EXECUTIVE
SUMMARIES OF KEY DOCUMENTS
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/executive-summaries.html>
Table of Contents
The White Paper
ICANN Articles of Incorporation
ICANN By-laws
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
Amendment 1 to the MoU
Amendment 2 to the MoU
Status Report under the ICANN/DoC Mou
Second Status Report under the ICANN/DoC MouConflicts of Interest Policy
Independent Review Policy
Reconsideration PolicyICANN Supporting Organizations
Address Supporting Organization
Protocol Supporting Organization
Domain Name Supporting OrganizationMembership Advisory Committee
Government Advisory Committee
Committee of the Board of Directors on Reconsideration
The Advisory Committee on Independent Review
DNS Root-Server System Advisory Committee
Audit Committee
Executive Committee
Executive Search Committee
Election Committee
Nominating CommitteeICANN Agreements, Recommendations, and Related Documents
ICANN/NSI Registry Agreement
Registrar Accreditation Agreement
NSI/DoC Memorandum of Understanding
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Report
ICANN/U.S. Government Contract for the IANA Function
IETF/ICANN Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the IANA
The White Paper (June 5, 1998)
Management of Internet Names and Addresses
United States Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htmThis document expresses the intention of the US government (USG) — through the Department of Commerce (DoC) — to end direct support of Internet name and address coordination services. As growth of commercial and international segments of the Internet has resulted in a distributed system beyond the jurisdiction of one nation to administer, the White Paper concludes that the US government should no longer take so central a role in the coordination of essential Internet services. In addition to providing a history of US government involvement with the Internet, the White Paper reviews and attempts to respond to public concerns (raised during a comment period following the issuance of the Green Paper), following what it calls the generally accepted guidelines of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation. Disagreement on the need for central coordination of certain tasks (such as a single authoritative root for domain names) was noted as well as the fact that the actual decision to standardize a technical protocol is a function performed by non-governmental organizations not regulated by any government.
ICANN Articles of Incorporation (November 1998)
http://www.icann.org/articles-pr23nov98.htmlArticles of incorporation typically set up the basic structure of an organization; detailed implementation occurs in the by-laws (which are often easier to modify). ICANN's Articles establish it as a private 501(c)(3) non-profit entity under California law. As such it has no shareholders or other external structural oversight mechanism save for potential oversight from the Attorney General of California who may intervene to keep the Corporation's activities within the bounds of California law. For non-Californians, and particularly non-US netizens, this is arguably inadequate protection. Therefore, early drafts of the By-laws (below) were amended to provide for an at-large membership which would elect half of the Board of Directors. Also contentious is Article 9, a provision which allows a two-thirds majority of the directors of the Corporation to make amendments to the Corporation's Articles. Since ICANN's Board currently has only ten members, seven of them could completely change the Corporation's structure (as well as its By-laws) at any time. However, once ICANN has "members," any such amendment would have to be ratified by a two-thirds majority of those members voting on the proposed amendment. ICANN established a Membership Advisory Committee (see documents and summary below) which developed recommendations for the establishment of the At-large Membership.
ICANN By-laws (November, 1998 and subsequently revised)
http://www.icann.org/bylaws-09apr99.htmlOne of the major debates over ICANN's structure concerned the relative power of the existing Internet technical community relative to the burgeoning ranks of commercial users and consumers. The By-laws set up a structure whereby half of the ICANN Board is elected by the technical community (the Supporting Organizations or SOs) and the other half by the general population at large (the At-large Membership).
The Supporting Organizations are expected to present themselves to ICANN for recognition and determine who best speaks for their concerns. To date, there are three: the Address Supporting Organization (or ASO, formed by the regional internet address registries), the Protocol Supporting Organization (or PSO, formed by the IETF and other organizations that have traditionally designed and approved standards for protocols), and the Domain Name Supporting Organization (or DNSO, to make recommendations on domain name issues). (See ICANN Supporting Organizations, below.) A Membership Advisory Committee (see ICANN Committees, below) was designated to recommend a structure for the At-large Membership.
However, neither the SOs nor the At-large Membership has the right to implement any policy. An SO's role is to advise and recommend; but the Board has final decision-making authority. Until there is some experience with this process, some in the technical community remain concerned that well-intended but technically disastrous policies will be recommended by the At-large Membership, while the at-large membership worries that the technical community will make decisions that favor well-connected insiders or otherwise disregard the public interest.
