Court of Appeal No

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................. iv

ISSUES PRESENTED........................................................................................... 1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.......................................... 2

STANDARD OF REVIEW.................................................................................... 6

summary of argument............................................................................. 7

argument.......................................................................................................... 8

I. THIS COURT SHOULD MAINTAIN THE AGE-OLD DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY AND TRESPASS TO CHATTEL............................. 8

A. The Court of Appeal Decision Radically Rewrites the Trespass to Chattel Doctrine Under California Law............................................................................... 8

B. The Principal Policy Justification for the Age-old
Distinction Between Trespass to Real Property and
Trespass to Chattel Is Fully Applicable in the Internet Context. 14

C. In the Internet Context, There Is Even Greater Policy Justification for Maintaining the Distinction Between Trespass to Real Property and Trespass to Chattel Than
Exists in the Traditional Physical World.................................. 17

1. The Court of Appeal Opinion Has Enormous
Adverse Consequences for Free Speech on the Internet. 17

2. The Court of Appeal Opinion Also Threatens the
Basic Operation of the Internet Itself............................ 21

D. The Relevant Analogies In This Case to the Traditional Physical World Support the Conclusion That Trespass to Chattel Should Not Be Extended to Censor Mr. Hamidi’s
E-mail Speech............................................................................ 23

E. This Court Does Not Need to Abandon the Distinction Between Trespass to Real Property and Trespass to
Chattel In Order For Intel To Protect Its Valid Legal
Interests...................................................................................... 27

F. Sound Policies of Judicial Self-Restraint Counsel This
Court to Reject the Court of Appeal’s Radical Revision
of Trespass to Chattel Doctrine............................................. 28

1. The Court of Appeal’s Radical Expansion of
Trespass to Chattel Doctrine Violates Principles of Judicial Self-Restraint Because the Regulation of
Mr. Hamidi’s E-Mail Speech Is Best Left to the Legislature, Given the Complex, Competing Policy Considerations Inherent in Such Regulation......... 29

2. The Court of Appeal’s Radical Expansion of
Trespass to Chattel Doctrine Violates Principles
of Judicial Self-Restraint Because the Majority
Should Have Deferred to the Legislature’s
Deliberate Choice Not to Censor Mr. Hamidi’s Speech. 31

3. The Court of Appeal’s Radical Expansion of
Trespass to Chattel Doctrine Violates Principles of Judicial Self-Restraint Because The Decision
Entails Enormous Social Costs...................................... 36

II. THIS COURT SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS CLEAR
DICHOTOMY BETWEEN NUISANCE AND TRESPASS
LAW WHEN DEALING WITH INTANGIBLE INTRUSIONS........... 38

III. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE INJUNCTION AGAINST MR. HAMIDI BECAUSE IT VIOLATES BOTH CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LABOR LAW.... 41

IV. THE INJUNCTION AGAINST MR. HAMIDI CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION THAT MUST COMPLY WITH THE FREE SPEECH GUARANTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.................................................... 43

conclusion.................................................................................................... 47

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE................................................................... 48

PROOF OF SERVICE......................................................................................... 49

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

STATE CASES

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

25 Cal.4th 826 (2001).............................................................................. 6

Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity,

19 Cal.4th 1106 (1999).......................................................................... 35

People v. Drew,

22 Cal.3d 333 (1978)............................................................................. 31

Elden v. Sheldon,

46 Cal.3d 267 (1988)............................................................................. 37

Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Association,

26 Cal.4th 1013 (2001).................................................................... 43-46

Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,

94 Cal.App.4th 325 (2001)............................................................. passim

Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage,

267 Cal.App.2d 84 (1968)........................................................................ 9

Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court,

72 Cal.App.4th 1045 (1999).................................................................. 28

Jordan v. Talbot,

55 Cal.2d 597 (1961)................................................................................ 9

Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court,

14 Cal.4th 814 (1997)............................................................................ 38

Macias v. State of California,

10 Cal.4th 844 (1995)............................................................................ 35

Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,

26 Cal.4th 465 (2001)............................................................................ 35

Mirkin v. Wasserman,

5 Cal.4th 1082 (1993)............................................................... 29, 31, 37

Moore v. Regents of the University of California,

51 Cal.3d 120 (1990)................................................................. 29-31, 36

Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,

47 Cal.3d 278 (1988)............................................................................. 30

Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.,

15 Cal.4th 456 (1997)............................................................................ 36

Peery v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County,

29 Cal.3d 837 (1981)............................................................................. 42

Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,

6 Cal.4th 965 (1993)........................................................................ 36-37

Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,

6 Cal.4th 539 (1993)........................................................... 30-31, 34, 36

Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,

14 Cal.4th 1066 (1997).......................................................................... 36

Rider v. County of San Diego,

1 Cal.4th 1 (1992)................................................................................... 41

San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior Court,

........... 13 Cal.4th 893 (1996)......................................................... 27, 38, 39-40

