Theoretical Frameworks of Deliberative Democracy

Working Draft

Jay Bregman | 04/02/00

Note: Please send comments, questions, or suggestions on this draft to Jay Bregman (jbregman@cyber.law.harvard.edu).

 

 

Introduction and Purpose

The Meaning of Public Deliberation

Necessary Elements of Deliberative Democracy

Deliberation and Political Legitimacy

The “Bootstrapping” Legitimacy Problem

Proceduralist vs. Non-Proceduralist Deliberative Models

Political Change and Community

Moral Learning and Community Identity

Cyberspace and the Concept of Community

Cyberspace and the Burden of Deliberation

Deliberative Decision-Making

How can Deliberative Decisions be both Binding and Open to Revision?

Prevention of “Tyranny of the Majority”

The Process of Deliberation

Deliberation and Reason

Deliberation and Equality

Equality in Decision-Making

Free and Open Exchange of Information

Large Social Inequalities Incompatible with Deliberation

Elimination of Social Inequalities Unworkable in Online Environment

Deliberation and Identity

Equality and Anonymity

Difference as a “Resource”

Deliberation and Education/Information

Role of the Moderator in Deliberative Discourse

Role of Participants in Deliberative Discourse

 

Introduction and Purpose

From the Athenian Agora  to modern-day chat rooms and newsgroups, political theorists have attempted to answer the question: “If a community wants to make decisions that will be embraced by its constituents what are the elements of a deliberative process necessary to realize that goal?” The specific motivation for this document was the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), yet the need for innovative software to facilitate online deliberation and discourse (grounded in solid political theory) reaches well beyond ICANN.

 

The ultimate test of any deliberative democracy will be its practicality—choosing among the philosophical models can only provide a rough outline for success. Cyberspace remains a unique venue for deliberation which finds no historical analog—its size, diversity of membership, and landscape are remarkably different from any populace or public square encountered heretofore. Any attempt to build a model of Internet organization as ICANN proposes will inevitably require us to transcend the following models, but at the very least they save ICANN and any future Internet policy-making body the trouble of re-inventing the wheel.

 

The Meaning of Public Deliberation

A democracy based on public deliberation presupposes that citizens can decide through discourse what laws and policies they ought to pursue. Discourse members respect that each of them possesses “deliberative capacities,” the capacities needed to participate in an environment where reasons are publicly exchanged and the ability to mold solutions and achieve consensus on policies developed from the exchange of such public reasoning.[1]

 

Necessary Elements of Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy presupposes some degree of plurality among discourse participants; that is discourse members have diverse interests, convictions, and ideals. Although members share a commitment to the discourse as a means of problem-solving and policy-making, they do not believe any one set of interests, convictions, or ideals is necessary for sound decision-making.

 

Deliberation and Political Legitimacy

In order for decisions reached through deliberation to be legitimate, the discussion should be both ongoing and independent. Its members should expect it to continue into the indefinite future.[2] This is to ensure that the decisions made through discourse are open to future review and revision, if necessary. “Free deliberation among equals”[3] is held by discourse participants as the source of legitimacy in the decisions they make as a body.

 

The “Bootstrapping” Legitimacy Problem

For a discourse to occur, an individual or group of individuals must first set the rules under which that discourse is to function. How these rules are chosen, in what manner (democratically or dictatorially), and by whom can place limits on the power of the discourse. Such limits could pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of decisions made through subsequent discourse, because of the potential for a discourse unable to correct problems in the discourse architecture.

 

There is no clear way around the “bootstrapping” problem of legitimacy. One approach, granting the discourse the power to remake the world as they see fit, gives the discourse unbridled political (or business) power. Once the board of directors (or the like) grants the discourse the power to make any changes in the structure of the corporation/government, the discourse members could then, by a supermajority (2/3 of the members) or similar, be able to dismiss the board of directors that gave birth to the discourse. The discourse members could then decide on whatever type of governing model suits their needs, as long as it is backed by a supermajority or similar amendment procedure. A supermajority is an ideal requirement for amendments, since it ensures stability in the laws or resolutions passed by the discourse.