The By-laws also require the establishment of other advisory committees to consider interests not represented by the above or to tackle specific, detailed tasks assigned by the MoU below. Internal review procedures are also mandated so as to make redress less dependent on the Attorney General of California. (See ICANN Committees, below.)
ICANN's By-laws were developed at the direction of Dr. Jon Postel who is said to have selected the nine Interim Board members from a list of nominees suggested by the public at large. Although Dr. Postel was well-known and respected by many in the Internet technical community, his designees are not so widely known.
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (November 1998)
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htmUnder the DoC's Joint Project Authority and at the direction of the US government, this document establishes a development program to design and test mechanisms for private coordination of certain Internet technical functions that previously had been handled under contracts with several different entities. It is also the primary formal vehicle through which ICANN was officially selected as the "newco" contemplated by the White Paper. Critics of the MoU, including critics of the White Paper that proceeded it, allege that the government has no right to transfer control of the Internet to private parties. Defenders respond that this agreement does not transfer regulatory functions because the US government has not exercised any regulatory functions in this area. However, critics of the MoU argue that the weight of government support behind ICANN is substantially equivalent to regulatory authority. ICANN's position on Commerce's authority is that the distributed ownership of the components of the Internet makes it impossible for any one entity to exercise any authority over the whole system; ICANN therefore argues that it only exercises influence over component operators that trust it, and since the operators' delegation of decision-making to ICANN is voluntary, no actual regulatory power has been transferred.
Amendment 1 to the ICANN/DoC MoU (November 1999)
http://www.icann.org/nsi/amend1-jpamou-04nov99.htmAmendment 1 formally incorporated ICANN's Registry Agreement with NSI into the MOU but retained to the DoC the ultimate authority to ICANN's rights under all contracts with registries and registrars should the DoC withdraw its recognition of ICANN.
Amendment 2 to the ICANN/DoC MoU (September 2000)
http://www.icann.org/general/amend2-jpamou-07sep00.htmAmendment 2 extended the term of the MoU until September, 2001. It recognized ICANN's progress in accomplishing the tasks set out under the MoU and listed a set of continuing tasks for ICANN. These tasks included continuing to provide expertise on private-sector functions relating to management of the DNS, continuing development of relationships with the RIRs, implementation of an enhanced root-server system architecture, continuing efforts to achieve stable agreements with the ccTLDs, and proceeding with introduction of new TLDs.
Status Report under the ICANN/DoC MoU (June 1999)
http://www.icann.org/general/statusreport-15june99.htmThe first status report under the ICANN/DoC MoU reviewed the principles laid out in the White Paper: stability, competition, private-sector bottom-up coordination, and representation. It also discussed the additional topics and action items covered by the White Paper and listed the specific actions ICANN took since entering the MoU. The report goes through each principle expressly looking at how ICANN's actions have addressed it. For stability, the report emphasized the continued stability of the DNS since ICANN took over management. For competition, ICANN noted the ongoing introduction of 5 test-bed registrars, the development of accreditation criteria, and the anticipated introduction of more registrars in the future. For private-sector bottom-up coordination, ICANN looked to the formation of the DNSO, the process of formation of the PSO, and the anticipated formation of the ASO in the near future. For representation, ICANN looked again to the formation of the Supporting Organizations and the difficult process of determining how to elect the 9 At-Large directors. In addition the status report addressed issues of incorporation, funding, staffing, governance, structure, new TLDs, and relations with governments. The report concluded with a stark picture of NSI's unwillingness to fully cooperate in the introduction of competition and development and acceptance of consensus policies.
Second Status Report under the ICANN/DoC MoU (June 2000)
http://www.icann.org/general/statusreport-30jun00.htmThe second status report under the ICANN/DoC MoU identified 9 specific tasks given to ICANN under the MoU and detailed ICANN's progress on each, in a few cases reporting that the task had been completed or were very near completion. However, the status report made clear that all tasks had not been completed and would not be finished by the end of the term of the MoU in September 2000. Thus the status report recommended an extension of the MoU (which was formalized in Amendment 2 to the MoU, above.) The tasks identified and the progress on those tasks are as follows (in paraphrase):
Task 1: Provide expertise on private-sector functions related to technical management of the DNS. Progress: ICANN has established stable relationships and understandings with the RIRs and SDOs. With the exception of establishing funding agreements with the RIRs, Task 1 is completed.