Thing v. LaChusa,

48 Cal.3d 644 (1989)............................................................................. 37

Thomas v. City of Richmond,

9 Cal.4th 1154 (1995)............................................................................ 40

Thrifty-tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,

46 Cal.App.4th 1559 (1996).............................................................. 9, 13

Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co.,

32 Cal.3d 229 (1982)................................................................. 27, 38-39

Zaslow v. Kroenert,

29 Cal.2d 541 (1946)................................................................................ 9

FEDERAL CASES

ACLU v. Reno,

929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).................................................... 17, 22

America Online, Inc. v. IMS,

24 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998)......................................................... 10

America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,

46 F.Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998)......................................................... 10

Ashcroft v. ACLU,

2002 WL 970708 (U.S. May 13, 2002)............................ 18, 19, 22, 23

Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,

29 F.Supp.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998)..................................................... 23

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,

463 U.S. 60 (1983)................................................................................. 46

Broadfoot v. Diaz,
245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000)................................................... 21

Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).............................................................. 21

Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com,

185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).......................................................... 28

CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,

962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997)............................................... 11, 13

eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge,

100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)............................................ 10, 13

E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,

311 NLRB 893 (1993)........................................................................... 43

United States v. Hay,

231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2000)................................................................. 22

Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc.
1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)................................. 10-11

Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc.,

2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001)...................................... 11

Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,

141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).............................................................. 21

126 F.Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)..................................................... 10

Reno v. ACLU,

521 U.S. 844 (1997)........................................................................ 18, 22

Rio Properties, Inc v. Rio International Interlink,

2002 WL 431915 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2002)................................... 20, 21

Rowan v. Post Office Dept.
397 U.S. 728 (1970) .............................................................................. 26

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,

2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)..................................... 10

Timekeeping System, Inc.,

323 NLRB 244 (1997)........................................................................... 42

STATUTES

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.4.......................................................... 5, 31, 32

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.45........................................................ 5, 31, 32

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17590-17595 (2001)............................................ 26

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §527.3(a) ................................................................... 41, 42

Cal. Evid. Code §§ 452(h), 459(a)..................................................................... 39

Cal. Penal Code § 502.................................................................................... 5, 34

California Rules of Court Rule 14(c)(1).......................................................... 48

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. 27 (2000)............................................................ 19, 22

Developments in the Law -- The Law of Cyberspace,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 1574 (1999)....................................................... 23, 45

Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future
in Terms of the Past, 7 CommLaw Conspectus 37 (1999)................. 18

David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the CyberForum: Public v. Private in
Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1998).............................. 18

Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the
Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1965 (2000)......................................................... 15, 16

Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984)................................................... 4, 10

Restatement (Second) of Torts .............................................................. 9, 12, 13

Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do,
104 Yale L. J. 1805 (1995).................................................................... 17

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. Petitioner Ken Hamidi is a former Intel engineer and the principal spokesman of Former and Current Employees of Intel (“FACE-Intel”), a California nonprofit organization consisting of current and former Intel employees. Superior Court File in Lieu of Clerk’s Transcript [hereinafter “C.T.”] at 187-189. FACE-Intel was formed to provide a medium for Intel employees to air their concerns about employment conditions at Intel. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 94 Cal.App.4th 325, 329 (2001); C.T. at 89-90, 269.

On six specific occasions over approximately a two year period, Mr. Hamidi sent a single e-mail message to between 8,000 and 35,000 Intel employees, highlighting what Mr. Hamidi considered to be Intel’s abusive and discriminatory employment practices. Hamidi, 94 Cal.App.4th at 328; C.T. at 269. Although these e-mail messages did not disrupt Intel’s computer equipment in any way, Intel objected to the content of the messages and therefore attempted to censor Mr. Hamidi’s speech by technologically blocking his messages from reaching Intel employees. Hamidi, 94 Cal.App.4th at 329; C.T. at 7.1-7.2, 65.2. Intel’s attempts to block Mr. Hamidi’s messages, however, were only partially successful. Hamidi, 94 Cal.App.4th at 329; C.T. at 7.1-7.2, 65.2.

After Intel’s own censorship efforts failed, it filed a nuisance and trespass to chattel claim against Mr. Hamidi, asking the state through an injunction to censor Mr. Hamidi’s expressive activity. C.T. at 1-3. The Sacramento County Superior Court granted Intel a preliminary injunction forbidding Mr. Hamidi from sending unsolicited e-mail to Intel employees at their place of work. Id. at 141-42. After Intel voluntarily dropped its nuisance claim, the Superior Court granted Intel summary judgment on the trespass to chattel claim and issued a permanent injunction against Mr. Hamidi. Hamidi, 94 Cal.App.4th at 329.

The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the issuance of the permanent injunction against Mr. Hamidi in a published, 2-1 decision over Justice Kolkey’s dissent. After reviewing the history of the trespass to chattel doctrine, the Court of Appeal concluded that the “harm” requirement of the tort could be satisfied by the “loss of productivity” that Intel suffered as a result of the time some of its employees spent reading Mr. Hamidi’s messages, or on the basis that some of its technical personnel spent time trying to censor Mr. Hamidi. Id. at 333.

