Copyright (c) 1999 California Law Review
                                        California Law Review

                                           January, 1999

                                         87 Calif. L. Rev. 17

   LENGTH: 36003 words

   SYMPOSIUM: The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand

   David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, Gary N. Frischling*
 
 

   Copyright © 1999 David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, and Gary N. Frischling.

   * The authors practice copyright law at Irell & Manella LLP in Los Angeles.

   SUMMARY:
   ... Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides model rules to govern transactions in the digital
   domain, such as the licensing of software and electronic contracting. ... When a copyright owner distributes
   its software, it is free to grant a license extending only to specified uses, while excluding others. ... At least
   for the modes of software distribution used today, copyright law provides all the teeth a publisher needs to
   control use and dissemination of her work. ... Since the distribution right is an exclusive right in copyright law,
   distributions outside the license infringe the copyright. ... If, however, the copyright owner elected a licensing
   framework, given the structure of the transactions, the end user's right to "use" (e.g., copy) the software
   depends on the end user license. ... The contract at issue in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg differs from the
   foregoing examples in the one respect relevant to nonstatutory preemption: it contravenes one of the core
   policies of the Copyright Act by extending quasi-copyright protection to works that do not qualify as "original."
   ... Although the Act limits the copyright owner's rights to "public" distribution, publishers who follow the logic
   of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg may amplify their statutory rights simply by wrapping books in cellophane, subject
   to the limitation that the buyer is barred from passing the purchased copy on to a friend. ...
 

   TEXT:
 

   Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides model rules to govern transactions in the digital
   domain, such as the licensing of software and electronic contracting. By addressing fundamental contract
   issues in the burgeoning world of digital commerce, it provides a salutary update to extant provisions of the
   U.C.C. dealing with traditional goods sold in traditional modes of commerce. However, to the extent that
   Article 2B aspires to protect copyright owners from improper uses of copyrighted works, it solves a
   non-problem. Copyright owners already enjoy robust and adequate protections under the Copyright Act. Far
   more troubling than solving this non-problem, however, is the possibility that Article 2B will be used to upset
   copyright law's "delicate balance" between the rights of copyright owners and copyright users. This balance is
   disrupted when state law is permitted to enlarge the rights that copyright owners enjoy.

   Attempts to alter the "delicate balance" through contract should fail under the doctrine of preemption. Article
   2B assumes a pose of neutrality on the extent to which copyright law preempts contractual encroachment,
   yet it facilitates emerging practices designed to alter the balance and place the burden of defending the
   proper bounds of copyright on copyright users. In this Article, the authors argue that if Article 2B is to be
   enacted, it must proscribe contracting practices that seek to extend copyright protection beyond its current
   scope.

   The Death of Copyright: n1 A Short, Cautionary Tale

   The year is 2010. With the closure of the last B&N-Walden-Borders-Broadway superstore in Upton, California,
   no more off-line retail content stores remain in the United States (apart from the Scholar's Palazzo in
   Disneyland). Theaters, music venues, and movie houses have all but disappeared in the wake of in-home - not
   to mention implantable - content delivery. Funding for public libraries and the arts has been diverted into
   providing each person in America with access to the all-purpose device for accessing anything - Microsquish
   Audiovisual Utilization System (MAUS).

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   n1. With apologies to Professor Grant Gilmore, author of The Death of Contract (1974). Rumors of contract's
   death proved, of course, to be greatly exaggerated, as will be evident from the analysis herein. Moreover, the
   true specter confronted today is not so much the death of copyright per se, but rather copyright as we know
   it - a law striking a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the public. Cf. David
   Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1385 (1995) (arguing that new trade discipline has
   eviscerated traditional notions of autonomy in the copyright arena).

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   Now, anyone who wishes to read poetry, browse great works of art, enjoy a novel, watch an epic feature film
   (or humble television show), or experience any other work of authorship can, as a practical matter, do so only
   through the instrumentality of the MAUS. To access any work through the MAUS, the user must first click "OK"
   (or, in the case of implantable access, blink a cortical acknowledgment) on the ubiquitous authorization
   screen. That screen lets the user acknowledge that she agrees to be obligated to abide by all terms and
   provisions of <http://www.contracts.com / usurious perpetual adhesive overreaching / 2001$ $ $ £
   <yen>.html>. This file (colloquially known as the "Gates from Hell Agreement") contains a hundred pages of
   boilerplate initially setting forth the text of Title17, United States Code, in haec verba, but thereafter subject
   to innumerable accretions, modifications, and revisions designed to magnify the rights of proprietors.

   Some companies had initially expressed reluctance at committing their works to protection under the foregoing
   regime; they were concerned that end users would find a way to circumvent the click-wrap contemplated
   above. However, with a nod to Ovid, the MYRRHA Encryption/Subversion Systems furnished the answer.
   Thanks to MYRRHA, it has been conclusively proven that no one anywhere can ever obtain access to any
   protected works in any form whatsoever without personally clicking on the omnipresent authorization screen.
   In addition, proprietors take heart from the fact that to buy any current equipment capable of accessing
   content, users must sit down for a half-hour tutorial at the appliance store and personally and meticulously
   agree to the Gates from Hell Agreement. The user's assent is, in each instance, routinely recorded on DCDVDB
   crystal, capturing for  posterity not only the user's facial expression and utterances, but also her brain
   state manifesting willing and voluntary assent.

   Overview

   In a commercial world burgeoning with transactions involving software and other electronically-delivered
   copyrighted works, an oft-expressed concern arises that traditional rules of commercial contract law - which
   evolved to address trade in goods - will prove ill-suited to address the peculiar needs of trade in digital
   products. The Uniform Commercial Code, after all, arose to address the paradigm of a sale of goods, a context
   that typically involves, at least in part, a negotiated contract between buyer and seller and where the value
   lies in the physical object exchanged. The typical software transaction, by contrast, does not involve a direct
   sale between the software proprietor and the end user; rather, it involves a non-negotiated license (otherwise
   known as a "shrinkwrap" contract) governing uses of the intangible asset (for example, software) embodied in
   a tangible thing that is sold (for example, the diskette or CD-ROM) - or even absent the nominal sale of a
   tangible thing (for example, delivery directly over the Internet). It is natural to suspect that the law for
   widgets may be inadequate for digits. n2

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   n2. "A body of law tailored to transactions whose purpose is to pass title to tangible property can not be
   simply applied to transactions whose purpose was to convey rights in intangible property and information."
   U.C.C. art. 2B, Preface at 4 (Draft, Mar. 1998). [All versions of Article 2B are available on the Internet. See
   National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts Official Site
   (last modified Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>. The Official Site offers the
   Article 2B drafts in several file formats, among which the pagination is inconsistent. In this Article and
   throughout this issue of the California Law Review, page references are to the pages as they are numbered in
   the Acrobat PDF file format. Only the prefaces to the drafts are cited by page number; all other material is
   cited by section number. The draft of August 1, 1998, has no page numbers in its on-line versions, and
   therefore the preface of that draft is cited without page references. Ed.]

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   It is here that Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code comes to the rescue. The proposed model law
   addresses many of the questions on which traditional commercial contract law is silent, for instance, whether
   a digital signature constitutes adequate consent to a contract, n3 what warranties attach to digital products,
   n4 what choice-of-law rules apply in transactions over the Internet, n5 what rules govern the transferability
   of a license, and how notions of mitigation, consequential damages, releases, inspection, etc., operate in the
   context of digital products. n6 In sum, it provides some measure of certainty to electronic contracting.

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   n3. See U.C.C. 2B-113 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

   n4. See id. 2B-401-409.

   n5. See id. 2B-107.

   n6. See id. 2B-502, 608, 701-716.

