reinforce gender difference and to
claim work competence and authority as masculine preserves. Whatever men's
motivations or sources of insecurity, harassment is a central process through
which the image of (certain) work as masculine is sustained. If there are no
women in the job, then the work's content can be described exclusively in terms
of the manly personal characteristics of those who do it. If, on the other
hand, women are actually succeeding at the work, it becomes far more difficult
to define the job with reference to stereotypically masculine images. As one
female pipefitter explained:
Some of the men would take the tools out
of my hands. You see it is just very hard for them to work with me because
they're really into *1760 proving
their masculinity and being tough. And when a woman comes on a job that can
work, get something done as fast and efficiently, as well, as they can, it
really affects them. Somehow if a woman can do it, it ain't that masculine, not
that tough. [FN406]
By driving women out of nontraditional jobs,
harassment reinforces the idea that women are inferior workers who cannot meet
the demands of a "man's job." More subtly, for women who stay in
nontraditional jobs, harassment exaggerates gender differences to remind them
that they are "out of place" in a "man's world." By
simultaneously labeling the women "freaks" or "deviants"
and pressuring them to conform to the dominant culture, men preserve the image
of their jobs as masculine work that no real woman would do. By marking
nontraditionally employed women workers as exceptions to their gender‑‑yet
still women and therefore never quite as competent or as committed as the men‑‑
harassment enables men to continue to define their work (and themselves) in
masculine terms.
In this analysis, hostile work environment
harassment is an endemic feature of the workplace that is both engendered by,
and further entrenches, the sex segregation of work. [FN407] In Carroll
Brodsky's terms, harassment provides male workers "a mechanism for
achieving exclusion and protection of privilege" in connection with work.
[FN408] Motivated by both material considerations and equally powerful
psychological ones, harassment provides a means for men to mark their jobs as
male territory and to discourage any women who seek to enter. By keeping women
in their place in the workplace, men secure superior status in the home, in the
polity, and in the larger culture as well.
Contrary to many prevailing assumptions,
workplace harassment is not a mere reflection of unequal gender relations that
have already been created *1761
elsewhere, such as in the domestic sphere. [FN409] The problem is not that men
are not yet accustomed to working alongside women as equals and therefore
revert to hierarchical and abusive relations learned in other settings. [FN410]
It is, instead, that by portraying women as less than equal at work, men can
secure superior jobs, resources, and influence‑‑all of which afford
men leverage over women at home and everyplace else. Work and workplace
relations are active shapers of gender difference and identity, and harassment
is a central mechanism through which men preserve their work and skill as
domains of masculine mastery. [FN411]
*1762 B. The Competence‑Undermining
Function of Hostile Work Environment Harassment
We should reconceptualize hostile work
environment harassment to acknowledge its crucial connection to job segregation
by sex. We should recognize that the central function of such harassment is to
preserve the masculine image and male‑dominated composition of favored
types of work. The definition of a hostile work environment should be broadened
to cover all conduct that is rooted in gender‑based expectations‑‑not
simply conduct that is sexual in nature. Experience teaches, however, that we
should go further: To render visible many of the nonsexual forms of harassment
that remain hidden, we should also recognize that much of the behavior that
creates a hostile work environment is conduct that has the purpose or effect of
undermining the perceived or actual competence of women (and some men) who
threaten the idealized masculinity of those who do the work. [FN412] By
engaging in hostile work environment harassment, incumbent male workers lay
claim to certain forms of work and the competence entailed as specifically
masculine forms of labor.
Such a competence‑centered account
creates a more complete understanding of the kinds of hostility experienced by
women at work, particularly in nontraditional settings. Cases brought by such
women, including many of the cases already examined in this Article, reveal
that a core element of their harassment is conduct having the aim or effect of
undermining their work competence. Sometimes this conduct assumes a blatant
form. As we have seen, many supervisors or coworkers openly question a woman's
right to hold the job at all: They tell her she is not cut out for the work,
[FN413] inform her that *1763 she
should be at home with her children, [FN414] or greet her with a "Men
only" sign [FN415] or equally graphic announcement that she is unwelcome.
[FN416] More typically, the men verbally demean a woman's competence or ability
to do the job, the content of the denigration varying with the type of work.
Sometimes, it takes the form of belittling a woman's physical prowess, as in
firefighting and corrections. [FN417] Sometimes, it takes the form of
disparaging her technical competence, as in the trades, sciences, or medicine.
[FN418] Sometimes, it takes the form of denigrating her intellectual
achievement, as in the academy. [FN419] Sometimes, it takes the form of
questioning her capacity for adequate aggressiveness, as in police work or
sales. [FN420] Sometimes, it takes the form of characterizing her as overly
aggressive or abrasive, as in law, management, or other elite professions.
[FN421] Sometimes, it takes the form of simply pronouncing her generally
incompetent or unproductive. [FN422] And, all too often, *1764 it takes the form of calling her dumb, stupid, or worthless:
[FN423] "You're a woman, what do you know?" [FN424]
Perhaps even more dangerous than such verbal
denigration of women's competence, men can take actions that convert those
statements into self‑ fulfilling prophesies. As the cases already
analyzed in this Article reveal, there are diverse methods of subverting a
woman's perceived or actual competence; the form of the conduct again varies
with the occupational setting. Sometimes, it takes the form of deliberate
sabotage of a woman's work performance, such as stealing a policewoman's case
files, [FN425] informing a lab worker that faulty equipment is sound, [FN426]
falsifying medical records to make it appear as though a female surgery
resident made an error, [FN427] or simply assigning her tasks that are
impossible to accomplish. [FN428] Sometimes, it takes the form of denying a
woman adequate training, assignments, or other opportunities to learn a job
fully, [FN429] refusing to mentor her, or ostracizing her *1765 from the informal networks through which crucial job skills
are passed on. [FN430] Sometimes, it takes the form of evaluating a woman's
performance by sexist and differential standards, [FN431] or requiring her to
perform service‑oriented tasks that are outside her job description, such
as cleaning, [FN432] serving coffee, [FN433] or providing secretarial support.
[FN434] Sometimes, it takes the form of denying a woman the privileges and perks
needed to succeed on the job, as, for example, withholding from saleswomen or
managers the right to deal with clients or the use of a company car, credit
card, or office. [FN435] Sometimes, it takes the form of assigning a woman
duties below her skill level or extending her forms of "help" that
signal she is incompetent to perform the simplest of tasks. [FN436] Sometimes,
it takes the form of gender‑neutral acts of physical assault, verbal
taunts, or other hazing in order to demoralize a woman psychologically or to
threaten or intimidate her physically. [FN437] And, far too *1766 frequently, it even takes the form of discrediting her
mental stability or sanity. [FN438]
Of course, these nonsexual forms of
harassment frequently are accompanied by more sexual ones, such as crude sexual
overtures, or sexual taunting and mockery. Such overtly sexual harassment, like
its less sexual counterpart, often is designed to undermine a woman's outward
image of competence and sense of self‑confidence as a worker. Sometimes,
such conduct takes the form of singling out a woman as the object of sexual
attention, as in work roles in which a woman's heightened attractiveness would
be inconsistent with the image of competent professionalism (such as in
medicine or academia). [FN439] Other times, men may use sexual overtures or
taunting as a way of branding a woman as inferior by brandishing their superior
masculine strength, as in settings in which physical virility is a central part
of the masculine image of the job (such as in police or construction work).
[FN440] In such settings, male workers use sexuality as "a technology of
sexism" [FN441] aimed at undermining a woman's work competence.
Contrary to the image of harassment as a top‑down
phenomenon, it is not only women subordinates who experience such efforts to
undermine their competence. As the earlier discussions of Reynolds v. Atlantic
City Construction Center [FN442] and Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. [FN443]
illustrate, women higher‑ups also confront challenges to their power and
efforts to subvert their performance by male subordinates. [FN444] Indeed, many
men may have particular difficulty submitting to the authority of a female
boss. A competence‑centered theory, in addition to explaining the
harassment directed at women who work in male‑dominated jobs, also helps
clarify some of the forms of harassment experienced by women in predominantly
female jobs. Like their nontraditionally employed counterparts, women in more
traditional settings also experience nonsexualized forms of harassment that are
geared toward undermining their competence or intelligence as workers. Often,
they are subjected to demeaning forms of authority, humiliation, and abuse‑‑objectified,
not necessarily as sexual objects, but as fools, children, or *1768 creatures to be exploited and
controlled. [FN445] Furthermore, when such women step out of place by refusing
to provide sexual favors or otherwise challenging male authority and control,
they are often punished through nonsexual measures to subvert their performance
or get them fired. [FN446] A competence‑centered model focuses on the
gendered nature of this process of punishment, rather than on the advances or
abuses of authority that preceded it.
To the extent that hostile work environment
harassment is motivated by a clear and conscious purpose, that goal is not
always clear. Sometimes, the harassment seems clearly calculated to drive women
away from the job. [FN447] At other times, it may serve to reconcile male
workers to women's presence by marking the women as different and inferior
workers who are less threatening competitors. [FN448] At yet other times, it
seems designed simply to punish a woman who has dared to transgress prescribed
gender boundaries. Whatever the goal, what unites all these experiences is that
women work in occupational environments that define their very womanhood as the
opposite of what it takes to be a good worker.
C.
Reconceptualizing the Harassment of Women Workers
The competence‑centered account of harassment
would return Title VII to its original and primary focus on dismantling job
segregation by sex. Experience with opening traditionally male jobs has
clarified the role of hostile work environment harassment in marking and
maintaining certain work as appropriate for men only. As we have seen, a core
component of such harassment is conduct designed to undermine a woman's
competence; the harassment does not always consist of sexual advances or other
sexually oriented conduct.
To reconceptualize harassment law, courts
must recognize the linkages between job segregation by sex, hostile work
environments, and not‑necessarily‑sexual, competence‑undermining
harassment. Berkman v. City of New York [FN449] provides an inspiring example.
Brenda Berkman and Zaida Gonzalez were members of a class of plaintiffs who had
won a suit against the New York City to open firefighting positions to women.
