IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO




LAWRENCE GOLAN,
      1777 Larimer Street, #1805
 Denver, CO 80202

RICHARD KAPP,
      20 Oakdale Drive                               COMPLAINT
      Hastings on Hudson, NY 10706,

S.A. PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
d/b/a/ ESS.A.Y RECORDINGS,
      145 Palisade Street
      Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522-1617,

SYMPHONY OF THE CANYONS,
      attn: Kortney Stirland
      14 East Center
      Kanab, Utah 54741,

RON HALL, d/b/a FESTIVAL FILMS,
      6115 Chestnut Terrace
      Shorewood, MN 55331, and

JOHN MCDONOUGH, d/b/a TIMELESS
VIDEO ALTERNATIVES INTERNATIONAL,
      3303 Fiechtner Drive, S.W.,
      Fargo, ND 58103,

                   Plaintiffs,
v.

JOHN ASHCROFT, in his official capacity
      as Attorney General of the United States,
      U.S. Department of Justice
      950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
      Washington, D.C., 20530-0001,

                   Defendant.



                                     COMPLAINT

       Plaintiffs, through their undersigned counsel, bring this action seeking declaratory

relief that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298

("CTEA"), which amended and is codified in relevant parts at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304, and

Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA"), Pub. L. No. 103-465,

which amended and is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a), are unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs also seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the enforcement

of both provisions.

                                   INTRODUCTION

        1.     This is an action to challenge the constitutionality of Congress's attempt to

remove and radically deplete the supply of literary and artistic works from the public

domain. Central to the constitutional design of our copyright system is the preservation

of a rich and vibrant public domain in which books, paintings, drawings, music, films,

photographs, and other artistic works are free for all to use and copy ­ which, in turn,

fuels the further creation of original works of authorship. Works enter the public domain

in one of two constitutionally guaranteed ways: first, all copyrighted works fall into the

public domain once their  limited  term of copyright ends; second, all works that fail to

satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act enter the public domain  immediately  and

irrevocably  upon general publication. However, in two recent and dramatic expansions

of the Copyright Act, Congress has attempted to dismantle both of these constitutionally

guaranteed sources of works for the public domain.


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        2.      Continuing its recent effort ­ over 10 times in the past 40 years ­ to

expand the term of copyright to unlimited duration, Congress enacted the Sonny Bono

Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298 ("CTEA"), increasing the

term of copyright by another 20 years to the previous term of copyright protection ­ even

for existing works (many of whose authors have long since passed away), with no

corresponding benefit to the public or effort to promote the progress of science and the

useful arts.

        3.      Congress's dramatic expansion of the term of copyright has been

accompanied by an even more radical depletion of works from the public domain. On

December 8, 1993, Congress amended the Copyright Act to recognize for the first time in

the history of our copyright law a general provision that purports to "restore" copyrights

­ retroactively ­ in numerous works that heretofore had indisputably been in the public

domain for failure to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act. Purportedly to

further the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), Congress restored

copyrights to motion pictures fixed in Mexico or Canada from January 1, 1978 to March

1, 1989 that were in the public domain in the United States for failure to affix the proper

copyright notice as required by pre-1989 U.S. copyright law. The North American Free

Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182.

        4.      A year later, on December 8, 1994, Congress went even further in its

wholesale diminishment of the public domain. This time, under the auspices of Section

514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 ("§ 514" or "Section

514"), Congress has extended copyright restoration automatically to  all  foreign works


                                             3



that were in the public domain in the United States if, among other things, (a) the work

"is not in the public domain in its source country through expiration of term of

protection," and (b) the work "is in the public domain in the United States due to (i)

noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United States copyright law,

including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to comply with any

manufacturing requirements; (ii) lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound

recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, or (iii) lack of national eligibility." 17 U.S.C.

§ 104A(h)(6). The effect of "copyright restoration" is the wholesale removal of vast

amounts of existing works ­ thousands of books, paintings, drawings, music, films,

photographs, and other artistic works ­ from the public domain.

       5.      Both of these acts of Congress are unconstitutional on their face, and as

applied to plaintiffs. Neither the CTEA nor § 514 of the URAA can be squared with the

limitations imposed by the Copyright Clause, which limits the power of Congress to grant

copyright protection "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing

for limited Times to Authors * * * the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." U.S.

CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. The CTEA creates a term of copyright that is neither "limited"

nor designed "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." In addition, § 514's

removal of existing works from the public domain under the guise of "copyright

restoration" flouts a fundamental principle of the Copyright Clause that requires that the

public be allowed to use freely any work in the public domain. The CTEA's grant of

extended copyright protection to works already in existence and § 514's restoration of

copyrights to works already in the public domain violate the constitutional requirement of


                                              4



originality, that works must be original to receive copyright protection. What's more, the

CTEA and § 514 result in speech restrictions that violate the First Amendment. And the

retroactive application of both Acts to works published years ago violates the Due

Process Clause's proscription against retroactive legislation that so disrupts settled

expectations as to be fundamentally unfair. At the heart of this case is the preservation of

not only the public domain, but the constitutional design of our entire copyright system.

                                        PARTIES

       6.      Plaintiff Lawrence Golan is the Director of Orchestral Studies, Conductor,

and Professor of Conducting at the University of Denver's Lamont School of Music. He

is also the Music Director and Conductor of the Portland Ballet Orchestra in Portland,

Maine; the founder, Artistic Director, and Conductor of the Atlantic Chamber Orchestra

in Portland, Maine; and the Principal Guest Conductor of the Bolshoi National Opera and

Ballet Theatre of Uzbekistan in Tashkent. He resides at 1777 Larimer Street, #1805,

Denver, CO 80202.

       7.       Plaintiff Richard Kapp is the founder and conductor of the chamber

orchestra Philharmonia Virtuosi, which performs at The Metropolitan Museum of Art in

New York and venues worldwide. Kapp resides at 20 Oakdale Drive, Hastings on

Hudson, NY 10706.

       8.      Plaintiff S.A. Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a ESS.A.Y Recordings ("ESS.A.Y

Recordings"), is a New York corporation and a recording label started and headed by

Plaintiff Kapp. ESS.A.Y Recordings records and sells to the public, through wholesale

distributors and on the Internet at www.essaycd.com, an assortment of music on CDs,


                                             5



ranging from classical to contemporary and children's music. ESS.A.Y Recordings is

located at 145 Palisade Street, Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522-1617.

       9.      Plaintiff Symphony of the Canyons is a small, not-for-profit community

orchestra and unincorporated association that is based out of Kanab, Utah and that

performs at locations mainly in Utah. Kortney Stirland is the founder and conductor of

Symphony of the Canyons, which has about 50 members. Symphony of the Canyons's

address is (attn: Kortney Stirland), 14 East Center, Kanab, Utah 84741.

       10.     Plaintiff Ron Hall, d/b/a Festival Films ("Festival Films"), specializes in

the sale of films, movies, television shows, and stock footage to colleges, universities,

libraries, film archives, and other members of the public. Hall is the founder and sole

proprietor of Festival Films, a self-run business that sells, through its website

www.fesfilms.com, public domain stock footage of movies, television shows, and

cartoons, as well as copyrighted movies on videotape, DVD, and 16-mm film. Festival

Films's address is 6115 Chestnut Terrace, Shorewood, MN 55331.

       11.     Plaintiff John McDonough, d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives

International ("Timeless Video"), is devoted to the preservation and distribution of public

domain movies, films, and television shows. John McDonough is the founder and sole

proprietor of Timeless Video, a self-run business that serves as a channel of distribution

of public domain works to television stations nationwide. McDonough also preserves old

public domain films on video and sells them to the public. Timeless Video's address is

3303 Fiechtner Drive, S.W., Fargo, ND 58103.




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        12.    Defendant John Ashcroft is the Attorney General of the United States and

is responsible for the enforcement of the laws of the United States.

                             JURISDICTION AND VENUE

        13.    This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1361, and 2201 because this declaratory judgment action challenges the constitutionality

of federal statutes. This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant Ashcroft. Venue

is properly laid in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

                                        STANDING

        14.    Plaintiffs have standing to bring and maintain this action because their

activities have been, and will continue to be, directly harmed by the CTEA's extension of

the term of copyright and § 514's restoration of copyright to thousands, if not millions, of

works. Each of the plaintiffs used, copied, distributed, performed, preserved, or sold

works that were in the public domain and planned on using works that would have fallen

into the public domain, but for the CTEA's recent extension of the term of copyright for

an additional 20 years. Plaintiffs also used works in the public domain that now are

subject to copyright restoration under § 514. Plaintiffs would have continued doing so,

had it not been for the automatic copyright restoration effectuated by § 514.