The court flatly rejected the argument that trespass to chattel requires some physical harm or disruption to the chattel itself. Instead, the court stated that the mere “electronic signal” of Mr. Hamidi’s e-mail was “‘sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action,’” even though it was undisputed that Mr. Hamidi’s e-mail messages caused no physical disruption to Intel’s computer equipment, nor was Intel dispossessed, even temporarily, of its computer equipment by receipt of Mr. Hamidi’s e-mails. Id. at 334-35 (quoting Thrifty-tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1566 n.6 (1996)). In short, the court concluded, “[t]he tangibility of the [electronic] contact is not dependent on the harm caused.” Id. at 335. Finally, the court ruled that the injunction against Mr. Hamidi comported with both the U.S. and the California Constitutions. Id. at 336-44.

In his dissent, Justice Kolkey provided a carefully reasoned critique of the majority’s analysis. Regarding the majority’s examination of the “harm” requirement of trespass to chattel, Justice Kolkey noted that “a loss of employees’ productivity” cannot qualify as the requisite injury for the tort. Id. at 348 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). If loss of productivity could support a trespass to chattel action, he explained, “then every unsolicited communication that does not further the business’s objectives (including telephone calls) interferes with the chattel to which the communication is directed simply because it must be read or heard, distracting the recipient.” Id. Moreover, he continued:

“Damage” of this nature -- the distraction of reading or listening to an unsolicited communication -- is not within the scope of the injury against which the trespass to chattel tort protects, and indeed trivializes it. After all, “[t]he property interest protected by the old action of trespass was that of possession; and this has continued to affect the character of the action.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 14, p. 87 (5th ed. 1984)). Reading an e-mail transmitted to equipment designed to receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory interest in the equipment.

Id. (emphasis added). Justice Kolkey also observed that it was “circular” for the majority to premise the damage element of trespass to chattel on the time spent by technical personnel attempting to block Mr. Hamidi’s messages. Id. More specifically, he explained that “[i]njury can only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, not by the cost of the steps taken to avoid the injury and prevent the tort; otherwise, we can create injury for every supposed tort.” Id.

Finally, Justice Kolkey examined the central question presented by this appeal -- namely, “[i]f the transmittal of an unsolicited e-mail that causes no injury to the condition, value, or operation of the chattel (or to the possessory interest therein) does not rise to the level of trespass to chattel, should the requirement of injury be relaxed to allow an injunction against unwanted e-mail?” Id. at 351. He answered this question in the negative, for two compelling reasons. First, he noted that the trespass to chattel tort exists to protect an owner’s possessory interest in his personal property, and therefore “[d]ispensing with the requirement of injury to the value, operation, or condition of the chattel, or the possessory interest therein, would extend the tort’s scope in a way that loses sight of its purpose.” Id. In particular, “[e]xtension of the tort to protect against undesired communications, where neither the chattel nor the possessory interest therein is injured, transforms a tort meant to protect possessory interests into one that merely attacks speech.” Id. at 352.

Second, Justice Kolkey explained that sound policies of judicial self-restraint counsel against relaxing the injury requirement of trespass to chattel in the Internet context. He reasoned that “such a metamorphosis of the tort is better suited for deliberate legislative action than judicial policymaking,” and noted that the California Legislature had, in fact, already enacted two statutes that restrict unsolicited e-mail, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17538.4 and 17538.45, and another that grants a civil remedy to those who suffer damage or loss from unauthorized access to a computer system, Penal Code § 502 (e)(1). Id. He observed that “[t]hese statutory provisions and the Legislature’s failure to extend these remedies to unsolicited e-mails in general suggests a deliberate decision by the Legislature not to reach the circumstances here.” Id. In sum, Justice Kolkey concluded, “[m]odification of the tort doctrine in this way, which would affect the free flow of communication on the Internet, is better addressed by the legislative branch . . . .” Id.

Mr. Hamidi appeals the decision of the Court of Appeal upholding the issuance of the permanent injunction barring him from sending unsolicited e-mail to Intel employees at their place of work. This Court granted review by order of March 27, 2002. The order did not specify or limit the issues for review.

1. Should California trespass law maintain a distinction between trespass to chattel and trespass to real property, such that e-mail messages that cause no physical disruption to the computer equipment that receives them may not constitute an actionable trespass to chattel?

2. Should California tort law maintain a clear dichotomy between nuisance and trespass law when dealing with intangible intrusions, such that e-mail messages that cause no physical disruption to the computer equipment that receives them may not constitute an actionable trespass to chattel?

3. If physically non-disruptive e-mail messages may support an action for trespass to chattel, does the judicial enforcement of an injunction against the sender of the e-mail messages violate California and federal labor law when the content of the messages involves workplace concerns?