The court in this earlier case had invalidated the required physical exam under
Title VII and had ordered the city to devise a nondiscriminatory exam. Berkman
and Gonzalez passed the new exam and completed the training academy with flying
colors, but they were fired at the end of their probationary period. When the
plaintiffs brought a second lawsuit to challenge their firing, the city argued
that their performances were substandard. Judge Sifton found, instead, that the
two *1770 women were subjected to
retaliatory discrimination because of their sex and that a core component of
the discrimination was a campaign to discredit their competence, which
culminated in their termination. Indeed, the judge concluded that "the
officers of the Department responsible for their training and evaluation . . .
deliberately set out to re‑examine Berkman's and Gonzalez' physical
capacities to be firefighters." [FN450]
Judge Sifton correctly perceived the origins
of such discriminatory conditions in the desire to preserve firefighting as an
all‑male preserve. The judge began the analysis, powerfully, by
recognizing how predictable it was that the first female firefighters to enter
the department would experience harassment and discrimination:
What is first of all apparent . . . is
that the Fire Department failed lamentably to prepare its officers and members
for the extraordinary task of integrating women into its previously all‑male
ranks. . . . Nothing was done to assure that the extraordinarily lax and
generalized system of evaluating the progress of probationary firefighters was
administered rigorously and concretely in the case of women probationers so as
to avoid the introduction of prohibited discrimination in the evaluation and
training to the women firefighters. . . . [T]he Department did next to nothing
to foresee and prevent retaliation and sexual harassment which was one obviously
foreseeable response to the disruptions of everyday life in the workplace
caused by women joining the fire force. [FN451]
Understanding that harassment was a
predictable aftermath of attempting to integrate women into the fire department
permitted the court to recognize, equally perceptively, how central the
nonsexual forms of harassment‑‑particularly, differential training
and evaluation‑‑were to the campaign to drum Berkman and Gonzalez
out of firefighting. In the true spirit of McKinney v. Dole, [FN452] the judge
forcefully conveyed the notion that the nonsexual conduct was as important as
the sexual misconduct to sabotaging the women's ambitions. This analysis in no
way trivialized the more sexual harassment. Indeed, Judge Sifton began by
acknowledging that "both Berkman and Gonzalez were subjected . . . to
extensive sexual abuse in the form of unimpeded hazing." [FN453] The judge
then went on to describe how Berkman was subjected to "crude sexual
comments" in the form of graffiti and cartoons, and how Gonzalez had
"prophylactic devices and a wet vibrator . . . placed in her *1771 bed." [FN454] Gonzalez even
experienced "physical sexual molestation" that was tolerated by the
department. [FN455]
Yet the court's analysis did not end with
these sexual overtures. Judge Sifton made clear that "the same
discrimination that permitted these practices to occur and continue itself
entered into the other more important matters at hand, namely the training of
the applicants and their evaluations." [FN456] The judge first detailed
how the male firefighters isolated the women from "the unique forms of
communal living that are characteristic of the firefighters' workplace."
[FN457] For example,
Berkman's bed was not made by the
firefighters assigned this task as part of their regular duties. She received
little help on cooperative tasks in the firehouse. A meal prepared by Gonzalez
was thrown into the garbage by the men in her firehouse. Both were . . .
"put out of the meal," meaning that they were denied the opportunity
to share in the traditional communal effort to use the cooking facilities of
the firehouse to enjoy a common repast.
[FN458]
Having recounted the exclusionary quality of
day‑to‑day life in the firehouse, the court concluded that the
inadequate training and evaluations that Berkman and Gonzalez had received were
part of this same hostile work environment, stating, "[I]t is clear that
this intentional discrimination went beyond a failure to integrate the women
into the workplace and, in fact, infected as well their evaluation and training
to be firefighters." [FN459] Judge Sifton understood that the department's
judgment that the women's performances were substandard was not only the
product of a sex‑biased evaluation process, but also the predictable (if
not sought after) result of the department's own discriminatory failure to
train women properly. According to the judge, "both women were faulted for
performances easily corrected by training which they were denied." [FN460]
Indeed, such opportunities were "deliberately withheld from them by
company officers intentionally pursuing an effort to prove that the women
lacked the basic capacity to be firefighters." [FN461]
Although the content of the competence‑undermining
campaign was subtle, the court's frame of reference enabled it to discern the
gender‑based quality of the conduct involved. The judge's discussion is
eye‑opening. In one incident, for example, Berkman's supervising officer
attributed her difficulty in *1772
operating a power saw to insufficient upper‑body strength. "[A]fter
initial difficulties in operating the device relying only on the laconic
explanation given her by the supervisor who later evaluated her," noted
the court, "Berkman learned of a recognized technique approved at the
Training Academy. . . . Once advised of this technique, Berkman thereafter
employed it successfully and, according to the uncontradicted evidence, has
never encountered difficulties in starting the saw or operating it since."
[FN462] Similarly, Berkman was accused of being unable to remove a hose nozzle
that her male counterpart was able to remove. "Despite having performed
this simple task numerous times before without difficulty (the nozzles are
required by the Department to be only hand tight)," Berkman could not
remove the nozzle by hand on this occasion and required a spanner to accomplish
the task. [FN463] She later discovered that, in violation of department
regulations, someone had tightened the nozzle to such a degree that there was
no way to unfasten it without a spanner. The court understood this act of work
sabotage for what it was: part of the men's larger campaign to transform their
pronouncement of Berkman and the other women's lack of competence to be
firefighters into a self‑fulfilling prophecy. [FN464]
The court also comprehended that, in
Gonzalez's case, sexual assault and accusations of emotional instability were
part of the men's plan to subvert her competence and drive her out of the ranks
of firefighting: "Not only was Gonzalez subjected to the same litany of
sexual harassment through comment, hazing, exclusion from the meals, and denial
of the ordinary amenities of cooperative firehouse living as Berkman, Gonzalez
was physically abused in a sexual manner and, in response to her complaints,
vilified and defamed . . . ." [FN465] The physical advances, rather than
signaling genuine sexual interest, served as a way of marking Gonzalez as too
weak and defenseless to be a firefighter. Indeed, Judge Sifton noted that
"[w]hen, in response to [her] systematic mistreatment, she on one occasion
lost control of her emotions [and cried], even that fact was recorded against
her as evidence of [her unsuitability] for the job." [FN466] Her captain
purportedly wrote her up for physical cowardice and emotional instability.
[FN467] To his credit, the judge refused to accept the department's
characterization of Gonzalez as incompetent. Instead, in a moving passage, he
commended her courage and commitment to her chosen calling:
*1773 Given the credible testimony at trial with respect to sexual
harassment and discrimination to which she was subjected, what is surprising is
not that Ms. Gonzalez was rated unsatisfactory on the few evaluations on which
she received that rating on her re‑evaluation at the Training Academy,
but rather that she has had the courage to continue to pursue her goal of
becoming a firefighter and learn as much as she plainly has about her chosen
career. . . . If any good can come of this sad history of mistreatment, it
arises from Ms. Gonzalez' courageous refusal to back down and the assurance
that such conduct, now brought to light, need never again be repeated in the
history of the City's Fire Department. [FN468]
Berkman exemplifies the kind of approach
courts would bring to cases under a competence‑centered paradigm. As we
have seen, the court's evaluation of the evidence was framed from the outset by
the judge's understanding of the difficulties that women who enter occupational
turf long reserved for men are likely to encounter. Such an understanding was
facilitated by the unique posture and claims of the case: Berkman was not a
hostile work environment case, but rather a challenge to the plaintiffs'
terminations in violation of an earlier court order. The court's involvement in
the earlier pattern or practice case gave the judge an intimate understanding
of the structural context of the women's firings; the judge had extensive
knowledge about the fire department, its history, its culture, its image, and
the attitudes of its leadership andits rank and file. The judge therefore
understood the depth of the resistance to integrating women into the ranks of
firefighting. From this frame of reference, the court perceived the campaign of
harassment, not as an expression of the male firefighters' sexual needs, but
rather as an attempt to police the gender boundaries of their calling against
incursion from creatures considered too physically inept to uphold the image of
the heroic firefighter. This perspective cast the nonsexual forms of harassment
in as suspicious a light as the more sexually abusive forms and revealed the
biases inherent in the plaintiff's training and evaluations. The court was able
to perceive that all the harassment directed at the women was designed to
challenge their capacity‑‑ and their entitlement‑‑to
become firefighters. This competence‑centered understanding of
harassment, in turn, revealed that any problems in the women's performance were
a product of the discriminatory training and harassment the women had
experienced because of their sex.
As Berkman illustrates, a competence‑undermining
account of hostile work environment harassment would help rectify the problems
of underinclusiveness created by the prevailing sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm. By redirecting the courts' attention away from whether harassing
conduct is sexual in nature and restoring Title VII's principal emphasis on
whether such conduct makes it *1774
more difficult for women to develop and express their capability as workers,
the new account would aid many women who have been excluded from the protection
of harassment law.
V.
Additional Advantages of the Competence‑Centered Account
The sexual desire‑dominance paradigm
has obscured more than women's gender troubles at work: It has also led the
courts to overlook the problems faced by some men who suffer from harassment by
male supervisors or coworkers. As this part shows, the competence‑centered
account creates a coherent framework for addressing claims of same‑sex
harassment. Rather than inquiring into whether the content or motivation
underlying such harassment is sexual, the new account would investigate whether
the harassment creates pressure to conform to the harassers' image of suitable
manly competence for those who do the job. If so, the conduct is based on
gender within the meaning of Title VII.
Just as the competence‑centered
account helps reveal the actionable features of male‑on‑male
harassment, it also reduces the risks of prohibiting benign sexual expression
that are present under the prevailing paradigm. The new account cautions
against confusing gender‑based harassment with mere talk about sex. Some
forms of sexual expression in the workplace remain properly outside Title VII's
purview because they do not involve the conscription of gendered work roles
that is the statute's central concern.
A.
Revealing the Actionable Features of Male‑on‑Male Harassment
Just as the heterosexual desire‑dominance
paradigm has rendered invisible some of the most debilitating forms of gender‑based
harassment and hostility experienced by women, it has also obscured some
pernicious forms of such harassment experienced by men. If the published cases
provide any indication, [FN469] the most common form of harassment experienced
by men may not involve, as the film Disclosure [FN470] would suggest, female
supervisors trying to extract sexual favors from their male subordinates.
Instead, the most prevalent form of harassment experienced by men may be
harassment directed at them by their male coworkers or supervisors in an
attempt to force conformity to the dominant group's image of suitable
masculinity for particular jobs. [FN471]
*1775 The competence‑centered paradigm provides a helpful
framework for analyzing such male‑on‑male harassment. As the
account illuminates, men have a lot at stake in assuring a tight linkage
between their work and their masculinity. It is crucial for many men to
maintain control over the masculinized image of their work.[FN472] If a job is
to confer masculinity, it must be held by those who project the desired
manliness. Thus, in these men's eyes, it is important to affirm that any woman
who would be found in a "man's job" is neither as competent as a man,
nor even a "real" woman. Indeed, nontraditionally employed women are
often branded as lesbians, without regard to the accuracy of the label. [FN473]
Crossing the gender divide in an occupational sense is associated with crossing
it in a sexual sense as well.
But women are not the only ones who can
disrupt the link between work competence and masculinity. As historian Ava
Baron has shown, for example, boys can do so also. [FN474] The expression
"Don't send a boy when you need to
*1776 send a man" ceases to have meaning if there is no difference in
capability between the men and the boys. In a similar way, the work‑gender
link can be disrupted by the presence of other males who fail to conform to the
definition of masculine mastery that the dominant group has projected onto the
work (to be reflected back onto themselves). The desired masculine persona
varies with the type of work involved: Professional boxers, no doubt, see the
manly qualities of their calling differently from research scientists, for
example. Contradictions abound: Whereas some male workers define the masculine
character of their work in terms of a capacity for "hard" physical
labor, others see masculine competence in the performance of mental or
intellectual activity that other men would see as "soft." [FN475] In
other occupations, the desired image of masculine mastery is defined in terms
of a conventional, head‑of‑the‑household status, which is
seen as befitting a member of the trade. Thus, in many male‑dominated
work settings, the dominant group is not only threatened by the presence of any
man perceived to be homosexual‑‑for homosexuality is viewed as an
expression of gender deviance‑‑but the group may also be threatened
by the presence of men who are not married, men who have trouble with women,
men whose wives or girlfriends earn more money than they do, men who perform
significant childcare or housework, men who are "overly" emotional,
men who are openly supportive of women's causes‑‑or any other men
whom the dominant group believes convey an image of masculine weakness or
gender nonconformity.