        15.    Both the CTEA and § 514 can be civilly and criminally enforced

(including monetary damages, impounding of articles, attorneys' fees, and imprisonment)

against plaintiffs. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-506. Under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), criminal charges

may be brought against "[a]ny person who infringes a copyright willfully either - (1) for

purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (2) by the reproduction or


                                              7



distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more

copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of

more than $1,000."

       16.     As discussed further below, plaintiffs have each suffered concrete and

particularized injuries because of the enactment of the CTEA and § 514. The impact of

these laws on plaintiffs, their businesses, and artistic endeavors is an actual, present

injury, and the threat of enforcement against plaintiffs who violate the laws causes an

imminent injury. These injuries can be redressed by a declaratory judgment that the

CTEA and § 514 are unconstitutional and by preliminary and permanent injunctive relief

against their enforcement.

                 EVENTS UNDERLYING PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES

       A.      Copyright Law and the Preservation of the Public Domain

       17.     Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution bestows upon

Congress a grant of authority as well as a limitation: "To promote the Progress of

Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

8; see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). In interpreting this Clause, the

Supreme Court has long recognized that the overriding goal of our intellectual property

systems must be to  serve  the  public interest  in the wide dissemination of works and

inventions. Put simply, "[clreative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private

motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of




                                             8



literature, music, and the other arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.

151, 156 (1975).

        18.    To that end, the Copyright Clause requires that the term of copyright must

be only for "limited Times" and must ultimately serve the "Progress of Science and

useful Arts." This ensures that the public receives the benefit of the constitutional

bargain struck by our copyright system in giving authors exclusive rights to their works

for limited times in exchange for the eventual dedication of the works to the public.

        19.    In addition to this strict temporal limitation, the Copyright Clause also

ensures the entry of works into the public domain by requiring, in the first instance, that

copyright protection be granted only to works that are original.  See Feist Publications,

Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.,  499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Works that fail to satisfy

the originality requirement necessarily fall into the public domain immediately upon

general publication.

       20.     To implement the true promise of the public domain, the Copyright Clause

guarantees that the public is free to use works in the public domain that have not, for

whatever reason, qualified for copyright protection.         As the Supreme Court has

consistently recognized, there is a "`federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the

Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy

whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."'  Bonito

Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (quoting Compco Corp. v.

Day-Lite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)).




                                             9



       21.     And, once a work or invention goes into the public domain, Congress

cannot remove it from free use by the public. That is the central tenet of the Supreme

Court's holding in  Graham v. John Deere Co.,  383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) when the Court

stated in interpreting the Patent Act: "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents

whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict

free access to materials already available." And that is also the central tenet of the D.C.

Circuit's conclusion in  Eldred v. Reno,  239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001), when the

court of appeals stated in the context of copyright law: "these teachings would indeed

preclude the Congress from authorizing under that Clause a copyright to a work already

in the public domain."

       22.     The CTEA and § 514 of the URAA violate these foundational principles

of the Copyright Clause, and they threaten to extinguish the supply of works in and to the

public domain. The statutory provisions also impose speech restrictions that cannot

withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. And they both amount to retroactive

legislation that so disrupts settled expectations as to violate substantive due process.

       B.      The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998

       23.     The term of copyright used to be limited. The original copyright statute of

1790 granted a term of 14 years, with an opportunity for the author to renew the

copyright for an additional term of 14 years. In 1831, Congress extended the original

term of copyright to 28 years, and in 1909 extended the renewal term to 28 years. Thus,

for over a hundred years, Congress expanded the term of copyright protection only twice,

with 56 years as the maximum possible duration of copyright (although not all authors



                                              10



exercised their right to renewal, meaning that in many cases 28 years would be the only

term of copyright).

       24.     In the past 40 years, however, Congress has expanded the term of

copyright 11 times, so that now under the CTEA the maximum possible duration of

copyright can be for some works 120 years or even greater (depending on the life of the

author). Congress granted each of these copyright term extensions not just to future

works, but also to existing works many of whose authors had long since passed away.

       25.     In addition, Congress amended the 1909 Copyright Act to make the

renewal of copyright automatic for copyrights derived thereunder and did away with the

renewal term altogether in the 1976 Copyright Act, thereby making the term of copyright

virtually always the maximum term under the statute.

       26.     The CTEA is the culmination of this dramatic expansion of the term of

copyright. Indeed, the CTEA's 20-year term extension marks the single greatest

increase of the term of copyright (except, conceivably, the terms allowed under the

switch to the "life of the author" metric under the 1976 Copyright Act). On October 27,

1998, President Clinton signed the CTEA into law. It grants ­ both prospectively and

retrospectively ­ an additional 20 years to the term of copyright, which applies differently

depending on when the work was created and the kind of work. For works published

before 1978, the renewal term is extended from 47 to 67 years, thus giving a total term of

copyright protection of 95 years for these works. For any copyrighted work created in

1978 or later, the CTEA extends the term of copyright from the life of the author plus 50

years to the life of the author plus 70 years. For any copyrighted work created in 1978 or



                                             11



later that is a work made for hire (or an anonymous or pseudonymous work), the CTEA

extends copyright protection from 75 to 95 years from the year of publication or from

100 to 120 years from the year of creation, whichever comes first. These changes took

effect immediately upon passage of the CTEA.

       27.     In general, the CTEA added 20 years to the term of copyrights. Thus,

prior to the enactment of the CTEA, a work that was copyrighted during 1923 would

have entered the public domain on December 31, 1998, because its term of 75 years

would have ended. The CTEA, however, extended the term of copyright of such work to

95 years, meaning that it will not enter the public domain until December 31, 2018. The

CTEA's 20-year extension has already prevented works published in 1923, 1924, and

1925 from entering the public domain. But for the CTEA, all works published in these

years would have already entered the public domain. And from now until 2018, the

CTEA will keep works published in 1927 all the way through 1943 from entering the

public domain ­ the result being that no copyrighted work will enter the public domain

until 2019.

       28.     To put the current term of copyright in historical perspective, an author

who publishes when 25 years old can now potentially obtain a term of copyright

protection that is over 120 years (if the author lives, say, to age 75, greater if he or she

lives longer). This expansion of the copyright term to over a century's worth of

protection marks nearly a 329 percent increase from the maximum term of copyright (28

years) and over a 750 percent increase from the initial term of copyright (14 years) in the

first Copyright Act of 1790. By comparison, the current term of patent protection is 20


                                             12



years, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a), which marks an increase of only 43 percent from the original

term of patent (14 years) in the first Patent Act of 1790. Although the first Copyright and

Patent Acts both had 14 years as the original term of the "exclusive Right" granted, the

CTEA now makes the term of copyright usually 4 to 5 times greater than the patent term.

       C.      Section 514 of the URAA and Congress's Attempt to Remove Works
               from the Public Domain

       29.     In addition to extending excessively the term of copyright, Congress has

also attempted to remove vast amounts of works from the public domain under the guise

of "copyright restoration." The provision was first enacted on December 8, 1993,

purportedly to further the goals of NAFTA. Pub. L. No. 103-182. The provision

removed from the public domain and gave copyright protection to motion pictures fixed

in Canada or Mexico from January 1, 1978 to March 1, 1989 that had fallen into the

public domain in the United States due to lack of the requisite copyright notice. 17

U.S.C. § 104A (1994). The affixation of copyright notice on the work was an essential

requirement of copyright eligibility under the 1909 Copyright Act and a requirement

(subject to limited exceptions) under the 1976 Copyright Act. In 1989 Congress did

away with the notice requirement ­ but only prospectively for future works ­ after the

United States joined the Berne Convention, a multilateral agreement designed to establish

minimum standards for copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a);  Norma Ribbon &

Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1995).

       30.     Congress went even further in removing works from the public domain

when it amended § 104A (and § 109(a)) a year later in § 514 of the URAA. This



                                              13



provision ­ which is currently in force and forms the basis of plaintiffs' challenge ­ now

grants copyright automatically to any "restored work," which is defined as follows:

               an original work of authorship that ­

               (A) is protected under subsection (a);

               (B) is not in the public domain in its source country through expiration of
       term of protection;

               (C) is in the public domain in the United States due to ­

                       (i) noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United
               States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or
               failure to comply with any manufacturing requirements;

                        (ii) lack of subject matter protection in the case of sound
               recordings fixed before February 15, 1972; or

                        (iii) lack of national eligibility; and

                (D) has at least one author or rightholder who was, at the time the work
       was created, a national or domiciliary of an eligible country, and if published, was
       first published in an eligible country and not published in the United States during
       the 30-day period following publication in such eligible country.