 

Proceduralist vs. Non-Proceduralist Deliberative Models

On the question of “what makes the outcome of a deliberative discourse legitimate?” theorists have not reached common ground. Some (Joshua Cohen, et. al.) believe that process is paramount—that any decision reached through a proper deliberative procedure is by definition legitimate. Others, however, believe that legitimacy is achieved only through proper deliberative procedure that also respects some set of substantive values embraced by a given society. This shared set of values is inherently more difficult (or may be impossible) to define in cyberspace. Deliberation in cyberspace will bring together people from many different countries, with many different sets of shared values. Take prohibitions against racist, sexist, or otherwise offensive speech. In a cyberspace discourse, an American (reflecting the values of the U.S.) would likely hold the First Amendment inviolate—and position him or herself against any attempts to curtail racist/sexist/offensive speech within the discourse. A Canadian (who represents a community which values free speech, but places greater limits on offensive speech, such as pornography)[4] might want some form of protections against offensive speech in the ground rules of the discourse. A German (representing a country where it is against the law to publicly claim the Holocaust never happened, even in scholarly discourse[5]) might opt for even more stringent speech restrictions. Perhaps out of the cyberspace “community” a new set of values will emerge, or perhaps it will be a simple amalgam of the pluralistic values of members of the Internet community.

 

Political Change and Community

Moral Learning and Community Identity

In the United States, if citizens so desired, we could amend our constitution every day. Amendments could be passed one day and revoked the next. Aside from pragmatic difficulties making the amendment process relatively difficult, theorists provide another explanation for the stability of our laws. Laws, Amendments, etc. on this view, are not only responsive to public opinion but, rather are deeply tied to the identity of the community making those laws. “Identity” is used here to represent, roughly, the degree of moral learning present in a community at a given time. On this view, Brown v. Board of Education and like decisions made during the Civil Rights Movement have remained in force not simply because of the difficulties in the process to overturn them but also because these decisions are representative of the moral learning process which occurred in the United States during that era. And once the message: “Racism is immoral” is incorporated into the identity of the U.S. community, it is difficult to “unlearn” this notion. The forward motion toward new learning, new understanding, and a new identity for the community is too strong to be overturned through amendments or legal modifications—it represents a change in the core values of a given society.[6]

 

Cyberspace and the Concept of Community

Cyberspace, as opposed to traditional populations, does not possess a “community” in the same sense as, for example, the U.S. population. In local communities, deliberation and discourse is almost a necessity; after all, citizens in the traditional model of a community have to live with one another. Because we must live together with fellow community members, the impetus toward deliberation is markedly increased. Likewise, in cyberspace, where the “community” (if it can be called that) is not a community in the traditional sense.

 

Although the decisions to be made through discourse may ultimately affect all Internet users, the people making these decisions do not have to face each other each and every day. Cyberspace discourse participants are not forced to live in the same neighborhoods, on the same streets, and send their children to the same schools. In the “real world” deliberative participants cannot escape each other—they must find some way to live together. The fact that citizens must find someway to live with one another despite their plurality of opinions on various issues drives the deliberative process in the “real world.” In the offline world, the motivation to live together drives and guides deliberative discourse.

 

Cyberspace and the Burden of Deliberation

Netziens do not have to face one another; most don’t even have to live with or near one another. This makes the burden of discourse all the harder to bear—what can drive discourse if participants feel that dropping out will not cost them anything? The motivation driving deliberation in cyberspace cannot be that participants are forced to (physically) live with one another, but possibly that they are all forced to abide by deliberative decisions that affect all Internet users (e.g. Decisions regarding the administration of the Domain Name System).

 

Though cyberspace may not be a community in the same sense as deliberative theorists envisioned, perhaps it possesses enough common elements to drive meaningful deliberation as a form of problem solving. Whether or not members of the Internet community have to physically live together may be irrelevant—the decisions made of, by, and for Internet users must be accepted by all Internet users. One cannot hide from a decision to do away with the “.com” suffix in the top-level domain name system—if such a decision were made typing in “XYZ.com” would do users no good. Changes in the architecture of cyberspace orchestrated by its members through deliberation and discourse provide a similar degree of accountability experienced in real-world communities. And as the Internet becomes a more common feature in the lives of people worldwide, decisions that govern its usability will make it more difficult for community members to escape the deliberative process.

 

Deliberative Decision-Making

How can Deliberative Decisions be both Binding and Open to Revision?

If discourse should be ongoing to allow decisions to be revised, how can we make “interim” decisions binding on constituents? If the discourse is the constituency (all the members of the constituency are also discourse participants) the problem appears trivial—members are aware that, although their decision may be “interim” in the sense that it is open to further revision, it is a “decision” all the same. In this situation, members make decisions or reach consensus with the understanding that these decisions are binding until they are properly revoked or reconsidered by a group process similar to the one which put the decision into place. However, making the discourse participants and the constituency be one in the same can also a very dangerous arrangement, as Madison noted in Federalist No. 10. In this arrangement the tyranny of the majority can be every bit as dangerous as tyranny by aristocracy or monarchy.