Just as dominant male workers may harass
women who threaten their idealized image of masculinity on the job, they may
also harass such nonconforming men. This form of harassment, like harassment of
women workers, perpetuates job segregation by sex. As we have seen, one
important way in which male workers reproduce such segregation is by
perpetuating the belief that only those who possess certain idealized masculine
qualities are competent to perform traditionally segregated jobs. We have seen
how men can sustain this impression by harassing women workers. They can also
sustain it by engaging in harassment that drives away men who fail to conform
to the desired image of masculinity or that incorporates them as weak and
inferior workers.
Because many heterosexual men regard any
failure to conform to their own preconceived notion of masculinity as a sign of
homosexuality‑‑and homosexuality as a failure to conform to their
preconceived notion of *1777
masculinity‑‑such harassment frequently includes antigay sentiments.
Indeed, sexual orientation and gender are often linked symbolically around the
issue of work competence. Just as many women are labeled lesbians simply
because their proclivity for male‑dominated work threatens the projected
masculine competence of the men who do that work, so too men whose actions or
personae jeopardize that competence may be presumed to be or taunted as gay.
Simply because hostile work environment harassment may include some antigay
expression, however, does not mean that it is not based on gender. Regardless
of whether the harassee's sexuality is placed at issue, such harassment is
gender‑based if it denigrates the harassee's manhood or otherwise
prescribes how the harassee should be or should behave on the job. As the
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins [FN476] instructs,
imposing pressure to conform to preconceived notions of appropriate manhood or
womanhood at work is the essence of differential treatment "because of
sex" within the meaning of Title VII. [FN477]
The lower courts, however, have not viewed
male‑on‑male harassment from this perspective. Instead, they have
analyzed these cases from the vantage point of the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm. Within that framework, the gendered character of male‑on‑male
harassment remains imperceptible because it does not conform to the
contemplated male‑female, dominant‑subordinate configuration.
Several cases illustrate this problem.
In Goluszek v. Smith, [FN478] the plaintiff
was an electronic maintenance mechanic who worked in a plant that treated paper
with polyethylene coating for freezer wrap and the like. His job was to
maintain and repair the machines used in production. Goluszek lived with his
mother and had never married. There was no evidence that he had homosexual
inclinations. An expert testified that he came from an "unsophisticated
background" and had led an "isolated existence" with
"little or no sexual experience." [FN479] He "blushe[d]
easily" at the mention of sexual matters. [FN480]
Almost as soon as Goluszek began work, a
group of machinists began to harass him. They did not accuse him of being gay,
but acted on gender‑based expectations to assault his masculinity, for he
did not fit their image of the type of man who should be a mechanic and member
of the Teamster's union. They taunted him about not having a wife or
girlfriend, telling him a man had to be married to work in the plant. They told
him he should get married and should go out with a female coworker named Carla
Drucker, because she "fucks." [FN481] They used other gender‑stereotyped
images to assault his work *1778
competence, telling him that if he could not fix a machine, they would send in
his "daddy"‑‑the supervisor‑‑to do it. They
made other comments that linked their assaults on his work competence to
attacks on his sexual virility. They told him that if he could not fix a
machine, they would get "Carla Drucker to fix" him. [FN482]
Eventually, Goluszek's coworkers resorted to work sabotage in an attempt to
drive him out of his job. They drove jeeps at him and threatened to knock him
off his ladder. When he filed a grievance, his supervisor punished him instead
of his coworkers by writing him up for alleged carelessness in his work.
Subsequently, he was transferred to a different shift where the machinists
accused him of being gay or bisexual and made crude sexual overtures. [FN483]
Goluszek continued to be taunted and to receive warnings about his performance.
Eventually, he was fired.
In an analysis that illustrates the logic of
the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm, the court granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff on his hostile work environment claim. The court
acknowledged that "Goluszek may have been harassed 'because' he is a
male" [FN484]‑‑the very definition of sex‑ based conduct
that violates Title VII. Nonetheless, the court concluded that Goluszek had not
stated an actionable claim: "Title VII does not make all forms of
harassment actionable, nor does it even make all forms of verbal harassment
with sexual overtones actionable." [FN485] In a classic statement of the
sexual desire‑dominance model, the court pronounced: "The 'sexual
harassment' that is actionable under Title VII 'is the exploitation of a
powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but
less powerful person.' Actionable sexual‑harassment fosters a sense of
degradation in the victim by attacking their sexuality." [FN486]
The court emphasized that the harasser‑harassee
configuration did not fit the typical male‑female pattern: "Goluszek
was a male in a male‑dominated environment . . . . [E]ach and every one
of [his harassers] was a male." [FN487] According to the court, these
facts alone proved that the harassment could not be "anti‑male."
[FN488] At least in the absence of evidence that the harassers desired sexual
relations with Goluszek, the court could not conceive how harassment of a male
coworker might violate Title VII. The fact that an incumbent group of male
workers might oppress a man because he failed to *1779 satisfy their image of the married, sexually robust
tradesman was lost on the court. Viewed through the lens of the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm, masculinity is monolithic and workplace harassment always comes in
the form of sexual exploitation.
Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
[FN489] provides a second illustration. Edwin Martin was a mechanical
supervisor in a diesel shop at a railroad yard. His immediate supervisor, a
fellow mechanical supervisor, and one of his subordinates subjected him to a
pattern of sexual overtures and taunts sufficiently extreme that the court
concluded they stated a claim for the tort of outrage. [FN490] Although the
harassment was sexual in content, the court concluded that it was not motivated
by a desire for actual sexual relations. Instead, the harassment functioned to
impugn Martin's manliness. Some of the harassment insulted Martin's girlfriend
(who soon became his wife): The harassers called her "ugly,"
"made improper and inappropriate remarks" about her, and asked Martin
where he was getting sex. [FN491] Other incidents took on the flavor of gay‑bashing:
The men told Martin he looked like he had AIDS and called him and two other
employees the "Three Muskequeers." [FN492] The majority of the
incidents were ambiguous; they could be interpreted as marking Martin with
homosexual affinities or as accusing him of "feminine" attractiveness
(or both). His harassers called him "pretty" and "cute,"
fashioned a piece of computer paper around his head as a scarf, and told him
they would like to "bend him over a chair and have sex with him."
[FN493] They also offered to show him their penises and asked to see his;
grabbed at his legs, rear end, and genitals; placed him in a headlock, pinched
him, and tried to kiss him. [FN494] Regardless of the precise form of the
harassment, however, it was clear that all the attacks were gender‑based:
Whether they were reducible to gay‑bashing or were a reaction to Martin's
perceived gender‑nonconformity (or both), the content and the context of
the incidents suggested that Martin's harassers meant to malign his masculinity
by implying that it was different‑‑and inferior‑‑to
their own. [FN495]
The court's analysis began auspiciously. The
court observed that, "[u]nder the plain language of the statute,
employment discrimination based on gender
*1780 is prohibited," [FN496] and concluded that even "'same‑gender
discrimination . . . is within the statute's reach provided the discrimination
occurs because of the employee's gender."' [FN497] Immediately after
announcing these principles, however, the court undermined them. Based on its
application of the twin strands of the definition of harassment in the
prevailing paradigm‑‑sexual desire and sexual dominance‑‑the
court proclaimed that Martin's hostile work environment claim was not
actionable as discrimination. [FN498]
First, to support the sexual dominance
theory, the court cited Goluszek for the proposition that sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII as sex discrimination only where it involves
"'the exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or
pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person."' [FN499] Extending
Goluszek to its logical conclusion, the court stated: "This [sexual
exploitation] theory focuses on whether there is an atmosphere of oppression by
a 'dominant gender,' and thus assumes that the harasser and victim must be of
opposing genders." [FN500] Second, the court made clear that it is the
presence of sexual desire that supplies the inference of gender domination or
discrimination where the harasser and victim are of the "opposing
genders" and the male is superior and the female subordinate. Drawing on
the reasoning of early quid pro quo cases such as Barnes v. Costle, [FN501] the
court noted that the presumption of sexual desire applies not only to advances
made by heterosexual men on women, but also to advances made by homosexual men
on other men (and, in a novel twist, to advances made by bisexual men on other
men):
In a situation where a male sexually
harasses a female, there is the presumption that he does so because she is a
female and that he would not do the same to a male. The same is true when a
homosexual or bisexual male harasses another male; there is the presumption
that the harasser does so because he is sexually attracted to the male victim
and would not treat a female in the same manner. The presumption arises from
the sexually oriented harassing conduct and is predicated on the perceived need
for sexual gratification. Because of the demand by the harasser for sexual
gratification, the victim is singled out because of his or her gender. [FN502] Based on this reasoning, the court
concluded in a final passage that heterosexual male‑on‑male (or
female‑on‑female) harassment could never occur "because of
sex" within the meaning of Title VII:
[I]n
the case of same‑sex heterosexual hostile working environment sexual
harassment, the presumption of sexual gratification and thus, sex
discrimination, ceases to exist . . . . Therefore, the court holds that same‑
sex heterosexual hostile working environment sexual harassment is not
actionable under Title VII. [FN503]
In the court's analysis, gender
discrimination is compressed to sexual desire. There is no room for an account
of male workers' harassment of other men that recognizes that sexuality can be
a potent weapon, without reducing the entire gender‑based struggle over
the definition of dominant masculinity to a desire for sexual gratification.
This analysis has an ironic implication: In cases of male‑on‑male
harassment, even participation in explicitly sexual advances does not signify
the presence of the desire that damns men who harass women. Men who make sexual
overtures toward other men are presumed to be solidly heterosexual, absent
proof to the contrary. [FN504]
In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors, [FN505] the Fourth Circuit adopted these propositions expressly.
Mark McWilliams was an auto mechanic for a state agency who had a learning
disability that had "arrested his cognitive and emotional
development." [FN506] His coworkers‑‑known colloquially as the
"lube boys"‑‑subjected him to a host of harassment, which
expressed contempt for what they perceived as his failed masculinity. The men *1782 taunted him with such remarks
as, "The only woman you could get is deaf, dumb, and blind." [FN507]
They teased him about his sexual activities, exposed themselves to him, and
sexually assaulted him by forcing a finger in his mouth to simulate oral sex
and placing a broomstick to his anus while exposing their genitals. Despite the
sexually explicit nature of these overtures, the court characterized the
conduct as "heterosexual" and concluded, like the Martin court, that
such "heterosexual‑male‑on‑heterosexual‑male
conduct" is not "because of the [target's] 'sex."' [FN508] The
court held, moreover, that even if the men were not heterosexual and a
different conclusion on causation were required, "the fact of
homosexuality (to include bisexuality) should be considered an essential element
of the claim, to be alleged and proved." [FN509] Otherwise, feared the
court, Title VII might be construed to cover "conduct merely suggestive of
homosexuality between persons of the same sex who actually are
heterosexuals." [FN510] Even the dissent adopted a desire‑centered
paradigm. [FN511] As with the Goluszek and Martin courts, it occurred to
neither the majority nor the dissenting judges that the sexual content of
McWilliams's coworkers' conduct might be only a tool to accomplish a larger
project: that of emasculating‑‑and expelling‑‑a
mechanic so beset with gender affliction as to be unfit to be a "lube
boy."