17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6).

       31.      Copyright restoration is available to the works from any of the more than

one hundred forty countries that are members of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")

or the Berne Convention.  Id.  § 104A(h)(3). Section 514 also purports to give power to

the President to declare and extend copyright protection to public domain works of other

countries that provide substantially the same protection for restored works to U.S.

nationals.  Id.  § 104A(g).





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       32.     The date of restoration of a restored copyright is "January 1, 1996, if the

source country of the restored work is a nation adhering, to the Berne Convention or a

WTO member country on such date." Id. § 104A(h)(2)(A).

       33.     The term of copyright for restored works extends "for the remainder of the

term of the copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted in the United

States if the work never entered the public domain in the United States."  Id.  §

104A(a)(1)(B). This means that many works that had been in the public domain in the

United States may now potentially claim copyright protection for the remainder of a

copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years in the case of works created on or after

January 1, 1978, or 95 years in the case of works made for hire or works in their renewal

term as of October 27, 1998, the effective date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term

Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), (c), 304(b).

       34.        The ownership of a restored copyrighted work "vests initially in the

author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source country of

the work." 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b).

       D.      The Harm to Plaintiffs and the Public

       35.      The CTEA's 20-year expansion of the copyright term and § 514's

retroactive restoration of copyrights cause great harm to the plaintiffs, the public at large,

and the very foundation of our public domain.

       36.      Before the CTEA went into effect, the public could expect that each year

some copyrighted works would naturally fall into the public domain due to the expiration

of the term of copyright. Thus, on December 31, 1990, the public (including plaintiffs)


                                              15



could expect works published in 1915 to enter the public domain; on December 31, 1991,

works from 1916; on December 31, 1992, works from 1917, etc. This yearly natural

progression of works into the public domain is designed to ensure that the public has the

wide availability of works envisioned by the Copyright Clause.

       37.     In establishing their businesses and pursuing their creative endeavors,

plaintiffs relied on the existence of this natural progression of works into the public

domain. Each year would bring "new" public domain works that plaintiffs could perform

or make available for the public.

       38.     What the CTEA does is to put an end to this natural progression of works

into the public domain for a 20-year period. On December 31, 1998, copyrighted works

published in 1923 would have fallen into the public domain. The CTEA, however,

prevented it. Starting from 1998, when the CTEA went into effect, and continuing for the

next 20 years, the public no longer can expect that copyrighted works will enter the

public domain due to expiry of the term. In fact,  no  copyrighted works will enter the

public domain at all until January 1, 2019 ­ assuming of course Congress does not amend

the term of copyright again as it has been wont to do.

       39.     Section 514's retroactive restoration of copyrights has also caused great

harm to plaintiffs and the public. When plaintiffs began their respective businesses, they

relied on the well-established principle of law ­ indeed one that has been recognized for

nearly the existence of our copyright system ­ that works in the public domain were free

for all to use and were simply beyond the reach of copyright. Indeed, the 1909 Copyright

Act (the formalities of which § 514 now attempts to excuse retroactively) said so


                                             16



expressly, stating: "No copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in

the public domain * * *." 1909 Copyright Act, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 7; see Bouve v.

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,  122 F.2d 51, 54 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Relying on

this fundamental compact of our copyright system, plaintiffs invested considerable time

and resources to the distribution or performance of public domain works. For all these

years, plaintiffs had absolutely no notice, nor should they have had any expectation, that

Congress would rewrite the copyright law  and  attempt to jettison this fundamental

principle governing the availability of works in the public domain.

       40.     Section 514, however, now attempts to do precisely that by removing vast

amounts of works from the public domain under the guise of "restored copyright." Under

§ 514, the owners of copyrights in restored works were given the option from January 1,

1996 to January 1, 1998 to file in the Copyright Office a notice of intent to enforce

("NIE") their restored copyrights against a "reliance party," which includes any person

(such as plaintiffs) who had acquired or made copies of the work before copyright

restoration. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c), (h)(4). Owners of copyrights in restored works may

also serve notice on a reliance party directly ­ at any point now and in the future.  Id. §

104A(d)(2)(B). Either way, the filing or serving of notice essentially starts the clock

running against the reliance party so that he or she can use, but not copy, the work only

for a 12-month period from the date of notice.  Id.  §§ 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii), (d)(2)(B)(ii).

During the 12-month period, the reliance party is nevertheless forbidden from making

further copies of the work.  Id.  §§ 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(III), (d)(2)(B)(ii)(III). After the 12-

month period, reliance parties are liable for copyright infringement if they copy or


                                              17



distribute copies of the work without authorization of the restored copyright owner. Id. §

104A(d)(2). And the restored copyright owner is under no obligation to agree to license

the restored work to any reliance party (except in the limited case of making

phonorecords of nondramatic musical works that fall under the compulsory licensing

provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 115).

       41.     Section 514(b) of the URAA even purports to deprive reliance parties of

their ability to dispose of copies of their works under the first sale doctrine, a doctrine

that has been recognized for nearly 100 years. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.

339, 350 (1908). Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner cannot claim any

distribution rights over any copy of his or her work in the stream of commerce after its

first sale. The lawful purchaser of the copy can dispose of the copy (e.g., by selling or

renting the work) at will. Section 514(b), however, attempts to abrogate the first sale

doctrine after a 12-month period for any copy of a restored work purchased before

copyright restoration.  See  17 U.S.C. § 109(a). This means that reliance parties cannot

sell or rent the copies of works they legitimately owned after the 12-month period "for

purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage." Id.

       42.     Reliance parties who made derivative works of public domain works that

have been restored to copyright under § 514 are given no right to continue to exploit their

derivative works, unless "the reliance party pays to the owner of the restored copyright

reasonable compensation."  Id.  § 104A(d)(3)(A). If the parties cannot agree, the restored

copyright holder can seek an action against the reliance party in district court to




                                             18



determine the amount of compensation that the reliance party must pay to the restored

copyright holder.  Id.  § 104A(d)(3)(B).

       43.     Section 514 essentially subjects plaintiffs and other reliance parties to the

mercy of the restored copyright holder for continued use of restored works. If the

restored copyright holder simply refuses to authorize copying or distribution of a restored

work (that is not a nondramatic musical work subject to compulsory licensing under §

115). § 514 leaves reliance parties, such as plaintiffs, absolutely no recourse.

       44.     Moreover, § 514 provides no administrative review to determine the

veracity or validity of NIEs filed with the Copyright Office or served on a reliance party:

the act of filing or serving is purely ministerial. Although an NIE is not supposed to

"create a presumption of validity of any of the facts stated therein,"  id.  § 104A(c),

reliance parties are left with virtually no statutory means to even test the veracity and

validity of the assertions made by purported restored copyright holders (who may be

asserting, for example, that they acquired the rights through one of the heirs of the author

­ allegations that are made even more difficult for reliance parties to verify since the

underlying facts are likely to have occurred long ago and in a foreign country). The only

"recourse" for reliance parties to test the veracity and validity of such assertions is to be

willing to be sued by the purported restored copyright holder for copyright infringement.

       45.     Individuals who are not reliance parties (such as people who did not

possess a copy of the work before its restoration) are given even less time to adjust to the

radical depletion of the public domain caused by copyright restoration. Such individuals

may be liable for copyright infringement right away on the date of restoration, which may


                                              19



start as early as January 1, 1996, if they attempt to copy a public domain work that is now

subject to restoration.  Id. § 104A(d)(l).

       46.      Section 514 has resulted in the removal of thousands, if not millions, of

works from the public domain. In the two-year statutory period, notices of intent to

enforce restored copyrights flooded the Copyright Office and filled pages and pages of

the Federal Register.  See  Copyright Restoration of Works in Accordance with the

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 19371-19388 (May 1, 1996); 61 Fed,

Reg. 46133-46159 (Aug. 30, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 68453-68461 (Dec. 27, 1996); 62 Fed.

Reg. 20211-20220 (April 25, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 44841-44854 (Aug. 22, 1997); 62 Fed.

Reg. 66765-66811 (Dec. 19, 1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 5142-5216 (Jan. 30, 1998); 63 Fed.

