Donath, Signals, Cues and Meaning
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Many of the things we want to know about each other are not directly perceivable. These qualities include emotional states (are you happy?), innate abilities (are you smart?), and the likelihood of acting a particular way in the future (will you be a loyal friend?). Instead, we must rely upon signals, which are perceivable indicators of these not directly observable qualities. Qualities can be almost anything: strength, honesty, genetic robustness, poisonousness, suitability for bookkeeping employment, etc. We rely on signals when direct evaluation of the quality is too difficult or dangerous. A bird wants to know if the butterfly it is about to eat is poisonous before it takes a bite, and relies on the signal of wing markings to decide whether to eat or move on. An employer wants to determine before making a hiring decision whether a candidate will be successful or not, and relies on signals such as a resume, references, and the candidate’s actions and appearance to predict suitability for the job. A smile can be a signal of happiness, a wedding ring a signal of being married, smooth skin a signal of youth, and a big house a signal of wealth. Our language is full of signals, both the words we say and the way we say them. Saying “yes, I would like another helping of your special Tuna-Delight” can be a signal of hunger or of politeness and the accent with which it is said can signal country of origin and social class. Indeed, much of our communication, whether it is with words, gestures, or displays of possessions, consists of signaling information about who we are and what we are thinking.
Signals have varying degrees of reliability. Some are quite highly correlated with the quality they represent: upon seeing such a signal, one can be sure that the quality is present. Seeing someone lift a 200 lb weight is a reliable signal of strength; no matter how much a weaker person wishes to signal strength, without actually possessing that quality he or she will not be able to lift that weight. Others signals are less reliable and those who wish to give the impression of having the quality, without actually possessing it can imitate them. Most people wearing wedding rings are indeed married, but an unmarried woman may choose to wear one to signal that she is married to forestall unwanted attention.
Signaling theory is concerned with understanding why certain signals are reliable and others are not. It looks at how the signal is related to the quality it represents and what are the elements of the signal or the surrounding community that keep it reliable. It looks at what happens when signals are not entirely reliable – how much unreliability can be tolerated before the signal simply becomes meaningless?
Signaling occurs in competitive environments. The interests of the sender and the receiver seldom align exactly, and often they are quite at odds with each other. Sometimes the competition is fierce and overt. Prey may signal to predators that they are poisonous or that they can run so fast or fight back so strongly that pursuing them is futile. Competitors can signal their strength to each other; if they are unevenly matched, the weaker may acquiesce and actual battle, which is costly for all, can be avoided. Sometimes the competition is subtle, as when the signaling is between seemingly congenial companions. However, even within cooperative relationships there are conflicts of interest about plans and identity: I wish to present myself in the best possible light while you want to know what I am really thinking and what I really can and will do.
In competitive situations, being deceptive can be quite beneficial. If a bug presents itself as poisonous when it is not, it may avoid being eaten. If I present myself as more experienced than I really am, I may get a better job. Yet if the rate of deception becomes too high, the signal loses its meaning. So, for communication to occur, for signals to maintain their significance, something must limit the rate of deception. This is the core question of signaling theory: what keeps signals reliable?
The answer is costs: a signal will be reliable if it is beneficial to produce truthfully, yet prohibitively costly to produce falsely. These costs can be inherent to the signal or they can be imposed by society. Signaling theory provides a framework for understanding the different types of costs, and the balance between the advantages of greater reliability vs. the costs incurred in maintaining honesty. Much of this chapter will look at the economics of signaling: the costs of signal production, deception detection, punishing cheaters, etc.
Signals can be ambiguous. What a particular signal represents and what are the costs that maintain its reliability are not always clear and universally agreed upon. The art of signal analysis comes in applying the theoretical framework to real situations and determining what are the actual - and not always obvious - costs and benefits of a signal We will also look at the interpretation of signaling, at how signals acquire their meaning and how people negotiate the differences among their different subjective understandings of them.