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   Because Article 2B accommodates contracts over copyrightable subject matter, it is relevant to both the
   federal and state law planes of legal discourse. As discussed below, the symbiosis between federal
   copyright protection and state contract law is ancient, inevitable, and fully consonant with the purposes of
   copyright. In developing the law of contracts for the "digital era," Article 2B therefore represents a salutary
   update to the U.C.C. that can benefit both buyers and sellers of digital goods by providing clear rights and
   guidance in matters beyond the experience and imagination of the drafters of the current U.C.C. n7 Article 2B
   thus carries on the role that state contract law has traditionally occupied in shaping commerce in copyrighted
   works.

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   n7. Although fashioned for the needs of digital commerce, Article 2B theoretically allows proprietors of
   traditional copyrighted works (such as books) to "opt-in" to its framework as an alternative to the classic
   structure of Article 2. See U.C.C. 2B-103(c) (Draft, Mar. 1998). As will be discussed below, applying Article 2B
   to old-fashioned copyrighted works creates a potential for mischief.

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   But harmony is not the end of the symphony. n8 When examined in light of its potential impact on copyright
   law's "delicate balance," n9 Article 2B presents the specter of becoming an unwelcome meddler. On the one
   hand, Article 2B might erroneously be imagined to solve a fundamental problem that does not need solving -
   protecting the rights of copyright proprietors insofar as third parties exploit the intangible expression
   underlying their works. On the other hand, Article 2B ignores and potentially weakens the rights of copyright
   users. These two phenomena are interrelated.

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   n8. Part of the dissonance stems from Microsoft v. Harmony, 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), discussed
   infra in Section II.B.

   n9. The metaphor of a delicate balance or equilibrium is widespread. As one court has articulated it: "The
   copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an
   incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid
   the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types of cases, courts must always
   keep this symmetry in mind." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992). We
   will refer to this "delicate balance" often, tracing its genealogy through Supreme Court cases and to Chief
   Judge Crabb's opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
   1996), treated at length below.

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   As discussed below, n10 Article 2B solves a non-problem to the extent that it aspires to protect the exclusive
   rights of authors granted under the Copyright Act from improper uses of digital products by end users. The
   rights of copyright proprietors are already fully protected by the Copyright Act without the need for bilateral
   contracts, and thus a fortiori without the need for any provisions under the U.C.C. validating mass market
   contracts.

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   n10. See infra Part II.

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   Solving a non-problem for copyright proprietors may do no harm, but Article 2B's framework threatens to
   create new problems for copyright users. As further discussed below, n11 the copyright laws are designed
   to achieve a "delicate balance" between the rights of copyright proprietors and copyright users. This
   balance is disrupted when state law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the expense
   of copyright users. Although attempts at altering the delicate balance struck by copyright law should fail under
   the doctrine of preemption, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit n12 illustrates that courts sometimes
   fail to appreciate the preemptive force of copyright, even when the subject contract is intended to defeat
   users' rights validated by on-point United States Supreme Court precedent.

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   n11. See infra Part IV.

   n12. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447. See discussion infra Part III.

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   Article 2B purports to remain "neutral" on questions of federal preemption based on encroachments by contract
   on copyright doctrine. However, by making provisions of software licenses presumptively enforceable while
   providing no limitations on overreaching contract terms that proprietors may unilaterally decide to impose,
   Article 2B facilitates known practices designed to alter the "delicate balance" and places the costs of
   defending the proper bounds of copyright on copyright users. This result is neither desirable nor necessary.

   Article 2B can help maintain rather than undo the delicate balance that lies at the core of copyright by giving
   some guidance as to which types of constraints are at odds with copyright and therefore preempted. But
   absent appropriate corrections to its current instantiation, it is likely to result in the use of contracts - backed
   up by the force of the U.C.C. - systematically to displace the rights of users. It is important to appreciate
   that such resort to contract does not represent the election of contract protection in lieu of copyright.
   Instead, it represents the use of contract to distort copyright, grotesquely at times. Proprietors who might
   take advantage of Article 2B do not opt out of copyright protection; they enjoy all of its benefits plus all of
   the benefits that can be accorded by contracts diminishing the rights of users. We suggest, accordingly, that
   if Article 2B is to be enacted, it first be amended to evince greater sensitivity towards proscribing certain
   contracting practices that are inconsistent with sound copyright policy.

   This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the existing relationship between federal copyright law and
   state contract doctrine. Part II argues that copyright law already provides adequate protection to copyright
   owners who distribute software, and that attempts by copyright owners to enlarge their rights by contract
   conflicts with copyright law's concern for the rights of users. Part III undertakes a critical discussion of the
   Seventh Circuit's decision in ProCD, which upheld a "shrinkwrap" license that extended contractual protection
   against copying to subject matter that the Supreme Court has already declared uncopyrightable. Finally, Part
   IV critiques the failure of Article 2B, under a guise of "neutrality," to take into account the rights of
   information users and the demands of federal law.

   I The Inevitable Coexistence of Copyright and Contract

   A. Transfer

   Copyright is, at heart, a creature of the Constitution and the Copyright Act. But ownership and exploitation of
   copyright are structured at every turn by contract. Unlike the monistic copyright system of German law, under
   which authors may never separate themselves from ownership of the indivisible whole, U.S. copyright law
   follows a regime of infinite divisibility. n13 The statute itself contemplates transfers in the nature of "an
   assignment, mortgage...or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
   exclusive rights comprised in a copyright...." n14

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   n13. Compare Adolf Dietz, Germany 4[2][a], in International Copyright Law and Practice (Melville B. Nimmer &
   Paul Edward Geller eds., 1998) with 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 10.03 (1998)
   [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics and the Droit
   Moral, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1997) (contrasting German monistic system with U.S. copyright). The Act also
   explicitly contemplates that the copyright owner may transfer the copyright bundle or any piece of it by "any
   means of conveyance." 17U.S.C. 201(d)(1) (1994). An exception to the general rule of alienability is the very
   limited rights of visual artists, conferred by a 1990 amendment. See 17U.S.C. 106A(e)(1) (1994). To this highly
   circumscribed extent, U.S. law resembles the French notion of inalienability in the moral rights sphere. See 3
   Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 8D.01[A], 8D.06[D]. Yet even here it departs from the French template
   of imprescriptibility, by allowing waivers of moral rights. See 17U.S.C. 106A(e) (1994).

   n14. 17 U.S.C. 101 (1994).

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   One salient feature of the terms just quoted is the failure of the Copyright Act to define any of them. Given
   that the United States Code nowhere contains an established common law as to what constitutes a
   "mortgage," resort to state law to determine the nature of that device, as well as like hypothecations of
   ownership, appears inevitable.

   Imagine for a moment that Atalanta transfers ownership of her copyright to Busiris, who gives it to Cadmus,
   who in turn mortgages it to Dindyma Bank, which then forecloses and sells out to Erigone. In a worst-case
   scenario for Erigone, her ownership of the copyright could be subject to challenge on the grounds that
   Atalanta was a minor who may disaffirm the contract because it was not confirmed by the state court of her
   domicile; n15 that Busiris (who had previously been declared insane and placed under the control of a
   conservator appointed by the courts of the state in which he lived) was not bound because his legal guardian
   failed to sign the purported grant; that Cadmus neglected to perfect the mortgage in the manner
   required by his own state's law; and that Dindyma Bank had previously dissolved, thereby rendering its
   purported transfer nugatory. n16

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   n15. See Cal. Fam. Code 6750-6751 (West 1994). See also Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537
   (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964) (disaffirming contract by minor reaching her majority).

   n16. "What if there is no "proprietor' at the time of renewal, because the corporation in which copyright vests
   has become defunct? Under general principles, it would seem necessary to trace disposition of assets under
   state corporate law to locate the proprietor in that instance." 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 9.03
   n.6.1.