Task 2: Design procedures for neutral third-party review of decisions.
Progress: ICANN has adopted a Reconsideration Policy which in operation, and Independent Review Policy which is still in the formation stages, and an Arbitration Process which is largely implemented through agreements with the registries and registrars. Task 2 will be complete within a few months.
Task 3: Introduce competition in domain-name registration services.
Progress: Competition at the registrar level has successfully been introduced. Task 3 is completed.
Task 4: Establish procedures for operation of and modifications to the root-zone file.
Progress: ICANN established the Root Server System Advisory Committee to define technical procedures. This process is well underway. Completion of task 4 is expected within the next few months.
Task 5: Establish more robust management for the root server system.
Progress: Though this task is well underway, with study ongoing by the DNSOP, it will require a few more months for completion.
Task 6: Establish procedures for allowing interested parties to participate in policy-making.
Progress: The creation of all of the SOs and the different mechanisms for policy-making have been work towards the accomplishment of this goal. It is a difficult goal on which continuing work and development will always be necessary.
Task 7: Establish procedures for getting information to the public.
Progress: The use of the ICANN website, mailing lists, webcasting and archiving of meetings. Though there will always be room for enhancement, this task has been completed to the satisfaction of the MoU requirements.
Task 8: Establish additional procedures to ensure accountability and representation.
Progress: Again the creation of all of the SOs, the review policies, the notice and comment mechanisms. Though there will continue to be development in this area, this task is completed to the satisfaction of the MoU requirements.
Task 9: Addition of new TLDs.
Progress: The DNSO has recommended the addition of new TLDs in a "measured and responsible manner" and the Board will act at Yokohama. Determinations about the future of new TLDs should be made by the end of 2000.
Conflicts of Interest Policy (March 1999)
http://www.icann.org/general/coi-policy.htmThe Conflicts of Interest Policy prevents any director, officer or person from using his/her position within ICANN for personal benefit. Because ICANN is a corporation made up of interested stake-holders, the result of this policy is that directors (and others) must disclose any personal interest in policy decisions and exempt themselves from those decisions that are determined to be a conflict of interest.
Reconsideration Policy (March 1999)
http://www.icann.org/general/reconsideration.htmUnder the Reconsideration Policy an interested person may request that the ICANN Board reconsider an action that it has taken. These requests are considered by a three-member Reconsideration Committee made up of ICANN Board members. The committee will evaluate the requests for reconsideration and make a recommendation for action on the request to the Board.
Independent Review Policy (March 2000)
http://www.icann.org/indreview/policy.htmIn accordance with the ICANN bylaws the Board adopted a policy for third-party review of its decisions. The policy is intended to allow for independent review of whether ICANN has violated the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation in one of its decisions. Requests for independent review are submitted to a nine member Independent Review Panel which is responsible for developing its own rules of procedure. Adjudications of requests are performed by three members of the review panel. IRP members serve for 4 year terms and are nominated by a nominating committee composed of two members from each SO Council. Nominees must be approved by the ICANN Board. The IRP will hear requests for review under the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws or on the grounds that consensus did not exist.
ICANN Supporting Organizations (SOs)
Each of the three SOs will elect three Directors to ICANN’s Board, and each will be ICANN's primary source of policy recommendations within its respective area of expertise. Under the ICANN By-laws, the SOs must organize themselves in a bottom-up fashion and be recognized by the board. They are also required to be financially independent from ICANN. Participation in an SO must be open to any individual or organization that meets the SO's reasonable minimum qualifications as ratified by the ICANN Board.