Reg. 19288-19366 (April 17, 1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 43830-43832 (Aug. 14, 1998). The

works covered the gamut ­ including songs, motion pictures, paintings, books, literary

works, photographs, etc. ­ from the obscure to the familiar and even famous.

        47.    The works claimed from the public domain for copyright restoration

include, for example, several hundred paintings of Picasso; the collection of works by

J.R.R. Tolkien including The Hobbit, The Fellowship of the Ring, The Two Towers, and

The Return of the King; Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own; several books by H.G.

Wells; numerous educational and literary books including  Dante, George Orwell, Jane

Austen Practising, Joseph Conrad, Robinson  Crusoe, and  The Wasteland;  hundreds of

songs and sheet music, including such favorites by the Russian composer Serge

Prokofiev as Six Pieces from Cinderella, Romeo and Juliet, and Three Children's Songs

for Piano;  a collection of photographs of the Beatles; and still photographs from the



                                              20



Japanese film  Godzilla.  These are  just  a few of the thousands of works claimed for

copyright restoration.

       48.     This radical depletion of the public domain severely harms not just

plaintiffs, but the very foundation of our democratic society. The wide availability of

works envisaged by the Copyright Clause depends on the ability of authors, musicians,

performers, and other artists to use freely works in the public domain for both the

creation of new works and the further dissemination of the public domain works.

Without the availability of such public domain material, the whole creative and artistic

endeavor is severely hampered ­ and the public ultimately disserved.

                1.        The Harm to Lawrence Golan

       49.     Lawrence Golan is an acclaimed conductor, violinist, and professor of

conducting, whose passion and professional mission is to bring classical music to new

audiences, young and old.           Golan earned his D.M.A. from the New England

Conservatory of Music in May 1995, and is currently the Director of Orchestral Studies

and Professor of Conducting at the University of Denver's Lamont School of Music,

where he teaches students in orchestral music and conducting. Golan is also the

Conductor of the school's Lamont Symphony Orchestra, which has 67 student members

and which performs 6 symphonic concerts and 1 opera each year. All of the symphonic

concerts are free to the public.

        50.     Golan is also the Music Director and Conductor of the Portland Ballet

Orchestra, which has 42 freelance professional members and which performs the




                                            21



Nutcracker  and one other ballet each year for communities in and around Portland,

Maine.

          51.    As a part of his mission to bring classical music to new audiences,

especially young adults, Golan has founded and continues to conduct the Atlantic

Chamber Orchestra. Under Golan's leadership, the orchestra has originated several

innovative events that incorporate the performance of classical music with other

entertainment that may be more familiar to the public. For example, the orchestra has put

on concert/wine-tastings where every piece of music has a corresponding wine, and

concerts involving Latin music combined with the serving of Latin food. These events

are designed to attract individuals who have not yet experienced the pleasure of listening

to the public performance of great orchestral works.

          52.    The CTEA's 20-year term extension and § 514's restoration of copyrights

have a profound and lasting harm on Golan's selection of music. For each of his

orchestras, Golan relies vitally on the availability of works from the public domain.

Indeed, public domain works form the vast majority of the works performed by the

Lamont Symphony Orchestra and by the Atlantic Chamber Orchestra, which have a

limited annual budget of $2,000 and $300 respectively. For the Portland Ballet

Orchestra, which has no funds at all for the renting of copyrighted music, Golan must

rely exclusively on public domain works.

          53.    It is now cost prohibitive for Golan to perform many works that would

have entered or that had already entered the public domain, but now are subject to

copyright protection because of the CTEA and/or § 514. Like most orchestras across the


                                            22



country, Golan's orchestras have a very limited budget or none at all, and simply cannot

afford the rental of many copyrighted works. This is so because an orchestra's budget

must cover two possible annual expenditures for sheet music: (1) the purchase of works

in the public domain at inexpensive cost, or (2) the one-time rental of copyrighted sheet

music typically for hundreds of dollars for each performance and many times more than

the cost of such work when it enters the public domain. The benefit of purchasing a copy

of a work in the public domain is that an orchestra can add the work to its library for

repeated use and can save all the annotations or "markings" that it makes on the sheet

music for the performance. Such markings (including phrase indications, bowings, and

nuances) must be consistent in all instrumental parts and are imperative for the coherence

of an orchestral interpretation. By contrast, renting a copyrighted work means that an

orchestra cannot keep the sheet music with its markings after the performance, but must

again pay for the sheet music and spend hours on the markings each time it wants to

perform the work.

       54.     Because the CTEA and § 514 diminish the supply of public domain works

and dramatically increase the number of copyrighted works for which copyright holders

can exact rental fees, Golan has been forced to avoid even considering for public

performance whole classes of orchestral works from great American and foreign

composers, including hundreds of foreign works that had previously been in the public

domain.

       55.     In particular, the CTEA has effectively prevented Golan from selecting for

public performance works of several great American composers such as George


                                            23



Gershwin and Aaron Copland, as well as works of great foreign composers such as

Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, Igor Stravinsky, Jean Sibelius, and Maurice Ravel.

Many of their works were published around 1923 and following and would have entered

the public domain soon or already had it not been for the 20-year extension of copyright.

For example, George Gershwin's most famous work,  Rhapsody in Blue,  was first

publicly performed in 1924. Had it not been for the CTEA's 20-year term extension, the

original Rhapsody in Blue would have already entered the public domain.

       56.      Copyright restoration has also greatly harmed Golan's ability to select

music for his orchestras to perform. Whole classes of foreign works ­ from such

luminaries as Prokofiev, Shostakovich, and Stravinsky ­ that had once before been in the

public domain have now been restored to copyright under § 514 and are simply too

expensive for Golan's orchestras to perform because of the cost to rent the copyrighted

sheet music.

       57.      This year, the CTEA and § 514's harmful effects on Golan's ability to

select music have been tremendous. As conductor of the Lamont Symphony Orchestra,

Golan would have liked to perform a notable foreign work, either Shostakovich's

Symphony  No. 5, Prokofiev's  Symphony No. 1,  or Sibelius's  Symphony No. 7,  because

such foreign works are essential to the diverse education of his students. Had it not been

for the CTEA and § 514, these works would have been in the public domain and

available for purchase at a relatively inexpensive price. However, because of the CTEA

and/or § 514, these works are protected by copyright and must be rented typically for

hundreds of dollars, if not more.


                                            24



       58.     Because of the incredible expense of renting music in terms of both money

and labor (for the markings), Golan could only select one copyrighted piece,  Symphony

No. 2 by the American composer Charles Ives, for rental this year at the "discounted"

educational rate of $685. Because this single rental consumed over 25 percent of Golan's

annual budget, he decided his orchestra simply could not afford additional rentals of

copyrighted works to fill the anticipated 19 other pieces the orchestra would perform over

the year. Instead, Golan purchased several less expensive copies of public domain works

for performance and, for the other selections, had to choose from the public domain

works in the library of the Lamont Symphony.

       59.     The CTEA and copyright restoration have had an even greater negative

impact on Golan's conducting of smaller orchestras, particularly where he has no budget

at all for the rental of copyrighted music. For these orchestras, Golan must rely almost

exclusively on the availability of works in the public domain. For example, in his former

capacity as Music Director and Conductor of the Community Orchestra of the Portland

Symphony, a small community orchestra in Maine, Golan had no budget for the

procurement of music. During his tenure, Golan wanted to perform several great

orchestral works of Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Gershwin, Sibelius, Stravinsky, and Ravel,

but, because of copyright restoration and/or the CTEA, the works were subject to

extended or retroactive copyright and were simply too expensive for Golan's orchestra to

rent. Had the CTEA and copyright restoration not been enacted, many of these works

would have been in the public domain soon or already, and would have been available for

purchase at a relatively inexpensive price.



                                               25



          60.    The CTEA and § 514 impact not only conductors and educators such as

Golan, but also his students and the public at large. By removing works from the public

domain and limiting the selection of music that orchestras can afford to perform, the

CTEA and § 514 deprive Golan's students of learning whole classes of orchestral works

from great American and foreign composers. And, perhaps worst of all, these laws

deprive the American public of the important benefits ­ cultural, intellectual, emotional,

and educational ­ of experiencing the public performance of many significant orchestral

works.

                 2.     The Harm to Richard Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings

          61.    Richard Kapp is a renowned conductor, who is dedicated to spreading the

beauty of classical works to the public through performance and recordings. He founded

the Philharmonia Virtuosi in 1968 and continues to conduct the orchestra in

approximately 60 to 80 public performances each year. He also established a series of

musical programs for young children between the ages of 4 and 8 entitled the Cushion

Concerts (a name referring to the fact that children sit on cushions during the

performance), which introduces children to classical music through live performances at

a minimal expense.