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   In each of those particulars, the battle is waged primarily under state law. n17 To take the case of an
   individual committed to an insane asylum, for example, it is difficult to find any governing federal law, and thus
   to resist wholesale descent into the minutiae of the subject state's ordinance. In the balance of the other
   instances, federal law likewise does not directly speak to the question of who holds the capacity to enter into
   a contract. Erigone therefore faces the prospect of lengthy explorations of state law in order to validate her
   federal copyright claims. The best she can hope for is the application not of the particular law of the state in
   which Atalanta, Busiris, Cadmus, and the rest chanced to live, but instead a general notion of common law as
   applied throughout the several states. n18 But even that victory does not invoke the application of federal
   norms; instead, it looks to an abstract notion of state law. n19

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   n17. Another oft-litigated issue in the copyright sphere arises when a party to a copyright contract attempts
   to rescind it, for non-performance or otherwise. The determination of whether the combined circumstances
   warrant rescission arises either under the law of the state in which the contract was executed (or the parties
   were located) or more broadly under the general state common law of contracts. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright,
   supra note 13, 10.15[A] (collecting cases).

   n18. See id. at 9.03 n.6.1 (citing Fleming v. Charles L. Harney Constr. Co., 177 F.2d 65, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
   (construing Surplus Property Act of 1944 such that corporate "dissolution cannot be distinguished from the
   death of a natural person," and following general common law rather than rule of state of incorporation)).

   n19. Whether the subject law tracks that of an individual state or a more generalized notion of state law is of
   no moment to the discussion that follows. Nonetheless, it strikes us that copyright law tends to focus on the
   "brooding omnipresence" of common law, rather than on the particulars enacted in any given jurisdiction. See,
   e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (determining status of "employee"
   under Copyright Act by reference to the factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) Of Agency). Cf. Erie
   R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rejecting federal "general law" as rule of decision in diversity cases).
 

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   B. Works for Hire

   As the above hypotheticals demonstrate, the symbiotic relationship between copyright and contract continues
   throughout the life of a copyright. Moreover, it can begin even before copyright birth, the moment an original
   work of authorship is fixed for the first time in a tangible medium of expression. n20 In this guise, it arises as a
   factor in defining who the "author" is and thus in determining the identity of the initial "copyright
   owner." n21 Ordinarily, the author is the efficient cause of parturition, that is, the human being(s) who gave
   birth to the work. The Act departs from the default rule, however, when a preexistent contract applies to
   certain categories of specially commissioned works "if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
   signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." n22 Thus, both at gestation and
   throughout its life, a copyright is owned according to a complex scheme deriving in large part from state law.

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   n20. See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1994).

   n21. "Initial Ownership - Copyright in a work...vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17U.S.C.
   201(a) (1994).

   n22. 17U.S.C. 101 (1994). In the Seventh Circuit, the contract must indeed be prenatal. See Schiller&
   Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992). In the Second Circuit, a more ameliorative
   rule prevails. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing with approval 1
   Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 5.03[B][2][b]).

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   C. Sale, Rental, Lease

   But it is not solely the question of ownership over which state law governs. Copyright exploitation, too, can
   often turn on distinctions that equally derive from state laws. In this respect, we depart from the intangible
   essence of the copyrightable work and move to the tangible good in which it may be embodied. n23 Consider
   that copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
   to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." n24 Moreover, one in
   possession of a lawfully made copy "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
   otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy...." n25 As was the case with respect to "mortgage" and the
   rest, neither the Copyright Act itself nor other applicable features of federal law define when a "sale" or
   "rental" or act of "lending" of a physical item has taken place. For these questions as well, resort to state law
   appears inevitable. n26

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   n23. See 17 U.S.C. 202 (1994).

   n24. 17 U.S.C. 106(3) (1994).

   n25. 17 U.S.C. 109(a) (1994). This provision - imprecisely labeled the "first sale" doctrine - plays a large role
   below. See infra Section III.B.

   n26. One case apparently holds that perfume with a copyrighted label, although imported from abroad, was in
   fact "sold" within the United States under the pertinent provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
   Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 344, 347 (S.D. Fla. 1985). That case treats gray market
   importation, a subject that the Supreme Court addressed in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research
   International, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125 (1998).

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   In sum, federal copyright doctrine leaves to state law the vast bulk of issues concerning contracts affecting
   copyright. It follows that state contract law (and cognate doctrines arising under state law) determine to a
   great extent the destiny of a copyrighted work and the physical object in which it is embodied. Those state
   rules play a critical role in maintaining the "delicate equilibrium" between the rights of copyright holders
   to reap the rewards of their intellectual property and the rights of the public to unimpeded advancement of
   knowledge and expression.

   D. Contract Formation

   Consonant with the traditional interplay between state contract law and federal copyright law, the U.C.C. can
   help define the mechanics of contract law in the context of contemporary transactions. For example, Article
   2B creates rules to govern electronic contracting and provides that the fact that a contract is in electronic
   form does not alter or reduce its effect, validity, or enforceability. It gives binding weight to electronic
   signatures, and it sets forth rules for determining who shall be held responsible for electronic messages. n27 All
   of these factors may arise in the context of an electronic license of copyrightable subject matter - an
   electronic contract for distribution rights in a book or motion picture, for example - which parties modify by
   e-mail and sign using digital signatures. Because federal copyright law, standing alone, is silent as to whether
   such a contract is enforceable, the U.C.C. can usefully fill the doctrinal gap in this and like instances. Article
   2B therefore can provide important support to the goal of maintaining copyright's "delicate equilibrium" in the
   digital age.

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   n27. See U.C.C. 2B-113-116 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

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   E. Limits of Contract Rights

   Nonetheless, federal abdication in favor of determinations of contract principles under state law has its limits.
   In certain particulars, the Copyright Act itself sets forth some governing parameters applicable to contracts
   and other matters typically reserved to determination under state law. When those circumstances obtain,
   federal law controls, notwithstanding contrary state doctrines. n28

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   n28. For a lengthy discussion of copyright contracts in contrast to state law doctrines of community property,
   see generally David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership By the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. Rev.
   383 (1988).

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   One example is so pronounced as to have virtually escaped notice. Undoubtedly the most well-known aspect
   of Anglo-American contract law is its requirement of a quid pro quo - the doctrine of consideration. n29 It is
   doubtful that the law of any state in the union dispenses with that general requirement. n30 Were it applicable
   to the copyright sphere, that doctrine would invalidate grants of copyright ownership unrequited by
   the grantee. n31 Yet "notwithstanding that feature of state law, no consideration is necessary under federal
   law to effectuate a transfer of copyright ownership that does not purport to require consideration." n32
   (Nonetheless, one must acknowledge that few, if any, cases have tested the boundary of consideration-less
   copyright grants, presumably because grantees of valuable copyrights invariably recite the delivery of "$ 10
   and other good and valuable consideration" in order to escape serving as a test case. n33)

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   n29. Thus, A's promise to B to pay $ 1000 if A cannot run a marathon in under 5 hours is a nullity. But B's
   agreement to give A a peppercorn if A timely completes the marathon probably resuscitates the contract. See
   Restatement (Second) of Contracts 17 (1979).

   n30. Of course, exceptions exist under state law. Thus, A's promise to pay $ 1000 to the United Way without
   any return obligation is often enforceable under an exception to the doctrine of consideration for promises to
   make charitable contributions.

   n31. Recall that Busiris gave the copyright hypothesized above to Cadmus gratis. Were a requirement of
   consideration applicable to copyrights, an additional quiver would accrue to the bow of Erigone's enemies.

   n32. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 10.03[A][8].

   n33. See, e.g., id. Form21-21.