 

When the public has free and unfettered self-rule, there is a chance that there will be rule by constantly-swaying public sentiment. Consider the following: One day, citizens decide on law X as a solution to a given problem. The next week, a citizen demands a re-hearing on law X. A re-hearing is held and law X is replaced with a consensus on law XY (a similar but more complex statute). The next week, a similar conflict ensues over law XY and its replaced with the modified law XYZ. If this process continued—how much binding force could the original law, X, actually have on citizens? How much faith would they put in this law, knowing that it will probably be gone by next week? What remains is tyranny of the majority—where the sways of public opinion make and break the laws to match popular sentiment. To avoid this potential pitfall, the decision-making portion of the discourse should be structured so as to prevent frequent revision and preserve the integrity of the law (possibly by requiring a supermajority for amendments).

 

Prevention of “Tyranny of the Majority”

“…[The political institution or discourse] must offer safeguards for individuals, for minorities, and for the rights that majorities governing in the name of community may often abuse. The difference between autonomous participation and mere consensus, between ongoing talk and mere voting, and between political judgment and mere plebiscitary decision-making needs to be given institutional expression.”[7]

 

The Process of Deliberation

Deliberation and Reason

Reason is the keystone of deliberative discourse[8] Participants give reasons and expect that those reasons (and not differences in power or social standing, for example) will shape the outcome of their collective decision.[9] In the ideal deliberation “no force except that of the better argument is exercised.”[10]

 

Deliberation and Equality

Equality in Decision-Making

Each member should have equal standing to put issues on the agenda, suggest solutions, and advance reasons for or criticism of the reasons behind the proposals of others.[11] Discourse participants should have an equal voice in the decision (i.e. “one person, one vote) in the stage of deliberation where outcomes are determined.[12] In an ideal discourse, members have an equal voice in the content of the agenda as well as any proposed change to the architecture or ground-rules of the discourse (e.g. in a decision by the group to temporarily end debate and vote or find consensus).[13]

 

Free and Open Exchange of Information

Participants should be equal in the sense that they have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the time constraints necessarily imposed by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter that would best serve the participant’s interest.[14] The participant’s interest is defined as whatever that person would choose with the fullest possible understanding of the results of that choice and its relevant alternatives.[15]

 

Large Social Inequalities Incompatible with Deliberation

Social inequalities are a threat to the validity of the discourse in that they may promote a non-ideal situation where some participants have more standing, or more power in the discussion, than others. We need not eliminate all social inequalities, but such elimination must remain a possibility and a goal in theory.[16]

Feminist theorists argue, for example, that gendered styles of communication are inherent in any discourse and bring gender domination into a given discourse. Such gendered features include: interruptions, how authoritatively one speaks, and how often one speaks.[17] It is open to debate whether these inequalities are the cause or the result of gender differences within society.

 

Elimination of Social Inequalities Unworkable in Online Environment

Social inequalities will persist in an online environment, yet they can be countered by a carefully-constructed deliberative procedure which works to make each member’s views and reasons carry equal weight in the discourse. This can also be accomplished through careful moderator training and selection. Well-trained moderators should aim to let all be heard equally, not allowing any one member to monopolize the discussion or otherwise exert any influence over another member other than that contained in the strength of the reasons he or she advances for his/her position. See this section for more on the role of the Moderator

 

Deliberation and Identity

Equality and Anonymity

An anonymous membership is ideal, but not necessarily in the sense of cyberspace anonymity. Anonymity as it is generally conceived of in cyberspace—where persons can communicate without regard for attributes such as race or gender—detracts from the humanity of the discourse. Members should have enough information about one another to gain a universal mutual respect for one another as human beings, but that’s not enough. In addition, the discourse benefits from members who appreciate the importance of the recognition of “group-based” identities which can only be gained from knowing something about the specific identity/background of other discourse participants.[18]

 

Difference as a “Resource”

Consider a discourse on poverty in which a Welfare mother wants to voice her views. If she is under-educated (relative to the rest of the group), if she writes in incomplete sentences or prefers stories to tightly-packed arguments and no one has any idea of her background, participants may simply ignore her comments. If, however, they know something about her background, participants will understand why she speaks as she does.[19] In doing so they will fulfill the hardest and most important duty of a discourse participant—not just to speak, but to listen and understand the arguments of others; to see things from their perspective.