Address Supporting Organization (ASO)
ICANN ASO Status Page
http://www.icann.org/aso/asonew.htmThe Address SO is expected to consist of the three regional Internet registries (RIRs): APNIC (Asia-Pacific Network Information Center, http://www.apnic.net), ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers, http://www.arin.net), and RIPE NCC (Reseau IP Europeans, http://www.ripe.net). InterNIC formerly managed this task under a National Science Foundation (NSF) contract, but as the demand for name assignment grew, the number allocation tasks were spun off to these private, non-profit organizations. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) allocates Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (the numbers that actually identify each host machine) in large blocks to the RIRs which then assign them for a fee to major access providers which in turn allocate further downstream. Assignments are ordinarily made on a first-come, first-serve basis and have generally been easily obtained, except when issues of routing efficiency intervene. The field of numbers has just been increased dramatically with Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6).
Protocol Supporting Organization (PSO)
ICANN PSO Status Page
http://www.icann.org/pso/psonew.htmPSO Proposal from IETF POISSON Working Group
http://www.icann.org/pso/pso1.htmlMoU between IETF, W3C, and ICANN re the PSO
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-poisson-mou-pso-00.txtProtocols are standards for the transmission of data over a network. Although protocols are not mandatory, they are useful in the same sense as a standard style of electrical outlet allows multiple appliances to operate with it. Many protocols used on the Internet have been developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF, http://www.ietf.org) through its bottom-up online peer review procedure. Thus, the IETF is expected to play a key role in the PSO, while the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI) is also expected to participate. Under a proposal from the IETF's POISSON Working Group, the IETF and other standards development organizations would collectively form the PSO. The proposal contemplates that standards development organizations will continue to design the technical aspects of standards, while ICANN will assume the ministerial role of assuring the uniqueness of numeric values as required by particular protocols.
Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO)
ICANN DNSO Status Page
http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso1.htmDNSO Web Site
http://www.dnso.orgFormation of the DNSO has generated nearly as much controversy as has its subject matter. Although the DNSO will "merely" make recommendations to ICANN regarding domain name policy, this ability to frame the issues is thought to be of critical importance. In March 1999, the ICANN board recognized what it said was the most popular DNSO structure: a two-tier DNSO with a General Assembly (GA) and constituencies that together choose a Names Council (NC). The GA consists of all interested individuals and entities; it is the initial source of both policy and representation. Any constituency that self-forms out of the GA and is recognized by the ICANN board can send three members to the NC. However, to prevent capture, there is a prohibition against more than one person from the same organization sitting on the NC.
Six initial constituencies were recognized by the ICANN board in May 1999: ccTLD Registries, Commercial and Business Entities, gTLD Registries, Intellectual Property, ISPs and connectivity providers, and Registrars. These constituencies representing commercial interests have organized rapidly. A Non-Commercial constituency called for by ICANN resolution is still in formation, and a proposed IDNO has not been accepted. Some concern exists about double-counting of votes among constituencies.
Membership Advisory Committee (MAC)
Berlin Report (May 26, 1999)
http://www.icann.org/macberlin.htm
ICANN Resolutions on Membership (May 27, 1999)
http://www.icann.org/berlin/berlin-resolutions.htm#3l
Representation in Cyberspace Study
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/
The MAC, responsible for recommending a structure for the at-large membership, was the first committee established by ICANN. Over 850 comments on the MAC's deliberations were received and are archived at http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/membership-current/maillist.html.
The MAC recommended that the at-large membership be free of cost, open to all individuals (but not organizations) with access to the Internet (whether or not they were domain name holders), using online registration and voting methods pending sufficient protections against election fraud. A great deal of discussion concerned fears of capture in such an election. If only a few members registered to vote, it would be easy for a special interest (such as a particular company stacking the rolls with all its employees) to gain control. On the other hand, postponing elections until the establishment of a sufficiently large and broadly representative membership base would further delay the seating of an elected ICANN Board. The decision to prohibit corporate membership was also protested by those who believe that these organizations represent most of the actual domain registrants. The Committee recommended that five of the nine at-large board members be pulled from regional pools. This policy was problematic for many, for non-US interests worry that current US dominance of the Internet slights foreign interests. However, issues are not necessarily divided along regional boundaries, making it undesirable to base a voting system on geography alone.
At the Berlin Open Meeting in May 1999, the ICANN Board reaffirmed its intention to establish a mechanism for representational elections, and it requested its staff to report on implementation procedures and costs prior to its August meeting in Santiago. It resolved that the costs of holding elections should be borne by the Membership and that elections, however designed, should be sufficiently secure and authentic to avoid risking the operational stability of the Internet.