          62.    The CTEA's 20-year extension of the term of copyright has greatly

harmed the supply of public domain works for Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings to perform

and record. Before the CTEA was enacted, Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings relied on the

yearly natural progression of copyrighted works into the public domain due to the expiry

of the term. The CTEA, however, puts an end to this vital supply of public domain


                                            26



works, at least for 20 years. Because the CTEA increases protection for all copyrighted

works for another 20 years, the term of copyright protection for any existing work will

not end until December 31, 2018 at the earliest.

       63.     Before the CTEA went into effect, Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings had

anticipated that numerous musical works published in 1923 or later would soon enter the

public domain starting in 1998. Kapp and his orchestra (a not-for-profit group) relied on

the availability of such public domain works because they could be performed without

the considerable expense of renting copyrighted sheet music or the payment of royalties.

The CTEA, however, extends the term of copyright for such existing works at least until

December 31, 2018, thereby substantially increasing the cost to perform or record such

works. The CTEA gives copyright holders another 20 years to exact payment for the

renting of sheet music and the payment of royalties for public performances.

       64.     The CTEA has the effect of keeping from the public domain for another

20 years important classical works written in the prolific post-World War I era. Many of

these works, which were written by such luminaries as Ravel (including Boléro, Tzigane,

Chansons Madécasses, and Piano Concerto for the Left Hand), Stravinsky (including his

orchestral works Concerto, Suite No. 1, Suite No. 2, and Suite from "Pulcinella"), and the

great Finnish composer Jean Sibelius (including  Suite Champêtre, Symphony No. 6,

Symphony No. 7, and Tapiola) were written in or after 1923 and would have entered the

public domain soon (within approximately the next five years) or already, had it not been

for the retroactive extension of the term of copyright.




                                             27



       65.     Because the term of copyright has been extended for such works for

another 20 years, the performance or recording of such works remains expensive.

Orchestras like Philharmonia Virtuosi must pay hundreds of dollars simply to rent the

sheet music of such works for a single performance. In addition, should it decide to

record such works for sale to the public, ESS.A.Y Recordings would be responsible for

the payment of mechanical royalties on the sale of each copy. Copyright term extension

has effectively left Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings without any supply of "new" public

domain works until 2019.

       66.     Copyright restoration has also had a tremendous negative impact on Kapp

and ESS.A.Y Recordings. Between 1968 and the time § 514 went into effect, Kapp

purchased the music of several famous works that had fallen into the public domain in the

United States. The public domain works included works from the famous Russian

composers Stravinsky, Shostakovich, and Prokofiev. Because the works were in the

public domain, Kapp obtained copies of the music at a relatively low price,

approximately $15 or so to purchase a copy of the score, and approximately $20 to $40

for the music for the individual instruments.

       67.      Copyright restoration has caused the prices of sheet music for formerly

public domain works to increase dramatically, since now the restored copyright holder

has, in effect, a monopoly on the sale and distribution of the music. Kapp and others in

the orchestra community may now expend a thousand dollars or more for the sheet music

of a restored work, which is usually only available for renting (but not purchasing) a copy

for a single performance. After the performance, Kapp must return the copy back to the


                                                 28



asserted restored copyright holder, thus requiring Kapp's orchestra to pay several

thousand dollars more should it wish to perform the work again.

       68.     Copyright restoration also subjects the public performance of restored

musical works to the payment of royalties. Before § 514 went into effect, Kapp's

orchestra could perform these public domain works for the public freely, without having

to pay royalties for the performance. Now, however, with copyright restoration, Kapp

and his orchestra must pay royalties for performance of such works to the collecting

agency ASCAP.

        69.    For example, for years, Kapp's orchestra performed the famous children's

symphonic fairy tale  Peter and the Wolf,  which was written by the Russian composer

Prokofiev. The performances were for children at the Cushion Concerts at small venues

in Westchester County, New York. Before § 514 went into effect, Kapp could perform

Peter and the Wolf for children without being subject to a licensing requirement and fee

under ASCAP for the performance. Now, because of copyright restoration, both are

required.

       70.     Section 514 has also made it more difficult, if not unpleasant, for Kapp to

perform restored works. For example, the music publisher G. Shirmer Inc. ­ a large

corporation that has asserted restored copyrights in numerous musical works, including

the works of Prokofiev ­ contacted Kapp to warn him about his performance of Peter and

the Wolf and told him that he was not entitled to perform the work because he had not

licensed the performance or rented the performance materials from Schirmer. The

representative of Shirmer even suggested to Kapp that he could not own the copy of



                                            29



Peter and the Wolf that he had purchased years ago when it was in the public domain, but

must rent it from Shirmer. Kapp, however, informed Shirmer that he legally owned his

copy of  Peter and the Wolf,  is a longstanding member of ASCAP, and has always paid

his ASCAP license fees for performances of any copyrighted work.

       71.     Section 514 has also negatively impacted several of Kapp's own

recordings on his CD label ESS.A.Y Recordings. For example, in 1991, Kapp decided to

make a recording of Stravinsky's sextet  Apollon Musagète.  One of the main reasons

Kapp chose to record this work was that it had entered the public domain and therefore

would not be subject to the payment of royalties. Given the substantial cost of making a

sound recording, and the relatively small market for classical works, Kapp believed that

the best chance of getting any kind of return on his investment would be to make a

recording of a work in the public domain. Kapp's hopes have been dashed, however, by

§ 514. The copyright to Stravinsky's  Apollon Musagète  has now been restored, and

ESS.A.Y Recordings must pay mechanical royalties to the collecting agency Harry Fox

on each copy sold. In addition, ESS.A.Y Recordings must expend time and labor in

keeping records of such sales for payment of royalties.

       72.     Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings also now face a diminished supply of

foreign classical works that they would consider economically feasible for them to record

and sell to the public. Before § 514 went into effect, Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings had

available many classical works from Russian and other foreign composers that were free

for them to use because they had fallen into the public domain. But now that supply of

works is subject to copyright and is available only at a significant price. Because the cost


                                             30



of producing and recording such copyrighted works would yield so little likely return

(and probably only a loss) for Kapp  and  ESS.A.Y Recordings, they have decided to

forego recording such works altogether.

               3.     The Harm to the Symphony of the Canyons

       73.     For over sixteen years, Plaintiff Symphony of the Canyons has been

performing orchestral and other music to small and medium-sized communities in Utah.

Under the direction of its founder and conductor, Kortney Stirland, Symphony of the

Canyons puts on 8 to 10 public performances each year, as well a major musical and a

performance of  Messiah.  Symphony of the Canyons is a not-for-profit, community

orchestra that draws its members from Kanab, Utah and surrounding areas in Utah and

Arizona. The ages of the members who perform in the Symphony of the Canyons range

from as young as 12 to as old as 70 years old. Members are paid for travel expenses, but

otherwise receive no compensation.

       74.     Symphony of the Canyons depends vitally on the availability of music in

the public domain. Nearly 80 percent of the music it performs is public domain music.

Symphony of the Canyons simply cannot afford to pay for renting or performing a large

amount of copyrighted music due to the cost of the rental fees.

       75.     The CTEA's 20-year extension of the term of copyright has greatly

harmed the anticipated supply of public domain works for Symphony of the Canyons to

perform. These musical works were published in 1923 or later and would have entered

the public domain starting in 1998, had it not been for the CTEA's 20-year extension.

These works include works of the famous and influential American composers George


                                            31



Gershwin (including perhaps his most popular work  Rhapsody in Blue,  as well as

Concerto in F, Cuban Overture, I Got Rhythm, Embraceable You, The Man I Love, and

selections from  Porgy  &  Bess)  and Aaron Copland (including  Piano Concerto).  All of

these works were written around 1923 and the decade following and would have entered

the public domain soon (within the next ten years) or already, had it not been for the

retroactive extension of the term of copyright. Now, with the enactment of the CTEA,

Symphony of the Canyons cannot rent the music for these works or perform them for the

public without considerable expense for payment to the copyright holder (or ASCAP in

the case of performances) for at least another 20 years. Because Symphony of the

Canyons is a small community orchestra, it simply cannot afford to pay such fees much

beyond the amount it currently expends for copyrighted works (roughly 20 percent of the

music it performs each year).