 

Failure to appreciate important aspects of others’ backgrounds, be they socioeconomic, racial, or gender-related, amounts in practice to no less than exclusion of their ideas and perspectives from the discourse. Though this approach allows for prejudices to creep into the discourse as judgments about the identity or background of other members, it is the price we pay if we want to ensure discourse members do not exclude relevant arguments of others. Far from being a burden to the discourse, difference can be “a resource” for communication across various groups, “the outcome of which is [a] more comprehensive and effective form of social knowledge.”[20]

 

Deliberation and Education/Information

The hallmark of a truly “informed” deliberative discourse (as opposed to a collection of unsupported opinions or prejudices) is that participants read comprehensive, unbiased, and well-balanced information packets on the subject to be discussed. Ideally, this should occur prior to the start of the discussion (e.g. In Fishkin’s deliberative polls, participants are provided with a packet of information on the subject to be discussed, carefully produced by a panel of experts representing a broad spectrum of positions[21]). In an electronic forum, these materials could be distributed electronically or via snail-mail (if the size or format of the materials is not conducive to online distribution).

 

If participants have questions about the material, they should have the ability to submit questions to the panel which produced the documents, and should be answered in a collective response by the panel to ensure an unbiased response. Questions to and answers from the panel should be made available to all group members. The panel should have the ability to communicate with one another at all times, and although their final answers should be public, it may not be in the best interests of the discourse to publicize internal panel discussions on the questions posed by individual participants (to do so might expose participants to the biases of individual panel members, rather than the panel’s collective and balanced response).

 

The question remains whether or not the individuals participating in the discourse should know the identity of panel members, or whether the transparency of cyberspace could be used as an advantage to combat possible association with one or more panel members and their respective positions. One possible model would make the deliberations of the panel and their conclusions available to participants in the discourse and the public at large. Another possibility is to have a democratically-elected board choose the panelists, whose identities would be kept secret. The problem with this approach is that if the panelists names and positions are not publicized, the public and the discourse participants would have no guarantee that the panel is indeed balanced. If the panelists’ names are released to the public to prevent this, then the discourse participants would, as members of the public, have access to that information.

 

The process of selecting members forming the panel of experts and evaluating the potential bias in the materials they produce may require oversight (possibly in the form of an oversight committee). If discourse participants pose substantive questions that cannot be answered by the experts, the experts should have the ability to consult other experts and bring this information to the panel, which would then agree upon an answer.

 

Simply directing participant’s questions to search engines is an extremely dangerous procedure: the answers produced by search engines are sometimes inaccurate and often the product of organizations with a vested interest in the topic (e.g. a search for “How do you define ‘abortion’” will produce differing answers from organizations ranging from Planned Parenthood to Americans United for Life). Answers gained in such a fashion would destroy a necessary element of a valid discourse—unbiased (or at least well-balanced) information on a given topic.

 

Members of the expert panel could, however, collectively designate (or even design) websites whose information is deemed accurate and unbiased. This might include such resources as a glossary of common terms, a topic FAQ, a list of further reading materials, or a searchable archive. Valid discourse demands that participants deliberate without being swayed by inaccurate or biased information—the very information search engines are notorious for displaying. A better alternative would be for the expert panel to produce a publicly-accessible (and searchable) archive of topical information beyond that found in the initial information packet provided to participants.

 

Role of the Moderator in Deliberative Discourse

For fear of the discourse being captured by aggressive moderators (in the ideal discourse no one is substantively more powerful than anyone else), critical theorists do not include a moderator in their deliberative discourse architectures. Moderators, by their very nature, stand for “umpired conversation,” that is, discourse “policed” by a moderator with greater conversational power than other members. The classical scheme of a moderator in cyberspace has the moderator play this sort of role—ensuring that participants argue in certain ways and not in others (e.g. shunning arguments ad hominem or neo-nazi remarks). Moderators are often also charged with the task of crystallizing points to stimulate discussion. As much as possible, this function should be eliminated in cyberspace discussions—it amounts to no less than the moderator interpreting arguments for the entire discourse. Any attempt to stimulate discussion will be similarly destructive—such a step, in effect, determines the agenda control of which should remain collectively in the hands of the discourse, not one member (SEE SECTION ABOVE). The role of the moderator in a discussion, in this light, is much like that of a judge in a legal proceeding or an umpire in a baseball game.