In Dillon v. Frank, [FN512] the Sixth
Circuit squarely confronted such a gender‑based argument. Ernest Dillon
was a postal worker who was tormented by his coworkers. One fellow employee
called Dillon a "fag," pushed materials into Dillon's work area,
turned off the bathroom lights when Dillon entered, and physically assaulted
Dillon so seriously that he suffered numerous injuries. Other employees
followed suit: They subjected Dillon to a "full orchestral assault"
of antigay epithets and such publicly displayed graffiti such as "Dillon
sucks dicks" and "Dillon gives head." [FN513] Although the
Postal Service fired the man who assaulted Dillon, it did little or nothing to
curb the harassment *1783 by his
other coworkers. His employers "threw up their hands in despair, telling
Dillon not to waste their time with his complaints and to fight back when
taunted." [FN514] After enduring abuse for three years, Dillon eventually
resigned upon advice from his therapist.
Dillon alleged that his coworkers tormented
him because he failed to conform to their expectations of suitable masculinity.
In his view, his coworkers' antigay ridicule was in the service of sexism:
"He contended that he was subjected to [sex] stereotyping in that he was
not deemed 'macho' enough by his co‑workers for a man" and that the
"abuse relating to [his perceived] homosexuality [occurred] solely because
he was a man," in violation of Title VII. [FN515] He argued that the
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins [FN516] supported this
theory: Just as Title VII prohibits an accounting firm from requiring a female
partnership candidate to conform to its gender‑based expectations for
appropriately feminine behavior, the statute also prohibits an employer from
permitting its employees to create a hostile work environment for a male worker
based on his failure to conform to its gender‑ based expectations for a
fitting masculine image. [FN517]
Despite the simplicity of such reasoning,
the Sixth Circuit rejected it on two related grounds. First, the court inverted
Dillon's argument in order to reject it. According to the court, the fact that
the content of the harassment directed at Dillon was sexual was irrelevant‑‑a
hostile work environment plaintiff must prove that the harassment was based on
sex. Here, "Dillon's co‑ workers deprived him of a proper work
environment," not because of his sex, but instead "because they believed
him to be homosexual." [FN518] Yet, discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality does not violate Title VII, the court concluded, and thus Dillon
failed to state an actionable claim. [FN519]
The court's analysis was beside the point,
however, in light of what Dillon had actually argued. Contrary to the court's
characterization, Dillon had not argued that the sexual content of the
harassment or the fact that he was picked on for his perceived homosexuality
made the conduct illegal; to Dillon, those facts were subsidiary. He had
argued, instead, that the harassment was illegal because it was based on his
sex. That it consisted of crude forms of gay‑ bashing was relevant only
as evidence that his harassers had subjected him to gender stereotyping; in
their eyes, his alleged homosexuality made him a lesser man not suitable to
stand alongside them as a postal worker.
In a second passage, the Sixth Circuit
purported to confront Dillon's actual argument, but continued to misconstrue
it: "Dillon attempts to avoid [[the fact *1784 that discrimination on the basis of homosexuality is not
proscribed] by alleging that he was discriminated against because he was
male." [FN520] The court rejected this argument on the ground that Dillon
had "not shown that his co‑workers would have treated a similarly
situated woman any differently." [FN521] His inability to make such a
showing, however, was based on the fact that the court once again converted his
argument about gender stereotyping into one focused on sexuality. According to
the court, Dillon's argument that he was treated differently because of his sex
"must presume that the abuse was directed at his supposed homosexuality or
at specific sexual practices (such as anal sexor fellatio)." [FN522] In
other words, Dillon had to show that a woman who was perceived to be a lesbian
or to engage in oral sex with men would not have been subjected to harassment.
Once the court forced Dillon into such a comparison, the court's ruling became
a foregone conclusion: "[Dillon] has not argued that a lesbian would have
been accepted at the Center, nor has he argued that a woman known to engage in
the disfavored sexual practices would have escaped abuse," concluded the
court. "Without such a showing, his claim to have been discriminated
against because he is male cannot succeed." [FN523]
But this was not Dillon's argument. Dillon's
analogy to Price Waterhouse had been perfectly clear: Just as the female
partnership candidate in that case was treated differently based on her sex‑‑in
the sense that a male candidate would not have been counseled to behave more
femininely‑‑so, too, Dillon claimed that he was treated differently
based on his sex, in the sense that a female postal worker would not have been
censured for failing to behave in a more suitably masculine manner. The court's
choice not to use Dillon's framing of the male‑ female comparison was not
mere semantics. As others have pointed out, the results of a disparate
treatment analysis can turn on the way the comparison is framed; [FN524] the
choice of framework invariably conveys something important about the way a
court comprehends the problem.
The Sixth Circuit was wrong in stating that
it was Dillon who was trying to avoid the problem posed by his alleged
homosexuality by framing the harassment as gender discrimination. Rather, it
was the court that sought to avoid the truth of Dillon's contention that his
male coworkers had discriminated against him based on his perceived gender
nonconformity. It did so by renaming the harassment sexual orientation
discrimination. In so doing, the court set up a standard of two‑tiered
justice. True, it had initially declared
*1785 that the relevant hostile work environment inquiry turned on the
motivation or meaning underlying the harassment rather than the form or content
of its expression. But it then reframed the problem to permit the harassment to
evade substantive review merely because it included some antigay content. Yet,
there is no reason that harassers who engage in impermissible gender
stereotyping should be able to insulate themselves (and their employers) from
Title VII liability merely by including among their hostile expressions charges
of homosexuality or antigay sentiments.
This point may be illustrated by a
hypothetical change in the facts of Price Waterhouse. Imagine that Ann Hopkins
had not only been counseled to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, [and] wear make‑ up," [FN525] but
also had been cautioned "not to be such a dyke." Surely, the mere
addition of this suggestion would not have changed the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the firm had engaged in impermissible gender stereotyping. To
allow such a result would permit the courts to deny Title VII's protection to
victims of sex discrimination simply because their harassers regard or taunt
them as homosexuals or because the victims have identified themselves as such.
This is tantamount to excluding people identified as gay from the protection
from gender stereotyping extended to all other people as men and women. By
denying Dillon the protection from gender stereotyping he was due under Price
Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit effected precisely such an exclusion.
There is another sense in which the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Dillon contributes to a two‑tiered application of
Title VII. Under the reasoning of Barnes v. Costle, Martin, and McWilliams, a
homosexual man who makes sexual advances toward another man is responsible for
the harassment. Such harassment occurs "because of sex" because it is
presumed that someone with homosexual inclinations would not direct similar
attentions toward a person of the opposite sex. Under Dillon, however,
heterosexual men who direct sex‑based harassment toward other men whom
they accuse of being homosexual will get off scott‑free. Worse yet,
McWilliams suggests that men who direct forms of harassment other than explicit
sexual propositions toward other men will be presumed to be heterosexual,
unless actually proven to be otherwise. [FN526] Taken together, the cases
create a biased form of justice: Men who are perceived to be homosexuals are
excluded from protection against sex‑based harassment, but men who engage
in antigay harassment of other men will be presumed to be heterosexual and will
not be held responsible. Indeed, some courts have expressly embraced such
logic. [FN527]
*1786 There is nothing in the language or purpose of the statute,
however, that requires such a biased pattern of protection and responsibility.
But for the blinders of the prevailing paradigm, the courts would not have
created such a pattern. In reality, male‑on‑male harassment may
have little to do with sexual desire or practices. [FN528] Male workers often
resort to sexually explicit taunts and assaults and make accusations of or
derogate a harassee's homosexuality‑‑along with other forms of
harassment that make no overt reference to sexuality but operate to insult the
harassee's manhood‑‑as a form of branding men who fail to satisfy
their image of suitable masculine mastery for the job as different and
inferior.
Thus, accusations of and antagonism toward
homosexuality are relevant, but not because such actions signal anything about
whether sexual desire is present between harassers and harassees. They are
relevant because antigay harassment frequently evidences gender stereotyping.
[FN529] The allegation that a man is gay is often an accusation that he does
not live up to one's expectations of masculine competence. Because the
harassers' remarks about sexual orientation provide clearer evidence of their
purpose, proof of the harassee's actual sexual orientation should not be
required. It is the accusation rather than the actuality that is relevant. Nor
is evidence of the harassers' sexual orientation relevant. The existence of
sexual desire between harassers and harassees should not be part of the
inquiry; men of any sexual orientation should be presumed capable of
impermissible gender stereotyping of other men (or women).
Indeed, courts should recognize that gender‑based
denigration of competence may occur across various configurations of the sexes.
[FN530] Just as *1787 some men may
bash other men as gay in order to denigrate their masculinity, men may also
bait women as lesbian to demarcate them as gender deviants. For purposes of
hostile work environment analysis, both forms of antigay ridicule are analogous
to the forms of harassment directed at women workers who cross the gender
divide into male‑dominated terrain.
Although this analysis recognizes that same‑sex,
gender‑based hostile work environment harassment may include antigay
conduct, it does not conflate harassment on the basis of gender with harassment
on the basis of sexual orientation. [FN531] Consequently, courts should not be
concerned that adopting this approach would merely accomplish indirectly a
prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination that Congress has, so
far, declined to do directly. [FN532] The competence‑centered approach
contemplates that men of any sexual orientation may seek to endow their work
with an idealized masculine image by denigrating women or men of any sexual
orientation who detract from the desired image. Just as the approach does not
reduce all gender‑based, same‑ sex harassment to sexual orientation
discrimination, neither does it treat all sexual‑orientation‑based
classifications as gender‑based discrimination. Some discussions and
overtures‑‑and perhaps even some forms of outright discrimination
based on sexual orientation‑‑are not gender‑based attempts at
denigration and would not be actionable under this approach. [FN533]
Contrary to the reasoning expressed in
Dillon, however, the fact that a group of male workers might direct harassment
of a similar form or content toward both male and female workers does not mean
that the harassment is not gender‑ based. To the contrary, once a sexual
desire model is abandoned, the fact that the men who harass seek to police
their occupational boundaries against both women and nonconforming men might be
evidence that the harassment of each group is based on gender. What matters is
not whether the men direct even the very same taunts toward men and women
("Dillon sucks *1788
dicks" and "Judy sucks dick"); [FN534] what matters is that, in
both cases, the men's taunts seek to humiliate and alienate the harassed women
and men because they fail to live up to their harassers' images of appropriate
masculinity and femininity. Just as in male‑on‑female harassment
cases, proof that a man went after women other than the plaintiff often
confirms that the harassment of the plaintiff was based on sex, so too evidence
that some male workers went after both women and men they perceived to be
gender‑deviant may confirm that the harassment of each group was based on
gender‑based notions of who should hold the job. Far from disproving the
existence of discrimination based on sex, then, the fact that the harassers
target women as well as men may tend to prove such discrimination.