Government Advisory Committee (GAC)
http://www.icann.org/governmental-com.html
Berlin Communique (May 25, 1999)
http://www.icann.org/gac-comm-25may99.html
The Government Advisory Committee (GAC) was established to provide a means by which official government representatives could express their interests in and thoughts about ICANN activities, since the White Paper (Structure, 4) and ICANN bylaws (Art. 7, Sec. 3) preclude government officials from having a direct say in ICANN's decision-making process. Hence, in accordance with the ICANN By-laws and White Paper guidance, the GAC provides a forum for discussion regarding ICANN activities as they relate to concerns of governments, "particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements."
Members of the GAC include representatives of national governments, multinational governmental organizations, and treaty organizations, each of which may appoint one representative to the Committee. The representative must hold a formal, official position with the Member organization's public administration. Although the GAC reports its findings and recommendations to the ICANN Board, it is an advisory committee, and as such has no legal authority to act for ICANN.
The GAC, which has met at ICANN Open Meetings in both Singapore and Berlin, issued a communique from its Berlin meeting in which it generally endorsed the WIPO report and suggested that ICANN, in case of conflict over which entity should control a contested country code top-level domain (ccTLD), should reassign the domain to the public authority with the support of the relevant community.
Critics of the GAC worried that closed GAC meetings would begin to make ICANN "a tool for the governments of the world to gain a measure of control over the ... difficult-to-regulate Internet" (ICANNWatch Archives). GAC Chairman Paul Twomey responded that "the meetings are closed for practical reasons ... [to] have discussions at a pragmatic level. ... Representatives need to have confidence that they may talk among themselves and not feel like they're talking to the world press [or] they simply won't speak their minds."
Committee of the Board of Directors on Reconsideration (Reconsideration Committee)
http://www.icann.org/reconsideration/recon-committee.htm
pp> Any person affected by an action of ICANN may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board of Directors, as required by the ICANN Bylaws (Art. III, Sec. 4(a)). The Committee of the Board on Reconsideration (Reconsideration Committee) was established in March 1999 to review and consider any such requests. Consisting of three directors, the Reconsideration Committee is charged with implementing ICANN's Reconsideration Policy (adopted March 4, 1999), and has the authority to investigate and evaluate requests for reconsideration. It then makes recommendations to the Board of Directors, which ultimately determines how to resolve such requests.The Reconsideration Committee is ICANN's internal reconsideration process — as distinguished from the external Advisory Committee on Independent Review (see IRAC, below). It is suggested that an individual with a claim ought first to exhaust ICANN's internal reconsideration process before taking the claim to the Independent Review Panel (IRP) of IRAC. As IRAC suggests: "A requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies promotes efficiency by maximizing the odds that the ICANN Board will resolve disputes on its own before they reach the IRP. In addition, the IRP will benefit from any record of decision, including factual investigation and findings, developed during the course of ICANN's internal reconsideration process." At the same time, however, in cases in which ICANN's internal reconsideration process has not been concluded within 30 days, IRAC recommends that complaining parties be allowed to bypass the Reconsideration Committee and go directly to the IRP.
The Advisory Committee on Independent Review (IRAC)
http://www.icann.org/dnsroot-com.html
As called for in the ICANN Bylaws (Article III, Section 4(b)), the Advisory Committee on Independent Review (IRAC) is responsible for advising the ICANN Board on an appropriate mechanism for independent third-party review of Board actions. The eight-member committee was appointed in March 1999, selected from over fifty expressions of interest in response to ICANN's invitation. IRAC posted its initial "Draft Principles of Independent Review" for public comment and review before submitting the revised principles ("Addendum") to the ICAAN Board as an Interim Report to be considered at the Board's Berlin meetings, May 26-27, 1999.
The eleven principles of the IRAC included: nomination of IRP members by a Nominating Committee separate from the Board of Directors; selection of IRP members based on experience, geography, and legal system representation; six year terms staggered every two years; public availability of all claims, procedures, and decisions; and online proceedings when possible to minimize costs.