 

In practice, however, the role of the moderator in a cyberspace discourse has been important to various administrative and technical tasks. The discourse benefits most from having multiple moderators—at least one technical moderator to provide technical support to both members and to troubleshoot the software package, but never participating in the discussion; and, another moderator whose role would be that of a discussion “leader” (note the scare-quotes). The purpose of the “leader” is not to lead in the traditional sense—it is not to set the agenda or guide discussion—but rather to organize the members and allow them members themselves to choose what they want to talk about and in what manner they see fit.

 

Although having a moderator is not desirable in face-to-face deliberation, and possibly not even in cyberspace deliberation, it appears a necessary evil. As such, the selection process for moderators should be carefully thought-out and democratically responsive to the concerns of discourse members. Moderators should be chosen from permanent members of the discourse, and should either be “rotated” through a process by which every participant takes on the role of moderator for a certain amount of time[22] or they should be chosen in some democratically-responsive way by members of the discourse. The existence of a permanent moderator, who cannot be unseated or changed, is highly inimical to the validity of the discourse.


Due to the varied concerns (from technical to substantive) moderators need to address, it may be advisable to divide the labor and have more than one moderator per discourse. Such an arrangement might consist of “technical moderators” and “discussion leaders.”

 

Technical moderators should appreciate not only the intricacies of the server-side software but also be able to teach users the basic computer literacy and Internet skills necessary to effectively use the deliberative software package. Technical moderators should be able to work effectively with persons of all degrees of computer experience. As with all teachers, training and hands-on experience is invaluable. If technical moderators come across as cold or arrogant, or they become frustrated at the lack of computer literacy among discourse participants, they may scare off participants completely or infringe on their ability to effectively use the software (and therefore impede their ability to effectively participate in the deliberation). Given the strong possibilities for abuse by technical moderators (“technological tyranny”) and the devastating effect this could have on the legitimacy and the outcome of the deliberation, it is advisable to have direct oversight on this issue or some other recourse for members who are having trouble with their technical moderators.

 

With regard to non-technical moderator selection, the Athenian Model is instructive: In ancient Athens, the Council (whose job it was to prepare items for the larger assembly) was convened and organized by a president. This position was not elected, but rather rotated among the membership such that "every fourth adult male Athenian citizen could say, 'I have been for twenty-four hours President of Athens' — but no Athenian citizen could ever boast of having been so for more than twenty-four hours."[23] In much the same way, an online deliberation system could have either a rotation of moderators selected from permanent discourse members, or such a moderator could be democratically elected from the membership (with the ability to “impeach” the moderator if the members so desire).

 

Role of Participants in Deliberative Discourse

Once the participants for a discourse are chosen, and a goal for that discourse is established, participants should follow a set of guidelines or “conversational rules” to ensure that the discourse is productive. These rules govern the conduct of participants in a cooperative venture (they do not apply to adversarial situations such as the interrogation of prisoners). The philosopher Paul Grice, in his essay “Logic and Conversation” was among the first to attempt to outline these conversational rules [See chapter 2 of Grice’s collected works: Studies in the Way of Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989)]. According to Grice, the keystone of a conversational exchange or discourse is the “Cooperative Principle.” It is as follows: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”[24]

 

Grice also outlines four principles that aid speakers in cooperating toward a common goal. These could act as guidelines for participants in an online deliberative discourse. An online discourse system should attempt (through its very design—i.e. the software could have deliberative “speed bumps” built-in to ensure participants respect the following):

The Rule of Quantity:

“Make your conversation as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange); and, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”[25]

The Rule of Quality:

“Do not say what you believe to be false”[26]

“Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”[27]

Participants can therefore be challenged in two ways:

Do you really believe that?

Why do you believe that?

The Rule of Relevance:

Be relevant! (e.g. Do not change the subject; do not interrupt)

The rule of Manner:

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief.

Be orderly.

Further guidelines for the conduct of participants in an online environment have been outlined by the Civic Practices Network (http://www.cpn.org). The CPN is funded partially by the Surdna Foundation, and according to their website they are non-partisan. Their mission is “to bring practical methods for public problem solving into every community and institutional setting in America.”[28]

 

Participant Guidelines for Electronic Discussion Groups (I have listed what I believe to be necessary elements that could be reasonably incorporated into an electronic system through design in boldface, with optional guidelines in regular typeface):[29]

·        Listen carefully to others.

·        Maintain an open mind.

·        Strive to understand the position of those who disagree with you.

·        Help keep the discussion on track.