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   The most prominent example of federal contract requirements trumping contrary state doctrine that has
   received treatment in published decisions is the Act's requirement that any transfer of copyright ownership
   n34 "is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance...is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
   conveyed...." n35 Even if state law validates oral grants - attested by the grantor before the mythical bench
   of fifty bishops, for example - that law must bow to the superior force of the federal enactment. n36

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   n34. Note that such transfers definitionally exclude nonexclusive licenses under copyright. See 17U.S.C. 101
   (1994).

   n35. 17U.S.C. 204(a) (1994).

   n36. See, e.g., Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding preempted
   claims for breach of oral contract and tortious breach of contract); Marshall v. New Kids On The Block
   Partnership, 780 F.Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting claim as one for breach of an oral contract
   rather than for infringement of the copyright orally transferred); Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Econs.
   Co., 548 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding unenforceable oral agreement for transfer of copyright
   ownership), aff'd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983).

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   Another example of the same phenomenon - though this one has gone unlitigated - arises under copyright's
   termination-of-transfers doctrine, which allows authors a "second bite of the apple" for works that they long
   ago sold, gave away, or otherwise alienated. n37 In particular, the Act itself provides with respect to
   transfers of copyright ownership that, following the lapse of a set period, n38 "termination of the grant may be
   effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make
   any future grant." n39 Accordingly, a contract not to exercise an author's termination rights may be
   fully operational under state law, yet the superior force of federal law nonetheless bars its enforcement,
   effectively rendering it a nullity. n40

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   n37. See 17 U.S.C. 203, 304(c) (1994). More technically, the Supreme Court has labeled the
   reversion-of-renewals doctrine as a "second chance" and, correlatively, the termination-of-transfers device
   here under consideration a "third opportunity" for authors to profit from works that they had long ago
   alienated. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220, 225 (1990).

   n38. In brief, grants effectuated before 1978 are subject to termination following 56 years of the work's
   copyright subsistence; grants effectuated thereafter are subject to termination 35 years after the work's
   publication. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 11.05.

   n39. 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (1994).

   n40. See generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 11.07.

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   Much confusion arises in attempting to reconcile these strands. n41 As an example, consider the ruling that
   when Congress used the term "children" in the context of termination of pre-1978 transfers n42 it intended to
   adopt antecedent state family law definitions as to who qualifies for that label, n43 whereas when Congress
   used the same word in the same Act to apply to termination of post-1978 transfers, it intended to adopt a
   federal definition incorporated into the Copyright Act itself. n44 The court reached that result by attempting
   to follow Congress's will in enacting a given provision of the Copyright Act. n45 As we shall see, that
   desideratum furnishes the touchstone for proper analysis in the journey that follows.

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   n41. As the drafters of Article 2B comment, "The relationship between federal law and state contract law is
   complex." U.C.C. 2B-105 reporter's note 1 (Draft, Mar. 1998). In our opinion, even the Courts of Appeals have
   erred on both sides of the issue under discussion, that is, state contract law control over disposition of
   copyrights. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued Congress's will in holding doctrines of state contract law preempted
   in Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993), criticized in 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13,
   11.01[B]. The Second Circuit, by contrast, inappropriately failed to advert to Congress' will to allow even oral
   grants of nonexclusive licenses, see infra note 47, by disallowing them under state law in Grappo v. Alitalia
   Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 56 F.3d 427, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1995), criticized in 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra
   note 13, 10.03[A][8].

   n42. On the termination-of-transfer doctrine, see the preceding paragraph and its footnotes.

   n43. The rationale here stems from DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), which looked to state family
   law in the reversion of renewal context. Yet even this Supreme Court ruling is not unlimited, as the Court
   indicated that applicable state law would not be followed to the extent that it defined children "in a way
   entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage." Id. at581.

   n44. See Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906 (1993),
   discussed in 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 11.03[A][2][a].

   n45. The court followed the logic that the provision applicable to pre-1978 grants was intended to continue
   prior law on the subject, which had been subject to the Supreme Court's gloss in DeSylva. By contrast, the
   provision applicable to grants entered on January1, 1978, and thereafter was created out of whole cloth; in
   this instance, Congress presumably wished to apply the definition of "children" that it incorporated into the
   same new enactment. See Stone, 970 F.2d at 1064-65.

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   II Contract Need Play No Role in Protecting Copyright Rights

   Though Article 2B, as noted above, can usefully serve a complementary role to copyright, there is one
   significant function for which Article 2B is not needed: to protect the copyright interests of copyright
   proprietors, especially in the context of mass market distribution of software, one of the paradigmatic
   transactions under Article 2B. Contrary to the claim that Article 2B is needed to protect copyright interests in
   that context, existing copyright law adequately protects those owners when they distribute
   copyrighted mass market software, even in a world in which shrinkwrap agreements are not deemed
   enforceable contracts. n46 That conclusion follows because the exclusive rights granted under the copyright
   laws effectively preclude use of computer software - to the extent the Constitution and Congress accord a
   monopolytherein - without the express or implied permission of the copyright owner.

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   n46. Other interests of the copyright owner, such as the right to a royalty stream, limitations of liability, and
   limitations of warranties, may, by contrast, require enforceable contracts for protection. It is precisely these
   other interests that Article 2B properly serves.

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   A. Enforceability of Unilateral License Terms

   When a copyright owner distributes its software, it is free to grant a license extending only to specified uses,
   while excluding others. Moreover, any such license does not require a bilateral contract. A simple, unilateral
   statement by the copyright owner of the scope of its license suffices. n47 In most cases, use beyond the
   scope of that license constitutes actionable copyright infringement under existing copyright law. n48 To the
   extent that any such use beyond the scope of the unilateral license is not copyright infringement - for
   instance, because it constitutes fair use under section 107 - state contract law cannot produce a different
   result.

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   n47. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 10.03[A] (citing cases). Indeed, even an oral statement may
   be sufficient to grant a nonexclusive license. See id.

   n48. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9thCir. 1989) ("Copyright licenses are
   assumed to prohibit any use not authorized.").

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   Several hypotheticals illustrate the ability of publishers to protect their intellectual property rights when
   engaging in mass distribution of software. First, Procne picks up the latest copy of SuperSmart321, a nifty
   spreadsheet program, at CompUSA. She purchases the program without opening the box and takes it home.
   Unlike most software products, SuperSmart321 contains no license terms of any kind.

   In this hypothetical, existing copyright law permits Procne to do exactly what a typical publisher and typical
   buyer would contemplate: use the software on a single computer and make a backup copy. Because Procne
   purchased a copy of the software, she clearly falls within the ambit of the statutory section securing rights to
   those owners. n49 She thus is entitled to copy the software onto her computer's hard drive in order to run it,
   n50 as well as to make a tangible backup copy. n51 Any further copying of the software - and thus,
   effectively, use on any other computer system - constitutes copyright infringement unless excused,
   for instance as a fair use. n52 Thus, copyright law alone affords the publisher of SuperSmart321 ample power
   to prevent Procne from making or distributing improper copies of the software, or even duplicating the
   software on multiple machines in her home or office. No bilateral contract is necessary to protect the software
   publisher's rights.

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   n49. See 17 U.S.C. 117 (1994) ("It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
   make...another copy or adaptation of that computer program...as an essential step in the utilization of the
   computer program in conjunction with a machine....").

   n50. See 17 U.S.C. 117(1) (1994).

   n51. See 17 U.S.C. 117(2) (1994).

   n52. See 17 U.S.C. 107 (1994).