The DNS Root-Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC)
http://www.icann.org/dnsroot-com.html
As called for in the ICANN Bylaws, the DNS Root-Server System Advisory Committee is responsible for advising the board on the operational requirements of the root server system, including hardware, operating systems, name server software, network connectivity and physical environment. The RSSAC is also responsible for advising on security, robustness and reliability of the system. The RSSAC includes the operators of all 13 root servers and others. Their report, presented at the public forum in Yokohama, recommended migration to an enhanced dedicated master root-server system. The Board approved these recommendations and agreed to forward them to the DoC by the end of August. To date, they have not been forwarded.
Audit Committee
http://www.icann.org/general/audit-committee.htm
The Audit Committee is a three-member subcommitee of the ICANN board created by resolution in November 1999. The Audit Committee is responsible for recommending external auditors to the board and reviewing and forwarding the annual reports of the auditors.
Executive Committee
http://www.icann.org/general/executive-committee.htm
The Executive Committee was created by resolution of the Board in November 1999 to exercise the powers of the Board and oversee the management of the business affairs of the corporation. It is composed of the Chairman of the board and at least two other board members. All actions of the executive committee are recorded and reported at meetings of the Board.
Executive Search Committee
http://www.icann.org/committees/exec-search/
The Executive Search Committee was created by resolution of the Board in November 1999 to head the search effort for a successor to Michael Roberts as CEO of ICANN. Since its formation the Committee has retained the services of Christopher Mill and Partners to aid in the search process. It is the objective of the committee to find a successor for Mr. Roberts by the end of 2000.
Election Committee
The Election Committee was comprised of ICANN Board members and outside election experts to advise the ICANN Board on rules for the recently completed ICANN At Large Director election. The Election Commitee was also responsible for the specification for an online voting system provider and a recommendation to the Board. Based on the committee's recommendation, the Board selected Election.com. The Committee submitted recommendations to the ICANN Board which were accepted with minor alterations by the Board at its meeting in Yokohama. In substance, the Election Committee made 6 recommendations (in paraphrase):
Recommendation 1: The elections should be conducted regionally rather than globally.
Recommendation 2: ICANN should post informational web pages about each candidate standardized in both substance and format.
Recommendation 3: Discussion forums for each candidate should be created to foster communication with the voters.
Recommendation 4: The elections should be conducted using a preferential voting system.
Recommendation 5: 10% of a regions voters should be the required threshhold for member-nominations.
Recommendation 6: Either a small committee or an independent organization should be tasked with evaluation of the fairness of the elections.
Nominating Committee
http://www.icann.org/nomcom/
The Nominating Committee was created in order to take suggestions from the ICANN community and nominate candidates for places on the ballot for the At Large Director election. As criteria for selection, the Nominating Committee identified reputation for integrity and hard work, ability to exercise indepedent judgment, professional/volunteer roles and accomplishments, understanding the Internet's architecture and history, specific experience with the domain name and IP address system, experience in international and/or multicultural environments, educational background, skills not currently present on ICANN Board, available time, energy and interest, and likelihood of finding broad support in the ICANN community. The Nominating Committee received expressions of interest from over 200 people and heard from over 400 people. At the end of July, the Nominating Committee nominated between 2 and 5 candidates for each region.
ICANN Agreements, Recommendations, and Related Documents
ICANN/NSI Registry Agreement (November 1999)
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htmICANN and NSI agree that NSI will be the Registry Operator for the .com, .net, and .org domains pursuant to extensive contractual obligations for both parties. In substance, NSI agreed not to restrain competition, to abide by all ICANN consensus policies, to escrow its registry data and make that data available under certain circumstances, to pay $250,000 per year to fund the operation of ICANN, and to charge only $6 to registrars to register a domain name for one year. ICANN agreed to abide by its own rules of openness and transparency in policy-making, not to restrain competition, not to single out NSI for disparate treatment, and to ensure adequate appeal procedures for NSI.
Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) (November 1999)
http://www.icann.org/ra-agreement-051299.htmlIn order to become a registrar in the shared gTLD domain name space (currently .com, .net, and .org), an applicant must agree to terms specified by the RAA. In particular, the registrar must agree to make public the technical details and contact information for each second level domain (SLD) registered; to abide by policies to be specified by ICANN regarding the verification of information supplied by registrants; and to pay ICANN a specified fee, not to exceed $1, for each registration completed.
