42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430

 Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc.
v.
Bucci

U.S. District Court Southern District of New York

No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW)

Decided March 19, 1997






The following text addresses the free speech and parody defenses raised by the defendant.  The full text of the case is also available.

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D. Defendant's Additional Defenses

  Defendant also argues that his use of plaintiff's mark is protected from injunction because (1) it is a parody, and (2) it is protected speech under the First Amendment. I consider these arguments in turn.

  1. The Parody Exception

[9] Defendant argues that his use of the "planned parenthood" mark is not likely to confuse because it is similar to a parody. A parody "depends on a lack of confusion to make its point," and " 'must convey two simultaneous -- and contradictory -- messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.' "Hormel Food Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 [ 37 USPQ2d 1516 ] (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Here, an Internet user may either find the defendant's web site through a search engine or may simply enter the words "planned parenthood" in the expectation that she will find the plaintiff's web site. Seeing or typing the "planned parenthood" mark and accessing the web site are two separate and non-simultaneous activities. Furthermore, the greeting "Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page!" does not immediately contradict an Internet user's assumption that she has accessed the plaintiff's home page. Only when an Internet user actually "clicks" on one of the topics and accesses commentary on The Cost of Abortion does she encounter defendant's message.

  I am not persuaded by defendant's argument that the message of the home page provides an ironic and contrasting allusion to plaintiff, nor do I find convincing his argument that the banner heading of the home page is sarcastic. Similarly, I do not conclude that defendant's use of the term "planned parenthood" in the context described above is intended not to confuse the user into an association with plaintiff, but rather "to reference  Plaintiff as the 'enemy.' " [FN12] Because defendant's use of "planned parenthood" does not convey the simultaneous message that the home page and web site are those of plaintiff and those of defendant, defendant's argument that his use of the mark is a parody fails. Thus, the Polaroid factors must govern the issue of whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Here, I have found that the Polaroid factors demonstrate that there is a likelihood of confusion that arises from defendant's use of the domain name "plannedparenthood.com," the home page address "www.plannedparenthood.com," and the banner at the top of the home page stating, "Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page!"

  2. The First Amendment Exception

 Defendant also argues that his use of the "planned parenthood" mark is protected by the First Amendment. As defendant argues, trademark infringement law does not curtail or prohibit the exercise of the First Amendment right to free speech. I note that plaintiff has not sought, in any way, to restrain defendant from speech that criticizes Planned Parenthood or its mission, or that discusses defendant's beliefs regarding reproduction, family, and religion. The sole purpose of the Court's inquiry has been to determine whether the use of the "planned parenthood" mark as defendant's domain name and home page address constitutes an infringement of plaintiff's trademark. Defendant's use of another entity's mark is entitled to First Amendment protection when his use of that mark is part of a communicative message, not when it is used to identify the source of a product. Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. News America Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 275 [ 25 USPQ2d 1752 ] (S.D.N.Y. 1992). By using the mark as a domain name and home page address and by welcoming Internet users to the home page with the message "Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page!" defendant identifies the web site and home page as being the product, or forum, of plaintiff. I therefore determine that, because defendant's use of the term "planned parenthood" is not part of a communicative message, his infringement on plaintiff's mark is not protected by the First Amendment.

  Defendant argues that his use of the "Planned Parenthood" name for his web site is entitled to First Amendment protection, relying primarily on the holding of Yankee Publishing, 809 F. Supp. at 275. In that case, Judge Leval noted that the First Amendment can protect unauthorized use of a trademark when such use is part of an expression of a communicative message: "the Second Circuit has construed the Lanham Act narrowly when the unauthorized use of the trademark is for the purpose of a communicative message, rather than identification of product origin."Id. Defendant argues that his use of the "Planned Parenthood" name for his web site is a communicative message.

  However, Yankee Publishing carefully draws a distinction between communicative messages and product labels or identifications:

  When another's trademark . . . is used without permission for the purpose of source identification, the trademark law generally prevails over the First Amendment. Free speech rights do not extend to labelling or advertising products in a manner that conflicts with the trademark rights of others.

  Id. at 276. Defendant offers no argument in his papers as to why the Court should determine that defendant's use of "plannedparenthood.com" is a communicative message rather than a source identifier. His use of "plannedparenthood.com" as a domain name to identify his web site is on its face more analogous to source identification than to a communicative message; in essence, the name identifies the web site, which contains defendant's home page. The statement that greets Internet users who access defendant's web site, "Welcome to the Planned Parenthood Home Page," is also more analogous to an identifier than to a communication. For those reasons, defendant's use of the trademarked term "planned parenthood" is not part of a communicative message, but rather, serves to identify a product or item, defendant's web site and home page, as originating from Planned Parenthood.

 Defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is not protected as a title under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 [ 10 USPQ2d 1825 ] (2d Cir. 1989). There, the Court of Appeals determined that the title of the film "Ginger and Fred" was not a misleading infringement, despite the fact that the film was not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, because of the artistic implications of a title. The Court of Appeals noted that " [f]ilmmakers and authors frequently rely on word-play, ambiguity, irony, and allusion in titling their works."Id. The Court of Appeals found that the use of a title such as the one at issue in  Rogers was acceptable "unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work"; even when the title has artistic relevance, it may not be used to "explicitly mislead[ ] [the consumer] as to the source or content of the work."Id. Here, even treating defendant's domain name and home page address as titles, rather than as source identifiers, I find that the title "plannedparenthood.com" has no artistic implications, and that the title is being used to attract some consumers by misleading them as to the web site's source or content. Given defendant's testimony indicating that he knew, and intended, that his use of the domain name "planned parenthood.com" would cause some "pro-abortion" Internet users to access his web site, Tr. 2/21/97 at 36, he cannot demonstrate that his use of "planned parenthood" is entitled to First Amendment protection.

  Because defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is subject to the Lanham Act, because the Polaroid factors demonstrate that there is a likelihood of confusion arising from defendant's use of plaintiff's mark, and because defendant has not raised a defense that protects his use of the mark, plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating that a preliminary injunction against defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is warranted. Hasbro, 858 F.2d at 73.

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