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   Second, Pandion picks up the latest copy of SuperSmart321 by purchasing it via the Internet. He pays for it
   with a credit card and downloads it to the hard drive of his computer. Once again, the results will be
   effectively the same as above, even without a written license agreement. Pandion still owns the copy of the
   computer program on his hard drive and is authorized to use it (but not reproduce it except for backup
   purposes) pursuant to the statutory sections invoked above. n53

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   n53. See 17 U.S.C. 117 (1994). One could argue in this context that Pandion is not the "owner of a copy of a
   computer program" under section 117 because a "copy" under the Copyright Act is a material object in which a
   work is fixed and Pandion did not purchase a material object (the hard disk), but only the data comprising the
   computer program. In light of the fact that Pandion was authorized to download the data to his hard drive (or
   to another conventional storage medium such as a diskette), it is more reasonable to conclude that Pandion
   has purchased a copy of the program, that is, a tangible medium in which the work is embodied. See, e.g.,
   MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-519 (9th Cir. 1993). See infra Section II.B. But
   even accepting the proposition that what is purchased must meet all the requisites of a "copy" before
   downloading begins, Pandion would seem to have a powerful argument that, by virtue of purchasing the
   software on-line, he received an implied license to use what he paid for. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v.
   Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990) (implying license from delivery, without restriction, of special
   effects footage for use in film). In the absence of any terms to the contrary communicated at the time of the
   license, Pandion should have the right to use the software for its ordinary and intended purpose, that is, on a
   single computer. For an extended treatment, see David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital
   Age, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Nimmer, Brains].

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   Third, Itys purchases a "10 User Pack" of Virulator, a software package that locates all computer viruses on a
   user's hard drive, removes them and e-mails them to Iraq. He installs the software on the network server in his
   office. The envelope containing the CD-ROM, as well as the install screen, inform Itys that: "This software
   product is licensed for installation on a network server, to be accessed by no more than 10users
   simultaneously. All other rights are reserved."

   Under existing copyright law, the manufacturer's 10-user limitation is enforceable regardless of whether state
   law treats the above notice as part of a binding bilateral contract. n54 A copyright owner may grant a
   non-exclusive license by any words or conduct tending to show such a license. n55 Thus, by virtue of the
   above language, the publisher of Virulator has expanded Itys's right to use his copy on a single machine n56 to include making one copy on a server and up to nine other copies in the random access memory (RAM) of client computers. If Itys were to allow 20 users to access the software, the copies existing in the  RAM of machines 11-20 would be unlicensed and hence infringing. n57 The publisher thus has the lever it needs to preclude unlicensed use, without obtaining Itys's enforceable promise via the U.C.C. not to use the software on more machines than authorized.

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   n54. The U.C.C. drafters lean in the same direction. See U.C.C. 2B-111 reporter's notes (Draft, Mar. 1998)
   (restricting usage for consumers only enforceable under copyright law without any requirement for assent).

   n55. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 10.03[A].

   n56. That is, the default right that Itys would have in the absence of the subject language under 17 U.S.C.
   117.

   n57. See MAI, 991 F.2d 511 (stating that loading a copy of software into computer's RAM constitutes creation
   of a "copy" under the Copyright Act).

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   Fourth, after her company's IPO, Philomela decides that she has grown bored with life in the Silicon Valley,
   exercises her stock options and moves for a year to Tahiti (after thrashing Thrace). Before she moves, she
   posts an ad on the Internet offering to rent her copy of MegaCAD 3D, an elaborate $ 10,000 software
   package. Tereus has an eight-month project for which he desperately needs MegaCAD. He spots Philomela's
   ad and jumps at her offer. Tereus pays $ 1,000 for a year's use of the disks. Can the publisher of MegaCAD
   prevent this transaction?

   Under existing copyright law, Philomela may not rent or lease her copy of the software. n58 Similarly, Tereus is
   not entitled to use the software, as to do so would involve copying the software into the computer's RAM,
   which constitutes infringement in the absence of a license. n59 Thus, the publisher has a viable copyright
   infringement claim against Philomela and Tereus. An enforceable promise by Philomela not to rent her software
   is unnecessary here, too.

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   n58. See 17 U.S.C. 109(b)(1)(A) (1994).

   n59. See, e.g., MAI, 991 F.2d 511. Tereus cannot avail himself of the benefits of section 117 because he is
   not the "owner" of the copy he wishes to use, having simply rented it. See 17U.S.C. 202 (1994).

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   Fifth, Bacchus needs software to help him manage a fleet of trucks for his party-hearty business. Like all good
   small businessmen, Bacchus is cost-conscious. He finds a shareware package on the Internet, OINOS, which
   looks like it will do the trick. Bacchus downloads the OINOS software, reads the license, which provides that
   he may use the software for his own business purposes, but cannot modify or redistribute it. He pays the $
   19.95 registration fee and uses the software. Two years later, Bacchus realizes he needs an integrated
   system to link his truck management software with the rest of his business. He hires an independent software
   consultant to build such a system. Because he loves OINOS so much, Bacchus specifically asks the consultant
   to make his new system work just the same way. The consultant, who is convinced he is underpaid, takes a
   shortcut and includes a modified version of some of the OINOS code in the system he has been
   fermenting. Ultimately, the new system is so successful that Bacchus markets it to other trucking businesses.

   Can the author of OINOS complain? Of course. It does not matter whether the license agreement that
   accompanied the OINOS software is deemed an enforceable contract. Under existing copyright law, Bacchus
   had no right to have the OINOS software modified or incorporated into another system, thereby creating
   unauthorized derivative works. n60 Nor did he have the right to reproduce it for distribution to others, whether
   as part of a new system or separately. Article 2B adds nothing of substance to the rights of OINOS's owner.

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   n60. See 17 U.S.C. 106(2) (1994).

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   One could spin out numerous other hypotheticals involving typical modes of software distribution and reach
   the same result. At least for the modes of software distribution used today, copyright law provides all the
   teeth a publisher needs to control use and dissemination of her work. No ersatz shark via contractual promise
   is necessary to enforce these rights.

   The conclusion that contract is not needed to protect copyright interests further pertains when we consider
   other forms of distribution in the digital realm. Consider, for example, the Divx (Digital Video Express)
   technology for distribution of movies, which may be upon us in the very near future. Divx operates like a DVD
   disk containing a movie, except that the encryption software included on the Divx disk limits the user to
   playing the movie for a set number of days following the first time she plays the disk. n61 Once the initial
   viewing period expires, the owner of a Divx disk can obtain additional play time, or in some cases convert the
   disk to unlimited play, for a fee. n62 What if a studio selling movies on Divx disks feels it needs an enforceable
   promise by the buyer not to attempt to circumvent the lockout technology built into the software?

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   n61. See Digital Video Express, LP, About Divx Technology (visited Sept. 13, 1998)
   <http://www.divx.com/about divx divxtechnology.htm>.

   n62. See id.

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   Although one can appreciate the desire of the studio to seek any and all legal protections it can, the copyright
   laws of today (and certainly those of tomorrow) should prove more than adequate to protect the studio's
   interest, even absent the proposed contract. n63 Modifying the Divx software to defeat the lockout
   (assuming, for the sake of argument, it were technically possible) likely would involve either unauthorized
   reproduction of at least a portion of the copyrighted work, or the creation of an unauthorized derivative work.
   Either way, copyright infringement liability would result. Moreover, any doubt about the impropriety of
   defeating anti-copying technology will likely be laid to rest by pending federal legislation. n64 Thus, even on
   the so-called bleeding edge of technology, we find it difficult to see a need for state law protection of
   copyright rights in connection with the mass-market distribution of copyrighted works.