NSI/DoC Memorandum of Understanding
http://www.networksolutions.com/nsf/agreement/Recent amendments to the original 1993 MoU make this document a notable one, establishing the ongoing contractual relationship between NSI and the DoC. In Amendment 11 (October 1998), NSI agreed to acknowledge the authority of "newco," later designated as ICANN, to take on the powers specified in the White Paper. NSI also agreed to create the Shared Registration System by which registrars may compete in entering data into a single registry. The terms of Amendment 13 discuss NSI's obligations to registrars, in particular the terms on which competing registrars pay NSI for its registry services.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Report
ICANN Resolutions on WIPO Proposal (May 27, 1999)
http://www.icann.org/berlin/berlin-resolutions.html#2Final WIPO Report on the Domain Name Process (April 30, 1999)
http://www.icann.org/wipo/wipo_report.htmAs requested by the White Paper, the WIPO Report attempts to address the problem of cyberpirates: when an entity with no previous right to use a particular well-known mark registers a domain bearing that mark and attempts to sell the domain for profit; this blocks use by rightful owners or causes harm to the mark if its use is a lure for improper or misleading use. Trademark law requires owners of marks to aggressively police the commercial use of their mark or risk losing rights in it, so they cannot ignore the problem; furthermore, cyberpirates represent a significant threat to marks with many submarks or variations that are confusingly similar, as in mickeymouse.com, mickeymouse.net, minniemouse.com, and so on. Thus there is a huge burden of enforcement, worsened by the fact that the domain registrant might reside in a distant jurisdiction. In its final report, WIPO requested a uniform domain dispute policy across all gTLDs and assurance that the introduction of new gTLDs won’t make the situation worse. In particular, WIPO proposes a mandatory arbitration procedure for cybersquatting disputes and a registration priority across all gTLDs for famous mark owners.
Opponents counter that WIPO only represents trademark interests at the expense of the legal rights of non-commercial users. Furthermore, potential gTLD registries and registrars not that WIPO's proposal would bind the few gTLDs to a new legal regime without altering the rules applicable to the hundreds of ccTLDs, giving those ccTLDs an unfair market advantage. Others suggest that existing law in each jurisdiction provides sufficient protection for trademark holders, that local laws in most jurisdictions do not grant special rights to famous trademark owners, and that ICANN is not the right means to establish a new global dispute resolution system.
ICANN has endorsed the principle that a uniform dispute resolution policy should be adopted for Registrars in the .com, .net, and .org Top-Level Domains (TLDs). It has asked the testbed registrars to work together to formulate a model dispute resolution policy for voluntary adoption. ICANN has also forwarded chapters three through five of the WIPO Report to the DNSO for further discussion and evaluation.
ICANN/U.S. Government Contract for the IANA Function (February 2000)
http://www.icann.org/general/iana-contract-09feb00.htmThis agreement transferred the contract for fulfillment of the IANA function from USC, operating as a contractor of the Department of Defense, to ICANN. Under the agreement ICANN assumed responsibility for coordination of the assignment of technical protocol parameters, administrative functions associated with root management, assignment of IP address blocks, and other services requested by the Department of Commerce. Though both the location of the IANA and some of the key personnel remained the same, this agreement was a significant formal step in transferring technical management authority for the DNS to ICANN.
IETF/ICANN Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Technical Work of the IANA (March 2000)
http://www.icann.org/general/agreements.htmThis agreement essentially ratified the pre-existing understanding between the IETF and the IANA that the IANA would make technical changes pursuant to the decisions made by the IETF RFC process. In addition, the agreement specifies that in the event of a disagreement between the IETF and the IANA, the IAB will be the final arbiter.
FAQ about the Berkman Center's Relation to ICANN
http://cyber.harvard.edu/icann/bcisfaq
The mission of the Berkman Center is to investigate the real and possible boundaries in cyberspace between open and closed systems of code, commerce, government and education. Our work with ICANN represents the mainstay of our research into open government, constitutionalism, and cyberspace. Although we haven’t masterminded a grand experiment in which our collaborators are unwitting participants, we do feel that we are all participating in a grand experiment that we hope will produce lots of good results—both pragmatic and academic. Please read the entire FAQ for details!