This reasoning casts new light on cases like
Lyman v. Nabil's, Inc., [FN535] in
which a court dismissed the claim of a male restaurant manager who complained
that the owner subjected him to a hostile work environment by forcing him to
observe and even to participate in the widespread harassment of female
employees. According to the plaintiff Lyman,
[the owner] offensively touched and
directed offensive language at women employees under Lyman's supervision. Lyman
further allege[d] that the women complained to him about these offensive acts,
that [the owner] made sexual comments about the women to Lyman, and that [the
owner] made Lyman transfer the women from restaurant to restaurant in
retaliation for their complaints . . . . Lyman also allege[d] defendant . . .
fir[ed] him for his complaining about the alleged discriminatory acts, his
being supportive of women complaining of those acts, and his refusal to
cooperate in defendant's retaliation against women. [FN536]
Operating under the prevailing paradigm, the
court could not comprehend how the owner's sex‑based harassment of women
employees could constitute harassment of the male plaintiff. As a consequence,
the court accepted the defendant's argument that "the conduct [the
plaintiff] alleges was not offensive to [the plaintiff's] own gender"
[FN537] and dismissed the hostile work environment claim. Under a competence‑centered
account of harassment, however, a court would recognize that Lyman experienced
a hostile work environment based on his own gender because the owner tried to
force him to behave as, and eventually fired him for refusing to become, a
manager who approves of and acquiesces in the harassment of women. Insofar as
Lyman *1789 sympathized with and
supported the cause of his female subordinates, he betrayed the type of
dominant masculinity his supervisor expected of him as a manager. As a result,
he was himself harassed and eventually fired. Although this misconduct was
nonsexual in nature, it would be actionable under a competence‑centered
approach. [FN538]
As the analysis of these cases shows, the
competence‑centered paradigm would direct the courts' attention toward
the processes through which men create work cultures that sustain their own
idealized definitions of masculine mastery to the detriment of men who cannot
or will not conform. The focus would no longer be on sexuality or sexual
orientation. Whether harassment flows from men to women, men to men, women to
men, or women to women, and whether it is sexual or nonsexual in content, the
focus should not be on sexuality as such. The goal of harassment law should be
to eradicate gender stratification, not to banish all sexual expression from
the workplace. The next section elaborates on that theme.
B.
Reducing the Risk of Prohibiting Benign Sexual Expression
Just as the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm creates problems of underinclusiveness, it may also create problems of
overinclusiveness by influencing courts and companies to characterize some
benign forms of sexual expression as hostile work environment harassment. We
have already seen how the sexual desire‑dominance paradigm enables a
paternalism that excludes many women who do not comport with the image of the
proper victim in need of sexual protection. [FN539] In addition, such
paternalism risks encouraging courts and companies to overreach in an effort to
protect women's sexual sensibilities from mere discussions of sexuality that do
not threaten their equality in the workplace. Perhaps predictably, courts
appear more likely to engage in such overreaching where the discussion involves
sexuality perceived as deviant. [FN540] By reorienting the focus of harassment
law toward conduct that promotes gender stratification, the new paradigm helps
rectify this problem.
Contrary to the assumption of the sexual
desire‑dominance paradigm, gender inequality is not synonymous with
sexual relations. [FN541] Just as gender‑based oppression occurs outside
the realm of the sexual, so too does the sphere of sexuality encompass more
than simply oppression. Sexual relations (heterosexual or otherwise) do not
inherently enact male dominance over women. Indeed, to characterize sexuality
as such risks allowing heterosexual women to become the arbiters of others'
sexual expression‑‑including that of marginalized sexual minorities‑‑even
where that expression does not hinder women's full participation in the
workplace. In Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, Inc., [FN542] for example, a
heterosexual woman who was the associate director of a nonprofit organization
alleged that her gay male supervisor had created a hostile work environment by
trying to draw her into conversations about homosexuality. Although the court
correctly concluded that the supervisor's comments were neither gender‑based
nor actionable harassment, [FN543] it is nonetheless disturbing that the
governing legal paradigm encouraged a lawyer to bring such a case without
risking sanction.
That Title VII law can be construed to
characterize this kind of sex talk as actionable harassment may influence some
companies to discipline or fire workers for sexual expression in an effort to
avoid legal liability. Recently, for example, the Miller Brewing Company was
assessed $26.6 million in damages after it fired an executive, Jerold
Mackenzie, whom a female employee, Patricia Best, had accused of sexual
harassment. [FN544] Mackenzie, who had worked for Miller for nineteen years,
had commented to Best about an episode of Seinfeld that aired the night before.
In the show, Seinfeld cannot recall the name of the woman he is dating. He
knows that her name rhymes with a part of the female anatomy, however, and
incorrectly guesses such names as "Mulva" and "Gipple." At
the end of the show, as the woman breaks up with *1791 him, Seinfeld remembers her name and calls out,
"Delores!" At work, Mackenzie recounted this episode to Best, and
when she did not get the joke, he photocopied a dictionary page defining
"clitoris" and handed it to her. Best complained to Miller officials
that she was offended by Mackenzie's action, and they later fired him for
"unacceptable managerial performance." [FN545]
The facts of the case, of course, bear more
than one interpretation. It is possible that Mackenzie's conduct was less
innocuous than it appears from the press accounts. Best testified, for example,
that she was offended not merely by Mackenzie's handing her the dictionary
page, but by the way he looked at her as he did so. Mackenzie had previously
told her that he had dreamed about her and had left her a "romantic"
voice‑mail message. [FN546] After learning that Mackenzie dreamed only
that Best was divorced, however, and after hearing Mackenzie's actual voice‑mail
message‑‑in which Mackenzie refers to Best as a "breath of
fresh air," but in a business context [FN547]‑‑a twelve‑person
jury that included ten women decided that Mackenzie's conduct did not comport
with their understandingof sex‑based harassment. [FN548] Indeed, Miller
may not have fired Mackenzie out of a genuine concern that his conduct left
them vulnerable to liability for hostile work environment harassment, but may
instead have used Best's accusation of harassment as a subterfuge for firing
Mackenzie, whom they wanted to get rid of for other reasons. [FN549]
Regardless of the motivation behind
Mackenzie's firing, the case has disquieting implications. At least on the
facts recounted in the press, Mackenzie's conduct does not approach the sort of
gender‑based hostility or denigration that threatened to undermine Best's‑‑or
other women's‑‑equality in the workplace. Instead, Mackenzie
appears to have been railroaded out of a company to which he devoted much of
his life for having joked about a racy television episode and referred to
female genitalia. Only a misplaced concern for women's sexual sensibilities
accounts for Miller's action: Absent other indicia that Mackenzie's actions
constituted or promoted gender inequality, the mere reference to sexual matters
should not have been construed as harassing conduct that justified discharge.
Indeed, feminists should be concerned about the prospect of companies firing
men in Mackenzie's situation. For one thing, feminism receives a bad rap when
workers are fired in the name of a feminist‑ *1792 inspired cause of action for merely talking about sex.
[FN550] For another, such firings may sow the seeds of backlash against
protecting women from genuinely harmful forms of hostile work environment
harassment. [FN551] Such seeds may become bitter weeds that choke legitimate
causes of action if juries begin to assess damages against individual women who
complain of harassment, as the jury did against Patricia Best. [FN552]
Other cases appear more difficult. In Pierce
v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., [FN553] a male manager, Tom Pierce, was
accused of sexual harassment after participating in an exchange of sexually
explicit cards with a female office administrator, Debbie Kennedy. One of the
cards Pierce sent read, "Sex is a misdemeanor. De more I miss, de meanor I
get." [FN554] The other was a cartoon valentine that read, "There are
many ways to say 'I love you' . . . but f‑‑ing is the fastest."
[FN555] According to Pierce and others in the office, Kennedy had also sent
Pierce cards with sexually explicit messages and had engaged in other off‑color
behavior toward Pierce and other employees. [FN556] In response to Kennedy's
claim of sexual harassment, Pierce was disciplined. He was summarily demoted,
with a significant reduction in pay, and transferred to another office on the
ground that he had violated the company's sexual harassment policy. After
spending thirty years with the company, Pierce was bid farewell by having
"[his] personal belongings from the office . . . dropped off to him at a
'Hardee's' roadside fast food restaurant." [FN557]
As with the situation involving Mackenzie,
it is possible that the facts were less sympathetic to Pierce than they appear.
Pierce was, after all, a manager, while Kennedy was not. Pierce was responsible
for managing three offices and for enforcing the company's sexual harassment
policy. The company claimed that he already had been counseled about two sexual
harassment complaints in the past ten years‑‑a record that Pierce
denied. In light of his position of authority, Pierce's sending the two
sexually explicit cards to Kennedy may suggest that his conduct veered
perilously close to being actionable. Even if so, however, the reasoning that
led the company to such a conclusion is unsound‑‑and disturbing.
The company relied on the sexually *1793
explicit character of Pierce's actions, without ever examining whether such
actions denigrated Kennedy's competence or otherwise disadvantaged her or other
women in the office on the basis of their gender. [FN558] In fact, in an
amazing bit of reasoning that conflates all forms of sexual interaction,
Pierce's superiors told him that he might as well have been a "murderer,
rapist or child molester, that [what he did] wouldn't be any worse."
[FN559]
Such reasoning is dangerous. It invites
companies to discipline or discharge workers for the wrong reasons. It is
unclear how often companies rely on the threat of harassment suits to
discipline workers for engaging in sexual expression, but some alarming stories
have been reported. In one account, a male social worker was fired for
imitating David Letterman and approaching a new female coworker with the
comment, "I'm gonna flirt with ya." [FN560] In another, a lesbian
psychology professor's guest lecture on female masturbation prompted a sexual
harassment lawsuit by a married, male Christian student, who claimed that he
felt "raped and trapped" by the lecture. [FN561] In a third story, a
male religion professor was formally reprimanded for "'engaging in verbal
conduct of a sexual nature' that had the effect of 'creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment"' [FN562] when he recited a story from
the Talmud, the writings that make up Jewish law. The story involved a man who
fell off a roof, accidentally landed on a woman, and had intercourse with her.
The professor related that in the Talmud, the man is deemed innocent of sin
because his act was unintentional. A female student in the class was offended
by the story, and her sexual harassment complaint led the university to
reprimand the professor and to record all his lectures with a tape recorder to
ensure that he did not say anything sexually offensive in the future. [FN563]
However subtly, the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm enables (or even encourages) these kinds of complaints by emphasizing
the "sexual" nature of harassment. These kinds of complaints tend to
legitimate opposition to *1794
harassment law on the part of those who are concerned about protecting sexual
expression [FN564] or who, for less salutary reasons, oppose placing the power
of accusation in the hands of women workers. Although some of the reported
sexual harassment complaints may raise First Amendment concerns, that is not my
focus here. [FN565] My concern, instead, is the effect on gender relations. It
gives feminism a bad name when men (or women) are fired for merely talking
about sex at work. In my view, it is misguided to attempt to banish all hints
of sexuality from the workplace. [FN566] For one thing, it will not work. One
does not have to be a Freudian to acknowledge that the old Taylorist belief
that sexuality could be banished from the realm of the modern organization was
incorrect; sexuality permeates organizations and, so long as organizations are
made up of human beings, will continue to flourish in one form or another.
[FN567]
Even if all sexual interaction could be
eradicated from the work world, this would not necessarily be desirable.
Sexuality should not be conceptualized solely as a sphere of gender domination,
but also as a potential arena of women's empowerment. [FN568] If some men use
sexual behavior as a weapon of gender struggle at work, one solution is for
women to refuse to cede sexuality *1795
as a source of male domination and to use it to turn the tables on oppressive
men. History provides examples of women who successfully mobilized sexual
conduct or expression as a way of undermining authoritarian male control in the
workplace. [FN569] Even more fundamentally, women and sympathetic men can work
together to integrate the workforce. Research suggests that where men and women
work alongside each other in balanced numbers, harassment is less of a problem.