       76.     Section 514's retroactive restoration of copyrights also harms Symphony

of the Canyons's selection and performance of works. By restoring copyrights to

numerous foreign works that were in the public domain, § 514 diminishes the available

foreign works ­ indeed, whole categories of works from the great Russian composers

Prokofiev and Stravinsky ­ that Symphony of the Canyons can even consider performing.

       77.     The CTEA's and § 514's combined diminishment of available works in

the public domain creates an inestimable loss for not only Symphony of the Canyons, but

all the communities in Utah where it performs. These laws effectively make the public

performances of many great orchestral works that had been or would have been in the




                                           32



public domain simply beyond the reach of Symphony of the Canyons and the small

communities in Utah where it performs.

                  4.     The Harm to Ron Hall and Festival Films

        78.       For twenty-five years, Plaintiff Ron Hall, d/b/a Festival Films, has devoted

his life to selling films for hobbyists, collectors, universities, film archives, and the

general public. While Festival Films deals also with copyrighted works, a mainstay of its

business has been the sale of public domain works, including such favorites as Birth of a

Nation, Phantom  of the Opera, Meet John  Doe starring Gary Cooper, and Kansas  City

Confidential.  For years, Festival Films has worked with the Bob DeFlores Archives to

supply public domain stock footage to such shows  as A&E Biography, The South Bunk

Show,  and other network and cable biographies and feature films. Hall's business at

Festival Films was founded on the principles of copyright law that ensure that works go

into the public domain after a "limited time" and that public domain works can be used

freely by all.

        79.       Both of these foundations have now been shattered by the CTEA's 20-

year extension of the term of copyright and § 514's retroactive restoration of copyright.

        80.       The CTEA's 20-year extension of the term of copyright has greatly

harmed the supply of public domain works for Festival Films's business. Before the

CTEA was enacted, Festival Films relied on the natural progression of copyrighted works

into the public domain each year due to the expiry of the term. Such progression into the

public domain was vital for Festival Films to offer "new" titles of public domain works.




                                               33



The CTEA, however, puts an end to this vital supply of public domain works for 20

years.

          81.    In practical terms, the CTEA has wiped out Festival Films's anticipated

supply of a whole category of films published in 1923 or later. Before the CTEA went

into effect, Festival Films greatly anticipated a number of popular works entering the

public domain due to the expiry of copyright, including a collection of Harold Lloyd

films such as Safefy Lost (1923), which has recently been named by the American Film

Institute as one of the 100 Most Thrilling American Movies ever made; numerous films

starring Lon Chaney, Sr., such as Tell It to the Marines, The Monster, and Laugh, Clown,

Laugh; and many silent films from the 1920s that are too numerous to name. Now, with

the copyright term extension effectuated by the CTEA, Festival Films cannot make these

classic films available to the public as public domain works.

          82.    Copyright restoration has had a similarly devastating impact on Festival

Films's business. Before § 514 went into effect, Festival Films offered a wide selection

of foreign titles of works that were in the public domain for failure to satisfy the

requirements of the relevant Copyright Act. Festival offered these movies for sale to the

public specifically because they were in the public domain. But, with copyright

restoration, Festival can no longer. Copyright restoration has forced Festival to remove

approximately 50 to 60 foreign titles from its selection, including such favorites as

Joffroi, the French film directed by Marcel Pagnol; Voyage Surprise; The Passion of Joan

of Arc, the classic movie about the life of Joan of Arc directed by Carl Dreyer; Diary of a

Country Priest,  the French masterpiece directed by Robert Bresson; numerous films by



                                             34



Jean Renoir, including his epic about the French Revolution Le Marseillaise,  the World

War I drama  La Grande Illusion, and The Testament of Dr. Cordelier; Le Corbeau, the

French thriller by  Henri-Georges Clouzot;  the French short film and children's favorite

The Red Balloon;  Jean Cocteau's  Les Enfants-Terribles;  the classic German silent film

Faust; Variete; the first German sound film, The Blue Angel; and the classic Fritz Lang

film  Metropolis.  Festival Films has also been forced to forego selling hundreds more

foreign films that it anticipated acquiring before copyright restoration.

       83.      Festival Films also used to sell several classic British films by Alfred

Hitchcock, including  Blackmail, The Manxman, Murder,  and  Number Seventeen.  The

works had been in the public domain in United States for years before § 514A went into

effect, but now all of this has ended with copyright restoration. NIEs to restore copyrights

in these Hitchcock works have been filed in the Copyright Office. With copyright

restoration, Festival Films can no longer sell these Hitchcock films and has lost revenue

from lost sales of these works.

               5.      The Harm to John McDonough and Timeless Video

       84.     John McDonough's vocation and avocation in life revolve around

preserving and distributing old movies and television shows that are in the public domain.

McDonough founded Timeless Video Alternatives International over 20 years ago, and

has amassed a collection of approximately 800 public domain movies and 800 public

domain television shows, including such favorites as Charade with Cary Grant, Sante Fe

Trail  with Erol Flynn, and  Royal Wedding  with Fred Astaire. Part of McDonough's

business at Timeless Video facilitates the airing of such public domain works on TV.



                                              35



McDonough arranges the airing of such shows with primarily small independent TV

stations in exchange for commercial time, which McDonough in turn sells to advertisers.

McDonough also preserves old films on video and sells them directly to the public.

McDonough's entire business was founded on the principles of copyright law that ensure

that works go into the public domain after a "limited time" and that public domain works

are free for all to use and copy.

          85.    But the CTEA and § 514 now jeopardize these principles and seriously

impact McDonough's business.

          86.    The CTEA's 20-year extension of the term of copyright has greatly

harmed the supply of public domain works for McDonough's business. Before the

CTEA was enacted, McDonough relied on the natural progression of copyrighted works

into the public domain each year due to the expiry of the term. Such progression into the

public domain was vital for McDonough to offer "new" titles of public domain works.

The CTEA, however, puts an end to this vital supply of public domain works for 20

years.

          87.    In practical terms, the CTEA has wiped out McDonough's anticipated

supply of a whole category of films published in 1923 or later. Before the CTEA went

into effect, McDonough anticipated a number of popular works entering the public

domain due to the expiry of copyright, including many silent films from the late 1920s

that are too numerous to name, as well as a host of early sound movies from 1929 and

later, including movies starring Edward G. Robinson, Humphrey Bogart, and James




                                            36



Cagney. Now, with the copyright term extension effectuated by CTEA, McDonough

cannot preserve these classic films or make them available to the public.

       88.     Copyright restoration has had a similarly devastating impact on

McDonough's business. Before § 514 went into effect, McDonough had a selection of

foreign works that were in the public domain in the United States for failure to satisfy the

requirements of the relevant Copyright Act, including such classics as Sydney Gilliat's

Night Train to Munich, The Demi-Paradise starring Laurence Olivier, Against the Wind,

The Baby and the Battleship, The Captive Heart, Doctor Blood's Coffin, Doctor in

Distress, Elizabeth of Ladymead, The Fallen Idol, Forbidden, Green Grow the Rushes

starring Richard Burton,  Heidi, Intermezzo  starring Ingrid Berman,  Jericho, The Night

Has Eyes, On Approval, One of Our Aircraft Is Missing, The Overlanders, The Private

Life of Don Juan starring Douglas Fairbanks, The Private Life of Henry VIII, The Rules of

the Game  directed by Jean Renoir,  Sanders of the  River, Song of  Freedom, The Spy in

Black, Things to Come, The Third Man  starring Orson Welles,  Thursday's Child, Dark

Journey  starring Vivien Leigh,  The Divorce of Lady X  starring Laurence Olivier,  Fire

Over England  starring Laurence Olivier and Vivien Leigh,  Storm in a Teacup  starring

Rex Harrison and Vivien Leigh,  Ikiru  directed by Akira Kurosawa, and several Alfred

Hitchcock thrillers including Blackmail, The Manxman, Murder, Number Seventeen, Rich

and Strange,  and  The Skin Game.  McDonough offered these movies for sale to the

public specifically because they were in the public domain. But, with the asserted

copyright restoration in these movies, McDonough can no longer. Copyright restoration

has forced McDonough to forego selling such works altogether.


                                             37



       89.     While the loss to Timeless Video has been significant, the loss to the

American public is even worse. Businesses like Timeless Video provide a huge public

service in facilitating the preservation of old films (such as silent and early sound films)

on videotape and making them available to the public. Most of the old silent and early

sound films were made on material (primarily nitrate) that deteriorates rapidly and

eventually becomes lost forever. Neither the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act

nor the URAA provides any means to insure that such old films are not lost forever. To

the contrary, both Acts exacerbate the problem of film deterioration by making it

impracticable, as well as unlawful, for film preservers like Timeless Video to deal with

works that fall within the ambit of either Act. But there is simply no guarantee that, for

each film that has been granted a retroactive copyright under § 514 or an extended term

of 20 years under the CTEA, a copyright holder even exists or intends to preserve the

film. Section 514 and the CTBA make these "orphan" works essentially unavailable to

the public.

