[*1559] NIES, Circuit Judge.
L.A. Gear California, Inc. (LAG) appeals the decision of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California,
Pensa, Inc. v. L.A. Gear of California, Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1016 (C.D.Cal.
1987), granting the motion of Avia Group International, Inc. (formerly
Pensa, Inc.) for summary judgment holding United States Design
Patent Nos. 284,420 ('420) and 287,301 ('301) valid as between
the parties and willfully infringed, and the case exceptional
under 35 U.S.C. @ 285 (1982). We affirm.
Avia owns the '420 patent, claiming an ornamental design for
an athletic shoe outer sole, and the '301 patent, claiming an
ornamental design for an athletic shoe upper, by assignment from
the inventor, James Tong. LAG ordered and sold shoes, Model No.
584 "Boy's Thrasher" ("Thrasher") and Model
No. [**2] 588 "Boy's Thrasher Hi-Top" ("Hi-Top"),
designed and manufactured for it by Sheng Chun Chemical Ind. Corp.
in Taiwan. Avia filed suit against LAG alleging, inter alia, that
both of LAG's models infringed its '420 design patent and that
LAG's Hi-Top model also infringed the '301 design. LAG counterclaimed
for a declaratory judgment that the two patents were not infringed
and were invalid because the designs were both obvious and functional.
Avia moved for partial summary judgment on the patent validity
and infringement issues and for attorney fees.
Finding no bona fide dispute as to any material fact and that
Avia had shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the
court granted Avia's motion after a hearing. It determined that
the infringement was willful and that the case was exceptional
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. @ 285 (1982), thus providing the
basis for an award of attorney fees. The court also issued a permanent
injunction enjoining further infringement by LAG. Because the
court reserved decision on the amounts to be awarded as damages
and as attorney [*1560] fees, these matters are not involved in
this appeal. n1
A patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. @ 282 (1982). In an infringement
action, it is not part of a patent owner's initial burden of going
forward with proof of its case to submit evidence supporting validity.
Rather, the burden is first on a challenger to introduce evidence
which raises the issue of invalidity. Further, a challenger must
establish facts, by clear and convincing evidence, which persuasively
lead to the conclusion of invalidity. See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer
Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894, 221 USPQ 669,
[**11] 674 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 83 L. Ed. 2d
120, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984). Thus, "[a challenger's] silence
leaves untouched at this stage what the statute presumes, namely,
that [the] patent is valid." Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys.,
Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1270, 225 USPQ 345, 347 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (footnote
omitted).
With this understanding of the parties' obligations, LAG's argument
that Avia unfairly waited for rebuttal to present its evidence
regarding validity clearly fails. Avia had no obligation to introduce
any evidence initially on validity. Such evidence was required
only in response to LAG's evidence. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534, 218 USPQ 871, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Where a challenger does put in evidence disputing validity, the
presumption of validity is neither eliminated nor undermined by
the challenger's evidence, as LAG argues. This is so because the
presumption is a procedural device, which assigns the burden of
going forward as well as the burden of proof of facts to the challenger.
See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574-75,
221 USPQ 929, 930-31 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at
1534, 218 USPQ at 875-76. [**12] Moreover, the presumption is
one of law, not fact, and does not constitute "evidence"
to be weighed against a challenger's evidence. Nevertheless, a
patent having issued, the challenger bears the burden of persuasion
that the established facts lead to a conclusion of invalidity.
The patents in suit are design patents. Under 35 U.S.C. @ 171
(1982), a patent may be obtained on the design of an article of
manufacture which is "new, original and ornamental"
and "nonobvious" within the meaning of section 103,
which is incorporated by reference into section 171. LAG attacks
the validity of the patents for the subject designs covering parts
of shoes on the grounds (1) that the designs are primarily functional
rather than ornamental and (2) that the designs would have been
obvious from the prior art.
A. Ornamental versus Functional Designs
We dispose first of LAG's argument that the record shows genuine
issues of material fact with respect to whether the subject designs
are ornamental within the meaning of section 171. LAG points only
to conclusory, conflicting statements in affidavits, which create
no genuine issue for trial, and
[*1563] to evidence of prior art references, none of which is [**13] in dispute. LAG's arguments are, thus, misfocused. Rather than arguing that there is a genuine issue of fact, in substance its arguments are that Avia was not entitled to judgment on the basis of the facts established by the record evidence.
LAG correctly asserts that if a patented design is "primarily
functional," rather than primarily ornamental, the patent
is invalid. See Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806
F.2d 234, 238, 231 USPQ 774, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1986). When function
dictates a design, protection would not promote the decorative
arts, a purpose of the design patent statute. See 1 D. Chisum,
Patents @ 1.04[2] at 1-194.1 to 1.195 (1986). There is no dispute
that shoes are functional and that certain features of the shoe
designs in issue perform functions. However, a distinction exists
between the functionality of an article or features thereof and
the functionality of the particular design of such article or
features thereof that perform a function. Were that not true,
it would not be possible to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian
article of manufacture, see, e.g., Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co.
v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 1111, 231 [**14] USPQ 67
(Fed.Cir. 1986) (design patent for chairs), or to obtain both
design and utility patents on the same article, see, e.g., Carman
Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 938-39, 220 USPQ 481, 486-87
(Fed.Cir. 1983); In re Dubois & Will, 46 C.C.P.A. 744, 262
F.2d 88, 90, 120 USPQ 198, 200 (1958).