Workers in such settings report that sexual talk and joking occurs with
frequency, but is not experienced as harassment. [FN570]
To some readers, it will seem too risky to
acknowledge that the prevailing paradigm may encourage some overreaching. Some
will fear that to concede that sexual expression does not always amount to
gender‑based discrimination creates problems of line drawing that are
dangerous to women's interests. Yet, as we have already seen, relying on the
sexual nature of alleged misconduct has not solved the problem of line drawing
and has itself created problems of underinclusiveness. [FN571] Furthermore,
eliminating the current emphasis on the sexual content of harassment does not
mean that sexual expression would always go unscrutinized. For one thing, the
cause of action for quid pro quo harassment would remain unaffected by my
approach; where a supervisor seeks to condition job benefits on sexual favors,
the company would continue to be liable. For purposes of hostile work
environment harassment, courts and companies would continue to review sexually
explicit behavior, but they would examine it along with any challenged
nonsexual behavior to determine whether all such activity, taken together,
created a discriminatory work environment. Part of the relevant inquiry would
be an examination of the larger workplace context‑‑most
importantly, the employers' past and present record of recruiting, hiring,
promoting, evaluating, and paying women (and gender‑ nonconforming men)
on an equal basis. Male supervisors' or coworkers' deployment of sexual
expression and activity in traditionally segregated job settings may raise
alarm bells that would not sound in more integrated settings‑‑particularly
where such sexual activity is accompanied by other actions that denigrate the
harassees' competence.
Courts should examine such structural
linkages between sex‑based harassment and other forms of gender
stratification, rather than focusing so much attention on the sexual content of
the alleged misconduct alone. Women
*1796 should not have to present themselves as Sunday‑school teachers
in order to comport with the image of the good victim. But neither should women
(or men) be able to sue because they are offended by someone else's sexual
conversation or gestures. A competence‑centered paradigm alleviates this
problem by focusing attention away from sexuality as such and toward gender
inequality in work roles. That is where Title VII's focus properly lies.
VI.
Conclusion: Toward Implementing the New Account
The new account of hostile work environment
harassment would restore harassment law to Title VII's original purpose. From
the beginning, the central purpose of the statute's prohibition against sex
discrimination has been to enable everyone‑‑regardless of their identities
as men or women, or their personae as masculine or feminine‑‑to
pursue their chosen endeavors on equal, empowering terms.
Over time, with the emergence of the sexual
desire‑dominance paradigm, harassment law has moved away from this
purpose. Indeed, the story of how this paradigm came to predominate may hold
important lessons about the paradoxes of legal reform. Influenced by early
feminist accounts that politicized sexual violations long‑shielded from
scrutiny, courts overcame their initial resistance to recognizing a
supervisor's demands for sexual favors as a form of gender discrimination and
created a cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment. As I have
emphasized, this represented a step forward for women: It was important for
courts to abandon the view of sexuality as a purely privatized matter and to
acknowledge that gender‑based discrimination at work can take the form of
employer‑sanctioned sexual advances.
Ultimately, however, judicial recognition
that workplace sexual relations can be infused with gender discrimination
evolved into an account that collapsed the two. Courts began to view sexual
advances as the quintessential form of gender‑based harassment and to
suspect many less troubling sexual interactions of an inevitable gender bias.
Undoubtedly, some early feminist accounts that portrayed heterosexual sexual
relations as a primary force disadvantaging women resonated with the conservative
proclivities of many judges, who shared the supposition that heterosexual
sexual relations are suffused with domination and danger for women. Such a
perspective did no harm in the context of quid pro quo harassment cases;
companies should be held responsible when supervisors condition employment
benefits on sexual favors. Yet, when courts and advocates transposed the
emphasis on sexual advances to hostile work environment harassment cases, they
created a framework that has proven to be more limiting than empowering for its
intended beneficiaries.
The sexual desire‑dominance paradigm
is too narrow. Although its triumph has been viewed as a feminist victory, that
success has rung hollow for the *1797
many women (and men) who experience forms of harassment that it does not
envision. Most centrally, the paradigm has failed large numbers of people who
are not subjected to sexual abuse, but whose competence as workers is
constantly thrust into conflict with their identities as women or gender‑
nonconforming men. We need an account of hostile work environment harassment
that recognizes that sexuality is only one tool that male workers can deploy in
a struggle to maintain the masculine composition and image of more highly
rewarded jobs. Conversely, the account should acknowledge that sexuality is not
inherently gender‑biased; in some contexts, it can be a neutral or even
positive resource for women (and nonconforming men). I have offered a new
paradigm for hostile work environment harassment that takes these dynamics into
account.
The competence‑centered account
deflects attention from the sexual content of workplace conduct and refocuses
it on the link between hostile work environment harassment and job segregation
by sex. This account emphasizes the role of sexual and nonsexual forms of
harassment in maintaining favored lines of work as male‑dominated. It
also highlights the competence‑undermining character of such harassment.
Our nation's history of excluding women from many of the most highly rewarded
forms of employment has conferred on male workers a sense of entitlement to
such jobs. By castigating women as less competent to perform such work, hostile
work environment harassment warns women away or incorporates them as inferiors.
In doing so, harassment upholds the idealized masculine image of the work and
those who do it. Harassment is thus both a cause and a consequence of larger
forms of gender‑based stratification of work, such as job segregation by
sex and the accompanying wage and status inequalities.
Implementing the new account would not be
difficult; it would require no greater resources than other Title VII sex
discrimination cases. Indeed, as I have emphasized throughout, the new account
seeks merely to restore harassment law to Title VII's traditional focus on
"break[ing] down old patterns of . . . segregation and hierarchy."
[FN572] Doing so demands primarily a shift in perspective. It entails
reevaluating what type of evidence is relevant and examining that evidence
through new lenses.
The new account directs that, as in Berkman
v. City of New York, [FN573] courts pay more attention to the larger structural
context of the workplace, including the company's record on job segregation by
sex. Such contextual information is frequently absent from hostile work
environment harassment cases, in part because the sexual desire‑dominance
paradigm has led to an isolating focus on sexual abuse that renders such
information irrelevant. As we *1798
have seen, the courts have disaggregated sexual conduct from other forms of sex‑based
harassment and discrimination. The severing of the claims and evidence along
such sexualized lines is both a signal and a further source of the problem.
Once courts hold that only sexual conduct may contribute to creating a hostile
work environment and conclude that nonsexual misconduct must be considered (if
at all) as a separate form of disparate treatment, it is clear that information
about the history and structure of any gender stratification in the workforce
will not lend perspective to the court's view of harassment.
To obtain such perspective and implement the
new account, the courts should first take one important step: They should cease
the disaggregation of hostile work environment harassment and other forms of
discrimination along sexual lines. Hostile work environment harassment is
simply a form of discrimination, one created to redress discriminatory working
conditions that do not necessarily affect a tangible job detriment. Judicial
decisions that have strayed from this insight and required elaborate elements
to prove a hostile environment claim have distorted the law and diverted it
from its remedial function. To restore the proper remedial focus, courts should
consider all of the challenged conduct‑‑sexual and nonsexual‑‑in
connection with the hostile work environment claim. For purposes of that claim,
the issue should not be whether the challenged conduct was sexual in nature,
whether it reflected gender "animus," or whether any of it effected a
tangible job detriment. The question is simply whether all the alleged
harassment and discrimination, taken together, created a discriminatory work
environment based on gender.
There are a few ways courts can move toward
such a unified approach. First, judges should rely on McKinney v. Dole [FN574]
and its progeny to examine as part of the hostile work environment claim any
alleged nonsexual misconduct that is not challenged as a separate form of
discrimination. As we have seen, nonsexual conduct that does not effect a
tangible job detriment frequently evades judicial scrutiny; many courts
conclude that it does not provide the basis for an independent disparate
treatment (or presumably disparate impact) claim, [FN575] while also excluding
it from the hostile work environment claim on the ground that it is not sexual
in nature. Under the McKinney rule, conduct such as nonsexual hazing or
assault, work sabotage, or failure to provide informal training, which may not
provide the basis for an independent disparate treatment claim, would count
toward establishing a hostile work environment.
Second, regardless of whether McKinney
requires it, courts should also consider whether any nonsexual conduct that
plaintiffs are or could be challenging as an independent form of discrimination
has contributed to *1799 creating a
discriminatory work environment. We have seen that in many work settings,
practices such as differential training, evaluation, and promotion not only
directly harm the women subjected to them, but may also indirectly create an
atmosphere of inferiority for the victims of discrimination and other women in
the workplace. Thus, courts should consider whether any such practices have
contributed to a generally hostile work environment based on gender (and,
conversely, should consider any evidence of such overall hostility toward women
in determining whether any particular practices constitute independent forms of
discrimination based on gender). [FN576] Proof of discrimination against some
women may help establish a hostile work environment involving others.
Similarly, evidence that may not suffice to establish an independent disparate
treatment (or disparate impact) violation may nonetheless serve to bolster
other proof of a hostile work environment. Of course, by identifying all the
practices that contributed to that environment, courts can also fashion a more
effective remedy.
Third, beyond considering all the sexual and
nonsexual conduct together, courts should also consolidate the trend away from
disaggregation by streamlining the elements of a cause of action for hostile
work environment harassment. The ultimate question is whether the challenged
conduct created a discriminatory work environment based on gender. Toward that
end, a simplified cause of action should require only three elements: (1)
Causation‑‑Did the challenged conduct occur because of sex (or
gender)? (2) Harm‑‑Was the conduct sufficiently harmful to
"'alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working
environment"'? [FN577] (3) Employer Responsibility‑‑Was it
conduct for which the employer is legally responsible? [FN578]
*1800 For purposes of causation, the courts should deemphasize the
current focus on whether the challenged conduct is sexual in nature. To
determine whether the conduct is based on sex withinthe meaning of Title VII,
they should inquire instead into whether it embodies gender‑based
expectations for the workers or work involved. The touchstone is Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. [FN579] Although the inquiry will vary depending on the
particular fact situation, relevant questions may include the following: Are
the women expected to present themselves in ways that would be considered
inappropriate for a male worker? Are they depicted as less competent than the
men? Are men depicted or expected to present themselves in ways that reflect a
narrow, preconceived notion of proper manhood? In many cases, it will be
helpful to ask whether the conduct helps maintain a male‑dominated
composition for the job or a preconceived masculine image of competence for the
work involved. [FN580]
As part of this causation inquiry, the
larger structural context of the workplace will be very relevant. In the
context of a workplace with longstanding inequality, a potentially "stray
remark[ ]" [FN581] about women or even an apparently gender‑neutral
act of hazing may assume heightened causal significance. Consequently, courts
should examine the record for structural indicia of gender inequality at work.
For example: Was there a history of discrimination or exclusion of women from
the relevant occupation or field, the workplace, or the job title? Were women
present in skewed sex ratios, which meant that they were likely to find
themselves unwelcome among the men who outnumbered them? Even if women were
well‑represented, had supervisory positions or other positions of
authority traditionally been held by
*1801 men? If so, how had that authority been defined and exercised? Had
managers and supervisors treated women with equal respect and dignity or had
they subjected them to paternalistic or authoritarian forms of supervision?
Conversely, when women were in positions of authority, had male subordinates
extended them their respect and cooperation or had they instead challenged them
and refused to take direction? What was the record and reputation of women in
the larger field? Had women's talents been overlooked or denigrated or had
their accomplishments been celebrated on an equal basis with men's? Finally, of
course, the courts should examine the particular situation of the plaintiffs:
Did the conduct have the purpose or effect of undermining the women's
"right to participate in the work place on [an] equal footing" ?