        90.    The combined effect of term extension and copyright restoration is

devastating to plaintiffs, who rely extensively on public domain works in their businesses

and artistic pursuits. Extending the term of copyrights for another 20 years to existing

works while granting retroactive copyright protection to a whole class of foreign works

essentially shuts off both supply lines of works into the public domain. And waiting 20

years for these works to enter the public domain is essentially waiting a lifetime for

plaintiffs, who are already in their productive years. This unbridled and unprecedented

attempt by Congress to deplete the public domain is patently unconstitutional.



                                             38



                                        COUNT 1
                           (CTEA/Copyright Clause Violation)

       91.     Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

       92.     Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution limits Congress's authority to

grant copyright protection only "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by

securing for  limited Times  to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their

respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).

       93.     Thus, Congress's power under the Copyright (and Patent) Clause is

expressly limited to enacting laws that are designed "[t]o promote the Progress of Science

and useful Arts." This stated constitutional purpose provides the standard by which all

copyright law must be adjudged. Congress in the exercise of the copyright power may

not exceed the limits imposed by the express constitutional purpose "[t]o promote the

Progress of Science."

       94.     Moreover, the Copyright Clause further limits the means by which

Congress may exercise its copyright power to one specific means: "by securing for

limited Times  to Authors * * * the exclusive Right to their respective writings."  Id.

(emphasis added).

       95.     Despite these constitutional requirements, Congress has prolonged the

term of copyright repeatedly ­ even for subsisting copyrights. The CTEA is the most

recent of Congress's continued expansion of the term of subsisting copyrights. From

1962 through 1974, Congress extended the term of copyright 9 times, with the end result

being that the maximum term of copyright (including renewal) went from 56 to 70 years.

In 1976, which effectuated a major overhaul to copyright law, Congress extended the


                                            39



term of subsisting copyrights to 75 years, but also granted works published in or after

1978 a term of protection of life of the author plus 50 years. Finally, in 1998, Congress

enacted the CTEA, which adds 20 more years to the term of copyrights ­ thus creating a

total term of protection of 95 years or life of the author plus 70 years for most works

depending on the date of publication and kind of work. Thus, works published in 1923

and following have had their term of copyright prolonged 11 times, culminating in the

20-year expansion of the CTEA. Had the original grant of copyright (including renewal)

been the exclusive term of protection allowed, all works from 1923 through 1944 would

have already entered the public domain (starting in 1979 and continuing each year up to

the present). Because of Congress's retroactive term extensions, however, these works

will not enter the public domain until December 31, 2018 through December 31, 2039.

       96.     The CTEA's retroactive extension of the term of copyright for subsisting

copyrights provides no incentive to authors for the further creation of works, or any

benefit to the public, and ultimately does not "promote the Progress of Science."

       97.     Moreover, Congress's 20-year expansion of the term of copyright for

works already in existence has resulted in a term of copyright that is not "limited."

       98.     In addition, a separate requirement imposed by the Copyright Clause is

that copyright protection can be granted only to works that are original.                Feist

Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.,  499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The

retroactive extension of the term of copyright to existing works violates this originality

requirement because, at the time the CTEA extended the term of copyright, the existing




                                             40



works added not even a modicum of creative thought or selection. The works were

simply the same as they were before.

        99.     The CTEA therefore violates the restrictions of Article I, § 8, cl. 8 and is

unconstitutional.

        100.    Since the unconstitutional sections of the CTEA are not severable from the

remainder of the CTEA, the entire act must be declared unconstitutional.

        101.    A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.

                                         COUNT 2
                            (CTEA/First Amendment Violation)

        102.    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

        103. The First Amendment restricts Congress's power to "make" any law

"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.

        104.    The CTEA, in its application to both subsisting and future copyrights, is a

law that restricts the plaintiffs' speech. But for the CTEA, plaintiffs could, without threat

of legal punishment, publish works originally copyrighted in 1923 through 1925, and

whose copyrights are presently subsisting. If the CTEA stands, plaintiffs can only

publish such works with the permission of the copyright holder.

        105. Whether the CTEA is considered a content-based or content-neutral

restriction on speech, it violates the plaintiffs' freedom of speech.

        106.    Since the unconstitutional sections of the CTEA are not severable from the

remainder of the CTEA, the entire act must be declared unconstitutional.

        107.    A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.



                                              41



                                         COUNT 3
                              (CTEA/Due Process Violation)

        108.    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

        109.    The Due Process Clause states that no person shall be "deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

        110.    The Due Process Clause serves to protect individuals from government

action that results in fundamental unfairness, including retroactive legislation that

unfairly burdens individuals and disrupts settled expectations.  Eastern Enterprises v.

Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556-57 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting

in part). "[A] law that is fundamentally unfair because of its retroactivity is a law that is

basically arbitrary."  Id.  For this reason, "[r]etroactivity is generally disfavored in the

law, in accordance with `fundamental notions of justice' that have been recognized

throughout history." Id. at 532 (plurality) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v.

Bonjorno,  494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Indeed, as the Supreme

Court has admonished: "Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has

been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with fundamental principles

of the social compact." Id.  (plurality) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891));  see also id.  at 547 (Kennedy, J.);  id.  at 558

(Breyer, J., dissenting).

        111.    The CTEA is fundamentally unfair in its retroactive increase of the term of

copyright to numerous existing works.

        112.    The CTEA effectuates a sweeping change from prior copyright law. It

attempts to add 20 more years to the term of copyright for works that have existed for


                                             42



numerous years and that have, over the years, resulted in settled expectations of plaintiffs

and the public about when the copyrighted works will enter the public domain.

        113.    The retroactive effect of the CTEA is severe in every respect. The CTEA

reaches back over 75 years and grants an additional 20 years of copyright to thousands

and thousands of existing works, many of which had been created years ago ­ potentially

dating back to 1923. While Congress has extended the term of copyright to existing

works several times in the recent past, it has never done so of the order or magnitude of

20 years. The previous term extensions were as follows: 3 years to subsisting copyrights

in 1962 (Pub. L. 87-668); 2 years to subsisting copyrights in 1965 (Pub. L. 89-142); 1

year to subsisting copyrights in 1967 (Pub. L. 90-141), 1968 (Pub. L. 90-416), 1969 (Pub.

L. 91-147), 1970 (Pub. L. 91-555), and 1971 (Pub. L. 92-170); 2 years to subsisting

copyrights in 1972 (Pub. L. 92-566) and 1974 (Pub. L. 93-573); and 5 years to subsisting

copyrights in 1976 (Pub. L. 105-298). The CTEA's 20-year increase is 4 times as great

as the largest of these previous extensions.

        114.    Given the existing law at the time, the plaintiffs had settled expectations

that copyrighted works were entitled to protection for the statutory term granted when the

works were created and published. Plaintiffs (as well as no doubt numerous other

members of the public) reasonably relied on the then-existing statutory term for

determining the entry of these copyrighted works into the public domain. In reliance on

this bedrock principle, plaintiffs expended a considerable amount of time, money, and

resources in their businesses to perform or make available public domain works for the

public. Plaintiffs all purchased works that had entered the public domain and that were



                                                43



free for all to use under the prevailing law. Plaintiffs also made business decisions in

reasonable anticipation that copyrighted works published in 1923 and following would

have entered the public domain soon or already.

        115.    By retroactively granting 20 more years of copyright to works already in

existence, the CTEA greatly upsets the settled expectations of the plaintiffs and deprives

them of property without due process of law. The result is particularly harsh and

oppressive. Plaintiffs chose their vocations years ago and developed their respective

businesses and artistic pursuits based in part upon the design of the copyright system that

allowed them to use freely works in the public domain. Each year, they could expect the

natural progression of at least some copyrighted works into the public domain. In each of

the plaintiffs' lines of work, the availability of "new" public domain works is essential to

their business. (Just imagine a business attempting to survive without any new product

line for 20 years.) The CTEA, however, ends the plaintiffs' (and the public's) supply of

public domain works for 20 years, until January 1, 2019 ­ which may as well be forever

for plaintiffs, who are well into their productive years.