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   n63. To a certain extent, the best protection for the studio will come from the quality of its technology.
   Regardless of whether copyright law or contract law forms the basis of a claim, suing individual buyers of
   movies for making illicit copies on behalf of relatives or friends is unlikely to be economically worthwhile, even if
   one somehow concluded that it were sound business practice. Pursuing large-scale pirates (including those
   who sell devices or software to defeat copy protection) can be done as effectively, if not more, under the
   copyright laws as under contract. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829
   (11th Cir. 1990).

   n64. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally David
   Nimmer, Aus der Neuen Welt, 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1998).

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   B. The Conflation of Licensing with Distribution

   The considerations set forth above assimilate software contracts to traditional means of copyright
   exploitation. The Article 2B posits "two distinct frameworks" in this regard. n65 It is worth reviewing the
   drafters' view of the matter at some length:

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   n65. U.C.C. art.2B Preface at7 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

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   The first [framework] involves use of a master copy and is common in the movie industry and in software
   contracts. Under this framework, a "distributor" receives access to a single master copy of the information
   work and a license to make and distribute additional copies or to make and publicly perform a copy. For
   example, Correl Software may license a distributor to allow its software to be loaded into the distributor's
   computers or video games. The contract will contain a number of terms. Correl may limit the distributor to no
   more than 1,000 to be distributed only in the computers and only if subject to an end user license. Since both
   the making copies of and the distribution of copies are within the scope of the owner's copyright, acts that go
   outside the contractual limitations are infringements as well as contractual breaches.

   An alternative methodology uses actual copies of the software. Here, for example, Quicken may license a
   distributor to distribute its accounting software in packages provided to the distributor by Quicken. A license is
   used in the software industry here, although some other industries may sell copies to the distributor for resale.
   In the license, the distributor may be allowed to distribute copies to retailers, provided that certain conditions
   are met, such as terms of payment, retention of the original packaging, and making the eventual end user
   distribution occur subject to an end user license. Since the distribution right is an exclusive right in copyright
   law, distributions outside the license infringe the copyright.

   In both sequences, the information product eventually reaches an end user. If it does so in an ordinary
   chain of distribution complying with the distribution licenses, the end user is in rightful possession of a copy. If
   the distribution involved sales of copies, nothing more is required. The end user is the owner of the copy.
   Copyright law spells out limited rights that flow to the owner of the copy (e.g., to distribute it, make a
   back-up if it is software, make some changes essential to use if [sic] its software). There is no direct
   contractual relationship between the copyright owner and the "end user."

   If, however, the copyright owner elected a licensing framework, given the structure of the transactions, the
   end user's right to "use" (e.g., copy) the software depends on the end user license. Typically, this is
   characterized as a license from the producer to the end user. It creates a direct contractual relationship that
   would not otherwise exist and which, in light of concepts of privity, might not be implied as between these
   parties. The contract, then, at this point, jumps past the chain of distribution and creates a direct link to the
   producer by the end user. It is also, in this sequence, the only contract that enables the end user to make
   copies of the software in its own machine. n66

   Given that, as the hypotheticals set forth in the previous subsection of this Article reveal, n67 copyright law
   itself regulates the activities of remote purchasers of software, why does Article 2B attempt to create "a
   direct link to the producer by the end user"? n68 The answer stems from the language italicized above.
   Through these various references, the draft posits a framework that falls short of a sale, constituting merely a
   license.

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   n66. Id. (emphases added, except for sixth emphasis ("these parties")).

   n67. See supra Section II.A.

   n68. Elsewhere, the draft goes even further: "The form establishes for the first time a relationship between
   the copyright owner and the end user that may be central to the end user's right to use the information."
   U.C.C. 2B-508 reporter's note 5 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

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   The first two paragraphs quoted above contrast "access to a single master copy" with the "alternative
   methodology [that] uses actual copies of the software." It is indeed possible to imagine access without making
   actual copies. For instance, instead of purchasing diskettes containing Microsoft Word 97 and loading it onto
   your hard drive, you could pay a monthly fee to log onto the Microsoft web site and create and edit
   documents there. At the end of each session, you would download your text and save it, but you would never
   obtain any copy of the computer program itself. That scenario indeed involves access without the alternative
   of obtaining actual copies. By contrast, if you do download Word 97 onto your hard drive, then you have
   already moved to the realm in which copyright law's first-sale doctrine applies. n69 This realm is
   entered, moreover, regardless of whether the label "license" applies to Microsoft's granting of rights in the
   copyright to the program.

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   n69. See 17 U.S.C. 109 (1994).

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   For these purposes, it is vital to differentiate between tangible and intangible property. n70 When a software
   publisher distributes its product, it certainly does not part with copyright ownership. n71 Instead, the only
   matter under examination is whether it has parted with ownership of the physical media incorporating that
   software. Article 2B evidently takes the view that a status short of sale exists - which it calls "licensing" -
   whereby end users nonetheless acquire full dominion over the tangible property that comes into their
   safekeeping.

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   n70. See 17 U.S.C. 202 (1994).

   n71. Only to the extent that the publisher assigns the copyright or exclusively licenses it (or engages in other
   hypothecations, such as mortgages) does a transfer take place. In a typical mass market situation, no such
   transfer of copyright interests has occurred.

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   One line of cases cited by the drafters of Article 2B apparently vindicates the existence of this type of
   "licensing" framework. It is exemplified by Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., n72 which
   arose over the distribution of Microsoft's MS-DOS and Windows software. The facts in the case are unclear. It
   may be that some of the software at issue in the case was pirated. To that extent, the subject diskettes
   were clearly unauthorized, outside the safe harbor of the first-sale doctrine, n73 and thus rightfully subject to
   seizure and suppression. n74 On the other hand, the opinion can also be read to arise from a factual posture in
   which Microsoft produced copies of Windows software, which it then distributed to Original Equipment
   Manufacturers (OEMs). The OEMs then disposed of the copies in their possession, as they were entitled to do
   under the first-sale doctrine. To the extent that the case implicated the first scenario, it is uninteresting -
   counterfeit products are clearly not entitled to further distribution. But the second scenario is evidently the
   basis for the Article 2B drafters' citation to the case. n75 It is accordingly necessary to evaluate it from that
   standpoint.

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   n72. 846 F.Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), cited in U.C.C. 2B-508 reporter's note 5 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

   n73. See 17 U.S.C. 109 (1994) (limiting protection to copies "lawfully made under this title").

   n74. See Harmony, 846 F. Supp. at212. An additional problem for the defense in that case was an inability to
   trace its precise distributions back to initial productions by Microsoft. See id. Given that the request was for a
   preliminary injunction, it is not surprising that the factual record before the court at that time was sparse.

   n75. See U.C.C. 2B-508 reporter's note 2 (Draft, Mar. 1998).

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   Microsoft v. Harmony rejected the defendants' first-sale defense on the basis that "Microsoft only licenses and
   does not sell its Products." n76 What does that holding mean? To appreciate its import, the buzzwords
   "licenses" and "Products" must be unscrambled.

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   n76. 846 F.Supp. at213.

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   License of tangible medium. If the underlying facts were that Microsoft leased diskettes or CD-ROMs to
   end users and sent its agent to collect those physical media at a time specified in the lease, then no sale of
   those physical products occurred. Under those assumed facts, Microsoft had not parted with possession of a
   physical copy. On that basis, no sale occurred and copyright's first-sale doctrine does not come into play. n77
   That is one possible sense in which Microsoft may have "licensed" its "Product."

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   n77. See 17 U.S.C. 109 (1994). Note that the statute itself does not actually require a "sale" for the section's
   protections to be triggered; instead it applies to all "owners" of lawfully made copies.