[FN582]
In cases involving harassment of women
workers, there is an efficient way for courts to operationalize the insight
that the larger workplace context matters: At least in close cases, courts
could assume that the challenged conduct is gender‑based where it is
directed at women who work in "traditionally segregated job
categories." [FN583] We have already seen that most courts are willing to
assume that conduct that is sexual in content is based on sex within the
meaning of Title VII. I have criticized this assumption for creating a two‑tiered
structure of causation in which nonsexual forms of harassment fade from view.
In order to remedy this omission, the courts should extend a parallel
assumption to nonsexual conduct that occurs in sex‑segregated job
settings. Such an assumption, which could take the form of a rebuttable
presumption, is a sensible way to recognize the proven link between hostile
work environment harassment and job segregation by sex. As we have seen,
conduct that may appear innocuous or even gender‑neutral may, in male‑dominated
settings, be part of a campaign to drive away women or denigrate their
competence. Similar pressures may exist in female‑dominated settings.
In cases involving same‑sex
harassment, the causation inquiry should also turn on whether the challenged
conduct is based on gender (rather than whether it is sexual in content). But
here the relevant evidence may look different. In many cases involving
harassment of men by men, the harassment will have the purpose or effect of
denigrating the harassee's manhood. Antigay ridicule will almost always do so,
but other types of evidence may also suggest that the harassees were targeted because
something about them threatened the dominant workers' views about the suitable
masculine image for those who hold the job. The harassees may be perceived to
be too weak, too young, too old, too asexual, too soft, or even too identified
with women's interests to fit the mold. In other cases, the harassment itself
may utilize gender‑based images
*1802 as a form of denigration or competition (such as calling men epithets
typically reserved for women). Regardless of whether the harassment assumes an
explicitly gender‑based content or more subtly attacks people because of
their failure to conform to the harassers' image of proper manly behavior, the
harassment is based on gender. The new account would recognize it as such.
Just as the new account would decenter the
focus on sexuality in connection with the question of causation, so too would
it do so in connection with the question of harm. In considering whether the
challenged conduct is sufficiently harmful to be actionable, the new account
would deflect attention away from whether the conduct is sexually offensive in
favor of a focus on whether it makes it more difficult for the harassees to do
the job because of their gender. Indeed, under the new account, courts would
recognize that, rather than signaling genuine sexual or romantic interest, even
sexual advances and other sexually oriented conduct may serve as a way of
marking women or nonconforming men as different and less adequate for the job.
Courts would also understand that overtly
sexual harassment is not the only, or even the most common, form of harassment
experienced by women or nonconforming men on the job. Once the sexual focus is
abandoned, many new forms of gender‑based harassment and harm may come to
light. Importantly, judges would understand from the outset that hostile work
environment harassment frequently has the aim or effect of denigrating the
harassee's work competence. The spectrum of gender‑based, competence‑undermining
conduct sweeps broadly; the form of the conduct varies with the occupational
setting. Thus, judges should not only exhibit sensitivity to the role of such
competence‑ undermining conduct in creating hostile work environments,
they should also scrutinize carefully employers' attempts to justify adverse
treatment of women or harassed male workers on the ground that such workers are
less competent. Particularly where a history of job segregation by sex or other
structural indicia of gender stratification are present, a harassee's
incompetence may be as likely to be the consequence as the cause of her
negative treatment. [FN584] At a minimum, courts should evaluate whether the
gender‑based mistreatment was a significant factor in creating any
diminished performance.
In contrast to the prevailing paradigm, the
new account would render any inquiry into the "unwelcomeness" of the
challenged conduct irrelevant. Once courts reconceptualize environmental
harassment as an assault on competence, the unwelcomeness inquiry no longer
makes sense. Although some people may welcome expressions of sexual interest,
few employees invite conduct that attacks their work performance in the name of
gender conformity.
*1803 Although no single decision has analyzed hostile work
environment harassment in precisely these terms, there is support for the new
account in the case law. As I discussed earlier, a number of courts of appeals
have followed McKinney and held that conduct need not be sexual in nature to
contribute to a hostile work environment. [FN585] It is time for courts to take
this point seriously and to utilize the McKinney reasoning to end the
disaggregated treatment of sexual and nonsexual forms of alleged misconduct.
The Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. [FN586]
approves such a focus; the opinion acknowledges that hostile work environment
harassment is simply a form of gender discrimination. As the Court observed,
"The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." [FN587]
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
majority in Harris highlights the competence‑undermining effect of such
environments. It notes that "[a] discriminatorily abusive work
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well‑being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in
their careers." [FN588] Justice Ginsburg's concurrence underscores the
point: "The critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed
to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed." [FN589] To establish a hostile work
environment, "[i]t suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to
the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the
harassment so altered working conditions as to '[make] it more difficult to do
the job."' [FN590]
These passages from Harris suggest something
close to the simplified standard I am urging for hostile work environment
harassment. Some lower courts have used such a simplified approach. [FN591]
Others have acknowledged, *1804 like
the Harris Court, that part of what can make a work environment harmful is
harassment that makes it more difficult for the harassee to do the job. [FN592]
Some courts have exhibited skepticism toward employers' attempts to attribute
women's adverse treatment to their own incompetence, where there is evidence
that any problems in performance are themselves an artifact of gender
harassment or discrimination. [FN593] Others have jettisoned the unwelcomeness
issue, acknowledging that a woman worker's use of profanity or other
"unladylike" behavior should not be deemed to provoke hostile,
harassing conduct from her coworkers‑‑whether or not that
harassment is sexual in nature. [FN594] In addition, the Supreme Court itself
recently held that gender‑based, male‑on‑male harassment may
be actionable, regardless of whether it is motivated by sexual designs. [FN595]
Finally, and most importantly, *1805
a number of courts have recognized the link between hostile work environment harassment
and job segregation. [FN596] Some of the most perceptive judges have even
acknowledged the role of harassment in preserving the masculine image of
traditionally segregated jobs (and the men who hold them). [FN597]
It is cause for optimism that, in spite of
the prevailing paradigm, some courts are struggling toward a broader
understanding of hostile work environment harassment. Yet, it is not only
courts, but also feminists and sympathetic lawyers and activists, who must
reconceptualize sexual harassment. As the history of harassment law shows, it
was the work of such people that produced the political, cultural, and legal
climate conducive to the prevailing paradigm. To change that paradigm, these
groups must once again take the lead. We must envision more than a world in
which women are protected from sexual violation. We must also envision a world
in which all women and the least powerful men are fully enabled to work as
equals in whatever endeavors their hearts and minds desire.
[FNd1].
Professor, Yale Law School. This Article has been a long time in the making; it
was conceived as part of my earlier work on job segregation by sex. As a
consequence of its long gestation, I will no doubt forget to thank many friends
and colleagues whose conversations have encouraged me and enriched my thinking.
I would like to express my appreciation‑‑and admiration‑‑for
the numerous women who have shared with me their stories of struggle,
demoralization, and triumph as they endeavored to pursue their life's work in
settings where they were unwelcome or underappreciated. Denice Denton has been
a particular inspiration. I am grateful also for thoughtful comments from
participants at the Yale Law School faculty workshop, the University of
Pennsylvania Legal Theory Workshop, the Law and Society Summer Institute, and
the Western New England School of Law Clason Speaker Series, as well as from
Anne Alstott, Mark Barenberg, Drew Days, Carol Rose, Jeremy Paul, Reva Siegel,
and especially Bruce Ackerman. In addition, I would like to thank a number of
students who provided superb research assistance: Carolyn Bernstein, Jackie
Rolfs, the late Markie Rath, Alex Klass, Beth Kransberger, Cathy Bowman, Nicole
Gueron, Marjorie Allard, Darren Reisberg, and especially Susie Schmeiser and
Glenn Edwards. My thanks go also to the Fund for Labor Relations Studies for
financial assistance.
I dedicate this piece to Natalie Virginia
Schultz‑Henry, who was almost as long in the making as this Article. May
she come of age in a world in which she is free to pursue her aspirations in a
community in which men and women work alongside each other as equals.
As this Article went to press, the Supreme
Court issued a unanimous opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., No. 96‑568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998), holding that same‑sex
harassment may constitute discrimination because of sex in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Although time and space limitations prevent me
from exploring the implications of the Oncale decision for this Article, it is
important to emphasize that the result and reasoning of the case conform to,
and in fact provide added support for, the analysis proposed herein. For
further discussion, see infra notes 18, 595.
[FN1].
Mary Lindenstein Walshok, Blue Collar Women: Pioneers on the Male Frontier 221‑22
(1981) (quoting a female welder).
[FN2].
Working Women United (WWU) is the first group known to have used the term
"sexual harassment." In May of 1975, WWU held a "Speak‑Out
on Sexual Harassment," for purposes of which it defined sexual harassment
as "the treatment of women workers as sexual objects." Dierdre
Silverman, Sexual Harassment: Working Women's Dilemma, Quest: Feminist Q.,
Winter 1976‑1977, at 15, 15.
[FN3].
For examples of recent newspaper articles depicting sexual harassment in
negative terms, see Jane Daugherty, Sexual Harassment Takes a Devastating Toll,
Detroit News, Jan. 28, 1997, at D1; Lisa Hoffman, Sex Harassment Last Straw for
Career Soldier: Woman Finally Left Army out of Frustration, Anger, Rocky
Mountain News, Feb. 16, 1997, at 3A; and A Mission for the Military, Boston
Globe, Feb. 7, 1997, at A18. The Lifetime television network produced a movie
told from the perspective of Kerry Ellison, the plaintiff in Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). See Hostile Advances: The Kerry Ellison Story
(Lifetime television broadcast, May 27, 1996). But see David Mamet, Oleanna
(1992) (depicting sympathetically a male professor accused of sexual harassment
by a female college student).
[FN4].
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
[FN5].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer...to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ... to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual employee of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
§ 2000e‑3.
[FN6].
See Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily; New Laws
Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, Wash. Post, May 12, 1997, at A1 (noting that
the fastest growing area of employment discrimination complaints is sexual
harassment, up from 6127 complaints in 1990 to 15,342 complaints in 1996);
Allen R. Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up the Fight, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1997, § 1, at 1 (noting that the new bias cases often are more
about pay, promotion, and harassment than about hiring, and increasingly
concern sex rather than race).
[FN7].
Title VII jurisprudence recognizes two different types of sex‑based
harassment: (1) quid pro quo harassment, in which a supervisor seeks to
condition employment benefits on a subordinate's grant of sexual favors; and
(2) hostile work environment harassment, in which supervisors or coworkers
engage in conduct that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
[FN8].
Throughout this Article, I use the terms "gender" and "sex"
interchangeably. I use the terms to refer to the complex process of socializing
human beings into the identities of men and women, to the element of social
relationships based on differences that society attributes to people with those
two identities, and to the process of signifying power through those
identities. See Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History 28‑50
(1988), for the views that come perhaps closest to capturing my own.