        116. The CTEA is a law that is, at its essence, fundamentally unfair. It

unsettles the reasonable expectations of plaintiffs about the progression of works into the

public domain and deprives them of their property without due process of law.

        117.    Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the CTEA is

unconstitutional.

        118.    Since the unconstitutional sections of the CTEA are not severable from the

remainder of the CTEA, the entire act must be declared unconstitutional.


                                              44



       119.     A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.

                                          COUNT 4
                     (Section 514 of URAA/Copyright Clause Violation)

        120.    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

        121.    Section 514 of the URAA violates the constitutional limitation on

Congress's power to grant copyrights prescribed by Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the

Constitution. Congress's enumerated power under the Copyright (and Patent) Clause is

expressly limited to enacting laws that are designed "[t]o promote the Progress of Science

and useful Arts."

        122.    The Copyright Clause also requires that the public have free access to

copy and use whatever copyright law has deemed to fall in the public domain.

Accordingly, once a work goes into the public domain, Congress cannot remove it from

free use by the public by granting it a copyright ­ "restored," retroactive, or otherwise.

        123.    Section 514 of the URAA violates these restrictions of the Copyright

Clause and is therefore unconstitutional. By its own terms, § 514 authorizes copyrights

to works already in the public domain, many of them for many years.  See  17 U.S.C. §

104A(a)(1)(B) (granting copyright to certain public domain works as "if the work never

entered the public domain in the United States").

        124.    Section 514's retroactive restoration of copyright provides no incentive to

authors for the further creation of works, or any benefit to the public, and ultimately does

not "promote the Progress of Science."

        125.    In addition, a separate requirement imposed by the Copyright Clause is

that copyright protection can be granted only to works that are original.                Feist


                                              45



Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co.,  499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The

retroactive grant of copyright protection to works in the public domain violates this

originality requirement because, at the time § 514 granted copyright protection, the works

were already in the public domain and contained not even a modicum of creative thought

or selection when copyright protection was granted. The works were simply the same as

they were before: works in the public domain.

       126.     Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that § 514 of the

URAA is unconstitutional.

        127.    A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.

                                         COUNT 5
                    (Section 514 of URAA/First Amendment Violation)

        128.    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

        129.    The First Amendment restricts Congress's power to "make" any law

"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.

        130.    Section 514 of the URAA is a law that restricts the plaintiffs' speech. But

for § 514, plaintiffs could, without threat of legal punishment, publish works in the public

domain whose copyrights now have been restored. If § 514 stands, plaintiffs can only

publish such works with the permission of the copyright holder.

        131.    Whether § 514 of the URAA is considered a content-based or content-

neutral restriction on speech, it violates the plaintiffs' freedom of speech.

        132.    Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that § 514 of the

URAA is unconstitutional.

        133.    A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.


                                              46



                                         COUNT 6
                       (Section 514 of URAA/Due Process Violation)

        134.    Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 90.

        135.    The Due Process Clause states that no person shall be "deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

        136.    The Due Process Clause serves to protect individuals from government

action that results in fundamental unfairness, including retroactive legislation that

unfairly burdens individuals and disrupts settled expectations.  Eastern Enterprises v.

Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556-57 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting

in part). "[A] law that is fundamentally unfair because of its retroactivity is a law that is

basically arbitrary." Id.  For this reason, "[r]etroactivity is generally disfavored in the

law, in accordance with `fundamental notions of justice' that have been recognized

throughout history." Id. at 532 (plurality) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v.

Bonjorno,  494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Indeed, as the Supreme

Court has admonished: "Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has

been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with fundamental principles

of the social compact." Id.  (plurality) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891));  see also id.  at 547 (Kennedy, J.);  id.  at 558

(Breyer, J., dissenting).

        137.    Section 514 of the URAA is fundamentally unfair in its retroactive

restoration of copyrights in numerous works that have been in the public domain, in

many instances for years and years.



                                             47



        138.    Section 514 effectuates a sweeping change from prior copyright law. It

attempts to revise retroactively several copyright laws that have existed for numerous

years and that have, over the years, resulted in settled expectations of plaintiffs and the

public, including (but not limited to):

                a.       Whether a particular work is accorded copyright protection is

       determined by the law existing at the time of creation and publication of the work;

                b.       General publication of a work under the 1909 Act without

       compliance with the Act's formalities irrevocably injected the work into the

       public domain;

                c        Works in the public domain are free for all to use and copy;

                d.       Works in the public domain cannot be copyrighted; and

                e.       Under the first sale doctrine, an owner of a lawfully made and

        purchased copy of a work can sell, rent, or otherwise dispose of it freely without

        the authorization of the copyright holder.

        139.    The retroactive effect of § 514 is severe in every respect. Section 514

reaches back over 75 years and grants retroactive copyrights to thousands and thousands

of foreign works, many of which had been created years ago ­ potentially dating back to

the early 1920s. Under the settled law under the 1909 Act and later the 1976 Act, these

works had unequivocally and unconditionally entered the public domain in the United

States because they did not meet the requirements of U.S. copyright law. What § 514

attempts to undo is nearly a hundred years of copyright law retroactively.




                                              48



       140.     Given the years of copyright law to support them, the settled expectations

of plaintiffs were that these public domain works were free for them to use and copy.

Plaintiffs (as well as no doubt numerous other members of the public) reasonably relied

on the well-established ­ indeed, unassailable ­ principle of law that works in the public

domain are free for all to use. In reliance on this bedrock principle, plaintiffs expended a

considerable amount of time, money, and resources in their businesses to perform or

make available public domain works for the public. Plaintiffs all purchased works that

had entered the public domain and that were free for all to use under the prevailing law.

        141.    Section 514 now attempts to strip plaintiffs of their ability to continue to

use their property, all of this by retroactively granting copyrights to works that have

already entered the public domain. The result is particularly harsh and oppressive.

Plaintiffs chose their vocations years ago and developed their respective businesses based

in part upon the design of the copyright system that allowed them to use freely works in

the public domain. Over the years, plaintiffs purchased, performed, or made available

foreign works that they now must forego using in their businesses and artistic pursuits

because of the retroactive grant of copyright under § 514.

        142.    Section 514 is a law that is, at its essence, fundamentally unfair. It

unsettles the reasonable expectations of plaintiffs about the free availability of public

domain works and deprives them of their property without due process of law.

        143.    Accordingly, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that § 514 of the

URAA is unconstitutional.

        144.    A declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy between the parties.


                                             49



         WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Lawrence Golan, Richard Kapp, S.A. Publishing Co,,

Inc., Symphony of the Canyons, Ron Hall, d/b/a Festival Films, and John McDonough,

d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives International request this Court enter judgment:

         1.    Declaring that the CTEA and § 514 of the URAA are unconstitutional;

         2.    Enjoining defendant from the enforcement of the CTEA and § 514 of the

URAA;

         3.    Awarding plaintiffs the costs of this action, including reasonable

attorneys' fees; and

         4.    Awarding any further relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

                                                            Respectfully submitted,



Lawrence Lessig
Edward Lee                                                  Carolyn Fairless
STANFORD LAW SCHOOL                                         WHEELER  TRIGG & KENNEDY
CENTER FOR  INTERNET AND  SOCIETY                           1801 California Street,
Crown Quadrangle                                            Suite 3600
559 Nathan Abbott Way                                       Denver, CO 80202-2636
Stanford, CA 94305-8610                                     phone: (303) 292-2525
phone: (650) 736-0999                                       fax: (303) 294-1879
fax: (650) 723-8440

Jonathan L. Zittrain
Charles R. Nesson
1525 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138
phone: (617) 495-7547

Dated: September                                            Counsel for Plaintiffs
                                                            [names and addresses listed
                                                            below]


                                            50



                                     Plaintiffs

LAWRENCE  GOLAN,
  1777 Larimer Street, # 1805
 Denver, CO 80202

RICHARD  KAPP,
 20 Oakdale Drive
 Hastings on Hudson, NY 10706,

S.A. PUBLISHING Co., INC.,
d/b/a/ ESS.A.Y  RECORDINGS,
  145 Palisade Street
 Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522-1617,

SYMPHONY OF THE  CANYONS,
 attn: Kortney Stirland
  14 East Center
 Kanab, Utah 84741,

RON  HALL, d/b/a FESTIVAL  FILMS,
 6115 Chestnut Terrace
 Shorewood, MN 55331,

JOHN  MCDONOUGH, d/b/a TIMELESS  VIDEO
ALTERNATIVES  INTERNATIONAL,
 3303 Fiechtner Drive, S.W.,
 Fargo, ND 58103

















                                          51