Efficiency and effectiveness

From Cyberlaw

Enhancing efficiency and effectiveness is the core of the broader rationalization process. For decades rationalization in the public field had been perceived as one of the Weberian style bureaucracy features ((Fountain: 2001, 8-9) points that Weber “explained bureaucracy as a technology of control through its structuring of information into cases and channels, its strict reliance on impersonal relations, and inevitable tendency towards rationalization” (Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans and eds. New York: Bedminster Press [1922] 1968)). But as with the whole concept of Weber, finally hierarchically built bureaucracy ceased to connote rationalization, opening the gates to the New Public Management's trend towards outsourcing previously public functions to private actors. Internet burst coincided with the trend, making the ground ready for the idea of IT enabled reengineering of government. In the first large scale attempt to make it real Al Gore (within IT related issues, Gore is probably better known of the National Information Infrastructure (NII) political agenda and his earlier contribution in drafting High Performance Computing and Communication Act of 1991 (HPCA)), then vice president of the USA, commissioned the National Partnership for Reinventing Government and Reengineering through Information Technology (NPR IT), an accompanying Report of the National Performance Review. By NPR Gore “to give citizens broader, more timely access to information and services through efficient, customer- responsive processes”. The program therefore substantially focused on one aim: improving customer service. In fact this is the way IT reengineering of government has always been understood—as streamlining and rationalizing existing practices and making them cheaper (“Americans complain that government is too slow or confusing in delivering its services or that they have too many places to call or go. Government employees complain even more about trying to deal with other parts of government. A big reason is the incredible volume of information that government processes and files. Information technology, with its ability to electronically store and rapidly sort, transmit, and access information, is the key to solving this problem.”) without causing too much turmoil of unpredictable organizational consequences (As (Fountain: 2001, 19) summarized it: “The NPR differed from most earlier American government reform efforts to resisting the temptation to restructure agencies. It emphasized redesigning process flows, increasing customer service to citizens , and leveraging the potential of information technology (IT) to enhance the capacity of government.”). The agenda of NPR was threefold: (1) strengthening leadership in information technology, (2) implementing electronic government, and (3) establishing support mechanisms for electronic government) (authors of NPR vaunted their efforts in: History of the National Partnership for Reinventing Government ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1993 – 2000. A Summary, available at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/appendixf.html. In the earlier stage, the program also met fierce critique. See e.g.: Ronald C. Moe, “The ‘Reinventing Government’ Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging the Consequences,” Public Administration Review, 54 (1994): 125-36.). Legally susceptible issues were placed among support mechanisms, concerning mainly privacy, IT acquisition (see also E—Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, which focused on responsibilities for acquisition of IT and the process of acquisition itself) and innovation incentives. Possibly due to its customer orientation the plan did not itself recognize the role of ICT as a performance incentive. The last issue was left for a separate act, Government Performance Results Act of 1993, available at http://www.john-mercer.com/library/gpra_text.pdf, passed the same year. The Act established strategic planning obligation for periods not less than 5 years, including the duty to devise program evaluations for establishing or revising general goals and objectives set in strategic plans (5USC306). Since September 1997 strategic plans were to be submitted to the Director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (5USC306(a)). Except when an agency’s annual outlay did not exceed $ 20,000,000 and the Director of OMB authorized the exception (31USC1117), strategic plans were to be made detailed within performance plans (31USC1115) and program performance reports were to be delivered to the President and Congress for each previous fiscal year (31USC1116). The reports were allowed to become incorporated into annual fiscal statements required under section 3515 (31USC1116(e)). Aside enhanced planning and reporting duties, agencies were given a chance to propose waiver from uniform administrative procedural requirements and controls and outline specific accountability mechanisms in lieu thereof. Under the Act (31USC1118, 31USC9704, 31USC1119) the Director of OMB was authorized to designate pilot projects for performance goals, performance budgeting and managerial accountability and flexibility. Subsequently, reports on the issues were to be delivered to the President and Congress. In any case Congress was empowered to interfere with the performance goals presented by agencies. Comptroller General of the United States (GAO) was required to deliver implementation report to the Congress in 1997 (Sec. 8). Office of Personnel Management, OMB and GAO were entrusted with training tasks (Sec. 9). How did the whole scheme work?