For many years, feminists distinguished
between "sex"‑‑the biological sex of a human being‑‑and
"gender"‑‑the different social and cultural expectations
and roles assigned to the sexes. Recently, this distinction has come under
challenge, as some feminists have questioned whether it makes sense to refer to
"sex" as an ontologically given category that we can comprehend free
of perceptions that have already been gendered. See, e.g., Judith Butler,
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990). For purposes of
this Article, I need not take a position in this debate. Regardless of whether
something endowed by nature called "sex" can be known with any
certainty, it is clear that the legal system cannot ascertain it with any
certainty. Thus, Title VII's protection against discrimination based on
"sex" has ultimately, and necessarily, been construed to protect
people from discrimination based on "gender," even though some courts
may cling to the notion that they can discover natural sex differences that
justify differential treatment. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1 (1995) (arguing that antidiscrimination law incorrectly proceeds from
the assumption of biological sex difference).
[FN9].
Walshok, supra note 1, at 222; see supra text accompanying note 1.
[FN10].
See infra notes 58‑69 and accompanying text.
[FN11].
One of the clearest statements of this position appears in Susan Estrich's
powerful article, Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1991). As
Estrich writes:
What makes sexual harassment more offensive,
more debilitating, and more dehumanizing to its victims than other forms of
discrimination is precisely the fact that it is sexual. Not only are men
exercising power over women, but they are operating in a realm which is still
judged according to a gender double standard, itself a reflection of the extent
to which sexuality is used to penalize women. In my view, [harassment] cases
are such a disaster in doctrinal terms precisely because, as with rape, they
involve sex and sexuality.
Id.
at 820. For additional examples of this perspective, see Caroline Forell,
Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 769; Ann
C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1558 (1992); and Miranda Oshige,
Note, What's Sex Got To Do with It?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 565 (1995). Cf. Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1311, 1318 (1989) (arguing that sexual harassment is "more clearly akin
to... rape than to misogynistic refusal to accept women workers").
[FN12].
See, e.g., Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and
Bisexual Harassment Under Title VII, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 55 (1995); Samuel A.
Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 Geo. L.J. 1 (1992); Lisa Wehren, Note, Same‑Gender
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atochem Marks a Step in the
Wrong Direction, 32 Cal. W. L. Rev. 87 (1995).
[FN13].
Most of the large‑scale empirical studies of sex‑based harassment
have also used a sexualized definition of harassment limited to sexual advances
and other conduct of a sexual nature. See, e.g., Barbara Gutek, Sex and the
Workplace: The Impact of Sexual Behavior and Harassment on Women, Men, and
Organizations (1985); U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Government: An Update (1988) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Government]; U.S. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem? (1981) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment in
the Federal Workplace]; Walshok, supra note 1; see also Patricia A. Frazier et
al., Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 51 J.
Soc. Issues 21 (1995) (citing numerous studies of harassment that utilize a
sexualized definition).
[FN14].
A few writers have urged courts to construe Title VII broadly to prohibit all
forms of gender‑based harassment, rather than focusing narrowly on sexual
advances and other sexual conduct. See, e.g., L. Camille Hebert, Sexual
Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 565 (1995); Frank S.
Ravitch, Contextualizing Gender Harassment: Providing an Analytical Framework
for an Emerging Concept in Discrimination Law, 1995 Det. C.L. Rev. 853. Even
such writers, however, have found it difficult to escape the prevailing sexual
paradigm. Some, for example, continue to make an artificial analytical
distinction between gender‑based harassment and sexual harassment. See,
e.g., Ravitch, supra, at 856‑57. Others subtly continue to highlight the
sexual nature of harassment as a reason for condemning it, even though they
purport to understand harassment as a form of sexism rather than sexuality.
See, e.g., Hebert, supra, at 587. None of these writers advances an account of
harassment that highlights its role in preserving job segregation by
constructing gender‑ based differences in work competence, as I do here.
[FN15].
A notable exception is Carlin Meyer, Feminism, Work and Sex: Returning to the
Gates (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Meyer insightfully
discusses how feminist legal theorists' emphasis on sexual harassment has
neglected other fundamental work‑related problems of concern to women,
such as sweatshops, occupational health and safety, pension issues, and the
rise of home work and contingent labor. See id. at 8‑10. This Article, by
contrast, shows how the courts' utilization of a feminist‑inspired
paradigm to regulate sexual forms of harassment has neglected equally
pernicious, nonsexual forms of gender‑based misconduct in the workplace‑‑particularly
conduct that denigrates women's competence and thereby preserves work along
gendered lines.
[FN16].
Jean Schroedel, Alone in a Crowd: Women in the Trades Tell Their Stories 20‑21
(1985).
[FN17].
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250‑51 (1989) (construing Title VII to prohibit
gender stereotyping in the form of pressuring a female accountant to conform to
stereotypically feminine demeanor and appearance in order to be promoted to
partner).
[FN18].
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., No. 96‑568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998), which was issued as
this Article went to press, sends a promising new signal to the lower courts.
In Oncale, the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit decision that had held that male‑on‑male
harassment is never actionable under Title VII. The Court concluded that
"nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because
of ... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same
sex." Id. at *2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000‑ e(a)(1) (1994)). In line
with the argument of this Article, the Court also made clear that
"harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at *4.
[FN19].
See Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence
Thomas 95 (1994).
[FN20].
Id. at 96.
[FN21].
Id. at 97.
[FN22].
The Thomas Nomination; Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas
Nomination, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1991, at A30 (quoting a statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
[FN23].
Id. (quoting a statement of Judge Clarence Thomas).
[FN24].
See John Lancaster, Navy 'Gauntlet' Probed; Sex Harassment Alleged at Fliers'
Convention, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1991, at A1; H.G. Reza, Women Accuse Navy
Pilots of Harassment, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1991, at B1.
[FN25].
E.g., Admiral Is Relieved of Duty for Delay in Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. Times, Nov.
6, 1991, at A23; Melissa Healy, Pentagon's Tailhook Report Expected To Detail
Obstruction, Cover‑Up; Scandal: Separate Inquiry Will Deal with Specific
Charges in the Sexual Abuse of Women at an Aviators' Convention, L.A. Times,
Sept. 16, 1992, at A14; Navy Cuts Ties to Group in Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 31, 1991, at A20; Sex Abuse Incident Brings Admiral Permanent Penalty,
L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1991, at A20; Sexual Abuse in the Military, Chi. Trib.,
July 5, 1992, at 2.
[FN26].
Letta Tayler, Operation: Parity; Assaults Renew Debate on Role of Women,
Newsday, July 27, 1992, at 6.
[FN27].
Sexual Abuse in the Military, supra note 25; see also Elaine Sciolino, Military
Women Report Pattern of Sexual Abuse by Servicemen, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1992,
at A1; The Sexual Abuse of Servicewomen, Boston Globe, July 8, 1992, at 12;
Soldiers and Sex Abuse, Hartford Courant, July 7, 1992, at B10.
[FN28].
See Patricia Dibsie, VA Emphasizes Sexual Trauma Care for Women, San Diego
Union‑Trib., Sept. 28, 1994, at B1; Dave Moniz, Veterans of Hell;
Nightmares of Rape Haunt Female Ex‑GIs, Chi. Trib., Nov. 19, 1995, at 10.
[FN29].
See Navy Acts To Improve Women's Lot: 80 Recommendations To Be Implemented, St.
Louis Post‑Dispatch, Oct. 14, 1992, at 10A.
[FN30].
See, e.g., Tom Bowman & Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Victims List Grows to 34 at
Aberdeen: Female Soldiers Alleging Misconduct Double from 17; Hot Line Logs
5,204 Calls; Panel of Military and Civilians Named To Study Army Culture,
Baltimore Sun, Nov. 23, 1996, at 1A; Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Rankling the Ranks: The
Battle over Sexual Harassment Rages on in the Military, Chi. Trib., Nov. 1,
1992, at 4; Michael Kilian, New Sex Scandal Hits Army Ranks: 3 Charged at
Second Training Site, Chi. Trib., Nov. 13, 1996, at 1; Ann LoLordo, Woman GI
Fights Private War over Sex Assault Case, Sacramento Bee, Mar. 29, 1993, at A1;
Dana Priest, Abuse in Army 'Not That Unusual': Sexual Misconduct by Trainers
Long‑Standing Problem for Military, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1996, at A1;
Andrea Stone, Women in Military: Sex Harassment and Silence, USA Today, July
23, 1992, at 6A; West Point Students Claim Sexual Harassment, Chi. Trib., Nov.
2, 1994, at 2.
[FN31].
See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Bill Would Separate Men and Women in Basic Training,
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1997, at A20 ("With sex scandals breaking out all over
the military, legislation to segregate men and women in basic training is
gaining momentum in the House."); Elaine Sciolino, Sergeant Convicted of
18 Counts of Raping Female Subordinates, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1997, at A1
("Today's verdict is certain to rekindle the debate on Capitol Hill and
within the military about whether the American military's experiment with
integrating men and women has failed.").
[FN32].
See Carol Kleiman, Harassment Suit at Stroh Brewery Puts Focus on Company's Own
Ads, Chi. Trib., Mar. 9, 1992, at 6.
[FN33].
Tony Kennedy, Judge Says Stroh's Ad Strategies Won't Be Part of Harassment
Trial; Ads Not in Workplace To Be Excluded, Ruling States, Star Trib.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 9, 1993, at 1D.
[FN34].
Kleiman, supra note 32.
[FN35].
Id.
[FN36].
Id.
[FN37].
See Meyer, supra note 15, at 12.
[FN38].
Id. at 13.
[FN39].
Jean Steiner, There's More to Sexual Harassment than a Swedish Bikini Team,
Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Dec. 19, 1991, at 27A.
[FN40].
See Kleiman, supra note 32; Meyer, supra note 15, at 12.
[FN41].
See Meyer, supra note 15, at 11. The Stroh's suit ultimately settled; the terms
of the settlement were kept confidential. See id. at 12 n.37.
[FN42].
See id. at 14‑15.
[FN43].
Swedish Bikini Team Taking Vacation from TV, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Feb. 14, 1992, at 2D
(describing a Stroh's television commercial).
[FN44].
See, e.g., Edward Walsh, Stroh Workers Charge Ads Fuel Harassment; 'Bikini
Team' TV Spots Prompt Lawsuits, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1991, at A3 ("'When
the company as a whole is treating women as sexual objects, as body parts, it
pretty much sends a message to the employees,' said... the only female
machinist at the plant. 'What I want Stroh's to do is to take a look at that
and understand that they're giving a big stamp of approval."').
[FN45].
Bikini Ad Prompts a Sexual Harassment Suit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at A11.
For stories with similar headlines, see Stuart Elliott, Suit over Sex in Beer
Ads Comes as Genre Changes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1991, at D22; Doug Grow,
Stroh's and Its Ads Square Off Against an Angry Young Lawyer, Star Trib.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 10, 1991, at 3B; Paul McEnroe, Women Cite Sexy Ads in
Harassment Suit Against Stroh's, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Nov. 8, 1991, at 1A;
Martha T. Moore, Taste Test: Debate Brews over Selling Beer with Sex, USA
Today, Nov. 15, 1991, at 1B; and George Will, Misguided Suit Targets Swedish
Bikini Team, St. Louis Post‑Dispatch, Dec. 2, 1991, at 3B.
[FN46]. A complete account of the origins of the paradigm would map the more remote historical antecedents of the phenomena discussed in this Article. The cultural‑radical feminist traditions discussed in the next subsection, for example, might be traced to the social purity wing of the 19th‑century women's movement. For a description of the views of