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   License of copyrighted work embodied in tangible medium. By contrast, if the underlying facts were that
   Microsoft issued only a license to its MS-DOS and Windows products, but did so through the sale or other
   permanent disposition of tangible items embodying those products, then the first-sale implications are wholly
   different. Imagine, for example, that Microsoft gave OEMs diskettes with the intent that they would be
   distributed to end users who could discard the diskettes in the trash or erase and reuse them n78 - so long as
   the users did not reproduce the subject software. n79 Under this latter scenario, a sale of the physical
   medium has occurred, and its purchaser is clothed under the Copyright Act with the rights belonging to rightful
   owners of physical property, subject to all of the obligations under the Act that are reserved to Microsoft of
   exercising copyright dominion. This is the second sense in which Microsoft may be said to "license" its
   "Product."

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   n78. See Nimmer, Brains, supra note 53, at 22.

   n79. An exception to the copyright owner's exclusive reproduction right of course is coterminous with the
   rights secured to users to actually exploit the computer program, guaranteed to them under 17U.S.C. 117.

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   These two paradigms are illustrated by the evolution of motion-picture exploitation. Film owners have the
   option not to sell their works, but only to "license" them. For decades, the motion-picture studios followed
   exactly that course, jealously guarding ownership of the celluloid prints and only renting them to theaters for
   exhibition, retrieving the physical stock at the end of the theatrical run. n80 That course of action matches
   the first set of facts hypothesized above. Alternatively, motion-picture studios also have the option of
   distributing tangible copies of their films - as they have done since the advent of the videotape era. n81 That
   conduct from the 1980s to the present matches the second scenario.

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   n80. In the later era of television syndication, film proprietors adopted the practice of "bicycling" film prints
   from one television station to another, again to preserve strict control over the physical stock. See National
   Broad. Co. v. Sonneborn, 870 F.2d 40, 51 (2d Cir. 1989).

   n81. See 2 Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 13, 8B.01[B].

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   Software publishers likewise enjoy the same rights. They can engage solely in rental or lease of physical
   media, mandating return of the subject tangible items at the end of the term. Or they can incorporate
   their software onto physical items that they then release from their control, setting them into the stream of
   commerce. In the latter instance, the end user, while admittedly a licensee of the copyright, is not a licensee
   of the diskette or CD-ROM in her possession. Instead, she is the owner of those physical media containing
   licensed works. As such, she is clothed with full rights under the first-sale doctrine. No innovation in software
   distribution so far has forced reevaluation of the traditional paradigm.

   Which circumstance actually obtained in Microsoft v. Harmony, the exemplar of the "licensing" paradigm?
   Sadly, the opinion fails to clarify the matter, and that inability to distinguish between differing paradigms is
   only too typical. n82 Nonetheless, lack of clarity does not create a new "licensing" paradigm. Instead, if there
   were a bona fide lease of the physical goods, then one legal regime pertained; if Microsoft actually sold or
   otherwise permanently disposed of those physical goods, retaining full copyright ownership in itself, then
   another legal regime governed. Current copyright law does not recognize any regime of "licensing" n83 that
   stands intermediate between those two possibilities. n84

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   n82. Other examples are Microsoft Corp. v. Gray Computer, 910 F.Supp. 1077, 1084 (D.Md. 1995) and Triad
   Systems. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally 2 Nimmer on
   Copyright, supra note 13, 8.12[B][1]. See also Nimmer, Brains, supra note 53, at 21-25 (discussing MAI v.
   Peak, 991 F.2d 511).

   n83. In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1125 (1998), the
   Supreme Court distinguishes between the ""owner' of a lawfully made copy" and "any nonowner such as a
   bailee, a licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful." 118 S.Ct. at 1131.
   Standing by itself, that dictum cannot illuminate who, in the Court's mind, deserves the status of "licensee,"
   although its juxtaposition with "a bailee [and] a consignee" hints that the Court views "a licensee" in this
   context as one who has not obtained ownership of the physical product, corresponding to the category
   posited above of "license of tangible medium." We thus must revert to the potential constructions of that term
   set forth in the text.

   n84. It is instructive to undertake some archaeological excavation into the myth that a separate "licensing"
   paradigm exists. One student commentator maintains that "if the software is only licensed, then the software
   developer may prevent the user from transferring ownership in a copy to a third party." Ira V. Heffen, Note,
   Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1499 (1997). As support, the
   Note cites the current case of Microsoft v. Harmony and traces its genealogy back to a handbook published by
   the Practicing Law Institute. See id. at 1494 n.37 (citing William H. Neukom & Robert W. Gomulkiewicz,
   Licensing Rights to Computer Software, in Technology Licensing and Litigation 1993, at 778 (PLI Patents,
   Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3897, 1993), available in
   WESTLAW, 354 PLI/Pat 775). The authors of that PLI handbook serve as Senior Vice President for Law and
   Corporate Affairs and Senior Corporate Attorney, respectively, with Microsoft Corporation. They explain "that
   software publishers license rather than sell software in order to negate the doctrine of first sale...." Id. One
   must congratulate their employer on realizing, in Microsoft v. Harmony, its goal - conceded with admirable
   candor - of voiding copyright's first-sale doctrine. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth in the text, the
   statute itself does not permit that result, to the extent that the underlying essence of the transaction results
   in a user obtaining ownership of the physical product containing the copyrightable expression.

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   Nonetheless, an innovation might be said to be occurring through Internet distribution. Are the old
   barriers breaking down such that U.C.C. Article 2B must come to the rescue of a tottering copyright system?
   We answer that question, too, in the negative. As the foregoing example of Pandion reveals, n85 purchases
   over the Internet do not suffer from a fatal lack of privity between software owner and end user which
   requires legal redress. Instead, copyright law itself governs the usages to which Pandion may put the product
   that he purchased over the Internet.

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   n85. See supra Section II.A.

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   Indeed, it is possible to go further here. Someone like Pandion who purchases SuperSmart321 as embodied in
   CD-ROM form has unambiguously acquired the right to pass the CD-ROM on to a friend. Does a parity of
   reasoning indicate that Pandion himself likewise has the right to sell his computer when he wishes to upgrade
   his whole system, even if the hard drive thereby transferred contains a copy of SuperSmart321 that he
   purchased over the Internet?

   Now the pedal comes down to the metal: Can Pandion keep his computer, deferring upgrades to a later day,
   but nonetheless pass along solely SuperSmart321 (by transferring the files to a friend and deleting them from
   his own hard drive, let us say)? There are two possible answers to this question:

   Yes. Under this rationale, Pandion can take advantage of a "digital first-sale defense." n86 Pandion, by this
   logic, is as much an owner of the "copy" purchased over the Internet as he would be of the CD-ROM. Granted,
   the copy in this instance cannot be as conveniently hefted and hoisted aloft, but the mere fact of its
   dispersion over manifold sectors of the hard drive does not detract from its status as a material object in
   which the subject software is fixed and from which it can be retrieved. n87

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   n86. Nimmer, Brains, supra note 53, at 9, 33.

   n87. See 17 U.S.C. 101 (1994) (defining "copy"); MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
   518 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a "copy' of that software"
   under the copyright laws).

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   No. An alternative view is that Internet distribution is different. No tangible copy has been released, because
   there is no discrete "material object" of the type invoked above that contains SuperSmart321. The
   ever-shifting sectors and buffers where the work flits and dances fail to qualify as either "material" or an
   "object" under the statutory language.

   The latter view - that Internet distribution is different because it does not result in a "copy" - must be
   rejected as implausible. For were it correct that the recipient of an Internet instantiation does not obtain a
   "copy," Pandion would be able to distribute that instantiation freely over the Internet to thousands of
   remote recipients without infringing the copyright in SuperSmart 321. n88 Such a construction would be
   disastrous for copyright owners, and should not be viewed as implementing Congress's intent.

