potential abuse of root servers by US Goverment (Panel: Root Name Server Security, 12:32:43 PM, #1379)
One thing I have yet to hear anyone address is what preventative measures are available to prevent
the U.S. Government from using the root servers for covert operations. It is possible to use the roots
to reroute traffic to proxies which capture the users information thereby violating the users integrety
and privacy.
(Panel: Registries and Registrars, 1:47:48 PM, #1380)
U.S.-based ICANN-accredited registrars are doing business with registrants who are members of terrorist organizations such as Hamas, and with registrants from countries where US trade embargoes are in force, such as Afghanistan. The ICANN Registrar Accreditation agreement specifies, Para. 3.7.2 Registrar shall abide by applicable laws and governmental regulations. Is this requirement in Para. 3. 7.2 necessary only to achieve ICANN accreditation, or to maintain ICANN accreditation as well?
(Panel: Registries and Registrars, 3:31:15 PM, #1381)
Whois reflects the registrant's country location. What would it take for a registrar to filter its whois database for embargoed countries? Surely the registrar doesn't need FBI assistance to accomplish this?
Preventing transfers between registrars (Panle: Registries and Registrars, 3:49:41 PM, #1382)
I transferred three domain names from NSI to gandi.net in July, just as they were about to expire.
I am still receiving repeated notices from Verisign/NSI to "renew it or lose it" for each of these domain names, the most recent "urgent notice" received today. Presumably if I click to "retain" the name it'll unnecessarily give more $ to NSI and transfer the names back to them.
Is ICANN geared to deal with such behavior?