·        Speak your mind freely, but don't monopolize the discussion.

·        Address your remarks to the group rather than the leader.

·        Communicate your needs to the leader in personal e-mail messages.

·        Value your own experience and opinions.

·        Engage in friendly disagreement.

·        Make your messages one computer screen length.

·        Limit each message to one idea.

·        Use the subject line according to group rules for topics.

·        Remember that humor and a pleasant manner can go far in helping you make your points.

·        Consider whether the message should go to an individual rather than the group.

Necessary elements could be incorporated into a software model by designing the software through limits on message length, mandatory subject/reference headings (to indicate which message participants are responding), and posted guidelines (possibly enforced by moderators) on when messages should be sent to moderators, individuals, or the entire group.



[1] Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 72.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Viz. Catherine MacKinnon’s anti-pornography statutes passed in Canada after being struck down as Unconstitutional in the United States. Compare American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F.Supp. 1316 (S.D.Ind. 1984) where MacKinnon’s proposed statutes failed to pass constitutional muster with Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449, 450-51 (1992) decision by Canadian court (upholding the illegality of socially harmful obscene materials, but not materials with redeeming purposes, such as scientific, artistic, or literary value). See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,” 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review (Winter, 1985).

[5] Viz. Section 6 of German "Act to regulate the dissemination of writings and media contents harmful to young persons" Gesetz über die Verbreitung jugendgefährdender Schriften und Medieninhalte, GjSM, as promulgated on 12 July 1985 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1502). Among the media likely to cause serious harm to young persons are those which "deny the holocaust” <http://iecl.iuscomp.org/gla/literature/media.htm>. See also Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Germany's highest court, holding that such an interpretation does not violate the free speech provisions of the Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) [BVerfG, NJW 1994, 1779, 1780].

[6] John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason,” in James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 113. Rawls uses the example of the repeal of the First Amendment: “The Court could say, then, that an amendment to repeal the First Amendment and replace it with its opposite fundamentally contradicts the constitutional tradition of the oldest democratic regime in the world. It is therefore invalid. Does this mean that the Bill of Rights and other amendments are entrenched? Well, they are entrenched in the sense of being validated by long historical practice. They may be amended in the ways mentioned above but not simply repealed and reversed… The successful practice of its ideas and principles over two centuries place restrictions on what can now count as an amendment, whatever was true at the beginning.”

[7] Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 262.

[8] This can be traced back to Kant (viz. The problem is how to bring about “the public use of reason.”) Quoted in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), x.

[9] Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Bohman and Rehg, 74.

[10] Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, tr. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press), 108.

[11] Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Bohman and Rehg, 74.

[12] James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 96-97.

[13] Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” 74-75.

[14] Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 307.

[15] Ibid.

[16] This is not to suggest that deliberative democracy is inconsistent with cultural pluralism. Yet if the ideals of deliberative democracy are not to lose their force, the elimination of some inequalities (such as equality of access to information) must at least be theoretically possible; and this is not impossible—as Kant puts it “Ought implies can” (Quoted in James Bohman, Public Deliberation, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, 21). Differences in viewpoints resulting from cultural pluralism can in fact add to the strength of discourse by introducing unique views and perspectives into the discourse. Ibid.

[17] Stacy Smith, “Democracy, Plurality, and Education: Deliberating Practices of and for Civic Participation,” http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/PES/97_docs/smith.html (12 January 2000). See also, Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 119 and Jane Mansbridge, “Feminism and Democracy,” The American Prospect 1 (1990).

[18] Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,” in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 387-388.

[19] This example was provided by Professor Angelia Means, Department of Government, Dartmouth College.

[20] Bohman and Rehg, xxv.

[21] James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy, (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1997 Expanded Edition), see appendix.

[22] Such as the Ancient Greek system whereby the “President of Athens” was rotated among citizens for twenty-four hour periods. See Roderick T. Long, “The Athenian Constitution: Government by Jury and Referendum,” http://www.freenation.org/fnf/a/f41l1.html (25 January 2000).

[23] Morgens H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 314. See also Roderick T. Long, “The Athenian Constitution: Government by Jury and Referendum,” http://www.freenation.org/fnf/a/f41l1.html (25 January 2000).

[24] Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 26.

[25] Robert J. Fogelin and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Understanding Arguments, fifth edition (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1997), 17-19.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] http://www.cpn.org (6 January, 2000).

[29] “Participant Guidelines for an Electronic Study Group,” http://www.cpn.org/sections/tools/manuals/electronic_handbook5.html (6 January, 2000).