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   n88. See 17 U.S.C. 106(1), (3) (1994) (limiting copyright owner's rights to reproduction and distribution of
   "copies").

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   It is not necessary, however, to resolve whether Internet distribution results in a "copy" to test the
   adaptability of extant copyright law to new technologies. Under the "yes" view, Pandion may dispose of his
   volatile "copy" under the first-sale doctrine; under the "no" view, he cannot. Under the former view, Internet
   sales of software are assimilated to current methods of film exploitation via videocassettes, laser discs, DVD,
   and the rest (that is, a first sale arises), whereas under the latter view, such sales are assimilated to
   motion-picture distribution in the pre-videotape era (that is, there was no first sale). In either event, no new
   paradigm is required. n89

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   n89. See Nimmer, Brains, supra note 53, at 11.

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   In sum, the new paradigm of "licensing" instead of sales, on the one hand, and lending, on the other hand,
   collapses. For that reason, no new conceptual breakthrough via U.C.C. Article 2B is required.

   III The Limits on Contract via the Preemptive Force of Copyright

   Our discussion in Part I demonstrates that state contract law acts as a necessary complement to the
   Copyright Act by delineating the basic mechanics of contract formation, performance, and interpretation.
   Those salutary goals can find further expression in Article 2B. The analysis in Part II demonstrates that state
   contract law is not needed to protect the copyright interests of copyright proprietors. Those interests are
   safeguarded by the Copyright Act itself. What remains to be discussed are the ways in which state contract
   law can improperly meddle with the copyright laws by altering the copyright laws in favor of proprietors at the
   expense of users. The phenomenon of attempted contractual displacement of copyright, and the limits of
   contract in that regard, arises in the doctrinal context of preemption.

   A. General Preemption Notions

   Copyright law and contract law not only clash overtly but may clash covertly to the extent that they pursue
   different implicit purposes and objectives. When conflicts occur, preemption principles force state contract law
   to yield. The source of copyright's preemptive power is the United States Constitution. To the extent that any
   state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," n90 the Supremacy Clause mandates that the law of Congress reign supreme. n91

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   n90. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

   n91. Constitutional preemption of a competing state law regime was established in the first copyright case to
   go before the Supreme Court. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (holding federal copyright
   law preempts state common law protection for published works).

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   Some cases describe preemption as the upshot of a clash between state and federal law in which state law is
   vanquished. n92 Other cases have enunciated even stricter principles according to which federal law does not
   tolerate parallel state regimes. n93 As the Supreme Court put it in its most recent pronouncement on the
   subject of parallel regimes of federal and state intellectual property protection, "The offer of federal protection
   from competitive exploitation of intellectual property would be rendered meaningless in a world where
   substantially similar state law protections were readily available." n94

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   n92. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("If the scheme of protection developed
   by [a state] ... "clashes with the objectives of the federal ... laws' then the state law must fall." (citation
   omitted)).

   n93. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) ("When an article is
   unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid
   copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art.I, 8, cl.8, of the Constitution and in the
   implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
   leave in the public domain.")

   n94. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).

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   On the other hand, in one case predating the adoption of the current Act, the Supreme Court allowed greater
   tolerance for state schemes covering the same subject matter as copyright. In particular, Goldstein v.
   California n95 held that the states retain concurrent power to afford copyright protection to the works of
   authors as long as such protection does not conflict with federal law. Nonetheless, state laws enacted
   pursuant to such concurrent power can, of course, be subject to preemption by federal statute.

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   n95. 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973).

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   When enacting section 301 of the current Act, Congress took precisely that action of preempting concurrent
   state law in the copyright domain. Unlike the parallel federal and state tracks that previously applied to the
   copyright realm, section 301 federalizes much of the domain of protection for copyrightable expression. n96 By
   reason of that explicit federal preemption, states' concurrent copyright powers lack almost all practical
   significance. n97

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   n96. For certain residual matters that the states may still regulate, such as unfixed works and phonorecords
   pre-dating February15, 1972, see 1 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 13, 2.02.

   n97. Goldstein held that state law is not preempted if "Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the
   area unattended...." 412 U.S. at 570. As a practical matter it may often be hard, if not impossible, to
   distinguish benign from conscious neglect, that is, to know if Congress has "left the area unattended," or
   whether Congress affirmatively decided that federal protection is not available.

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   B. A Case Study in the Contract/Copyright Clash: ProCD v. Zeidenberg

   1. A Twist on Feist

   In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, n98 plaintiff spent millions of dollars to produce a massive "telephone book" of
   nationwide scope. Because the "book" contained almost one hundred million listings, plaintiff released it on
   CD-ROM with copyrighted search software designed to navigate through the mass of information. The CD-ROM
   was placed in a box that stated that the software came with restrictions listed in an enclosed license. The
   license was encoded on the CD-ROM discs, printed in the manual, and appeared on a user's screen every time
   the software ran. It expressly provided that the end user "will not make the [search] Software or the
   [telephone] Listings in whole or in part available to any other user in any networked or time-shared
   environment, or transfer the Listings in whole or in part to any computer other than the computer used to
   access the Listings." n99

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   n98. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

   n99. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at645.

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   When the matter under discussion combines listing from the white pages of the telephone book and allegations
   of copyright infringement, the Supreme Court's landmark holding in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
   Service Co. springs immediately to mind. n100 If that unanimous decision made anything clear, it is that not
   even a massive expenditure of funds to compile phone listings can render them copyrightable. Instead, they
   repose in the public domain - both as a matter of statutory construction and of constitutional necessity.
   Relying on Feist, defendants in ProCD copied all the listings off the plaintiff's CD-ROMs, composed their own
   software to access the names and addresses, and went into business in competition with plaintiff by making all
   the listings available for search on an Internet web page.

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   n100. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

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   The plaintiff responded by bringing suit. Barred by Feist from bringing a copyright claim against the copying of
   telephone listings, plaintiffs sought redress against defendants' constitutionally privileged copying by alleging
   breach of contract and misappropriation.

   2. Issues State and Federal

   On the latter cause of action, the district court concluded that "because plaintiff's misappropriation claim is
   not qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim, the underlying rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate
   are equivalent to federal rights and are preempted by the Copyright Act." n101 In reference to the contract
   issue, the district court noted that most commentators disfavor rights asserted under shrinkwrap
   licenses, given users' inability to bargain over precise terms. More fundamentally, those licenses "pose
   important questions about the extent to which individual contract provisions can supplement or expand federal
   copyright protection." n102 The district court accordingly concluded that section 301 preempted the contract
   claim. As Chief Judge Crabb held, any other ruling would "alter the "delicate balance' of copyright law" and,
   more particularly, constitute an impermissible end-run around Feist. n103

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   n101. ProCD, 908 F.Supp. at661.

   n102. Id. at650.

   n103. Id. at658.

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   This solicitude for "delicate balance" is not an aberration. As the Supreme Court itself has noted,
 
 

   It is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
   granted to authors or to inventors.... This task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors
   and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
   competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.... n104

   This ventilation of the contract issue in the context of copyright poses two analytically separate issues. n105
   The first question is whether, as a matter of contract law, the shrinkwrap license unilaterally imposed by the
   manufacturer constitutes a binding agreement. That first question implicates construction of state law,
   namely, the Uniform Commercial Code as implemented into Wisconsin law. Assuming an affirmative answer, the
   second question is whether that contract can govern in the copyright context. This second question arises
   under federal law, as a matter of preemption via the statute or the Constitution.

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   n104. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); accord Twentieth Century Music
   Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
   the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflect a balance of competing claims upon the
   public interest." (citation omitted)).

   n105. For a valuable untangling of the two strands implicated here, see MaureenA. O'Rourke, Copyright
   Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Mar