With respect to functionality of the design of the '301 patent,
the court stated:
"[LAG] has taken each little aspect of the upper and
pointed out that many of the aspects or features of the upper
have a function. Even if, arguendo, true that would not make
the design primarily functional. If the functional aspect or
purpose could be accomplished in many other ways that [sic] is
involved in this very design, that fact is enough to destroy
the claim that this design is primarily functional. There are
many things in the ['301] patent on the upper which are clearly
ornamental and nonfunctional such as the location of perforations
and how they are arranged, and the stitching and how it's arranged,
and the coloration of elements between black and white colors.
The overall aesthetics of the various components and the way
they are combined are quite important and are not functional.
They [**15] are purely aesthetic. . . ."
Pensa, Inc., 4 USPQ2d at 1019.
On the design of the '420 patent, the court made a similar analysis of various features and concluded:
Pensa, Inc., 4 USPQ2d at 1019-20. We agree that the designs in suit have not persuasively been [**16] shown to be functional and that no genuine issue of material fact is present with respect to this issue.
B. Obviousness
Design patents must meet a nonobvious requirement identical to
that applicable to utility patents. Accordingly, 35 U.S.C. @ 103
(1982) applies to determine whether the designs of the '420 and
'301 patents would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. [*1564] v. Whirlpool
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1440-41, 221 USPQ 97, 108 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1215, 211 USPQ 782, 783 (CCPA
1981); 1 D. Chisum, @ 1.04[2] at 1-198. The court found no genuine
issue of material fact was raised with respect to the four factors
to be considered in determining obviousness: the scope and content
of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and claims
at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the art when the invention
was made, and secondary indicia, such as commercial success and
copying. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; Litton Sys., 728 F.2d at
1441, 221 USPQ at 108.
LAG attempts to create a dispute as to the content of the prior
art through the court's statement that "all of the shoes
referred [**17] to as prior art in the record below had come out
after the Model 750 [commercial embodiment of the '420 patent]
was on the market." LAG mischaracterizes the court's statement.
The court restricted that statement to shoes mentioned by inventor
Tong in deposition answers. Pensa, Inc., 4 USPQ2d at 1020. The
court also noted that LAG's deposition questions were "so
generally worded as to be almost meaningless." Id. at 1024.
Neither LAG's failure to ask specific questions during discovery
nor its mischaracterization of the court's decision can create
a genuine issue of fact.
With respect to a design, obviousness is determined from the vantage
of "the designer of ordinary capability who designs articles
of the type presented in the application." In re Nalbandian,
661 F.2d at 1216, 211 USPQ at 784. LAG acknowledges that standard,
but asserts that the court is required to defer to its expert
testimony. As we have stated, however, an expert's opinion on
the legal conclusion of obviousness is neither necessary nor controlling.
See, e.g., Petersen, 740 F.2d at 1547-48, 222 USPQ at 567.
Further, a conflict in the legal opinions of experts creates no
dispute of fact. See [**18] Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can
Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1572, 220 USPQ 584, 589 (Fed.Cir. 1984). LAG
argues that the designs would have been obvious because they are
"traditional ones consisting of features old in the art."
That some components of Avia's designs exist in prior art references
is not determinative. "If the combined teachings suggest
only components of the claimed design but not its overall appearance,
a rejection under section 103 is inappropriate." In re Cho,
813 F.2d 378, 382, 1 USPQ2d 1662, 1663 (Fed.Cir. 1987). There
is no evidence that the overall appearances of the '420 and '301
designs would have been suggested to ordinary shoe designers by
the references.
LAG does not contest the commercial success of Avia's shoes manufactured
according to the patented designs, but argues the success is attributable
to factors other than the designs themselves, such as advertising.
Although commercial success is relevant only if a nexus is proven
between the success of the patented product and the merits of
the claimed invention, see, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois
Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575, 222 USPQ 744, 746 (Fed.Cir.
1984), [**19] cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 85 L. Ed. 2d 496, 105
S. Ct. 2138 (1985), Avia did present evidence tending to prove
nexus and LAG's conclusory statements to the contrary fail to
create a genuine factual dispute. In addition, the trial court
referred to the accused products as "copies" of the
patented designs. Pensa, Inc., 4 USPQ2d at 1021. Copying is additional
evidence of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc.
v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000, 228 USPQ 562, 565 (Fed.Cir.),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 91 L. Ed. 2d 565, 106 S. Ct. 3275
(1986). LAG's conclusory characterization of the evidence as "speculative"
is insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.
On the basis of its evaluation of the four factors outlined above,
the court held that the ordinary designer would not have found
the '420 or '301 designs, considered as whole designs, obvious
in light of the differences between the prior art and the claimed
designs. We agree. No genuine issue of material fact or error
of law has been shown in the district court's ruling.[*1565]
The Supreme Court established the test for determining infringement of a design patent in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 20 L. Ed. 731 (1871):
Id. at 528. In addition to overall similarity of designs, "the
accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented device
which distinguishes it from the prior art." Shelcore, Inc.
v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 628 n. 16, 223 USPQ 584,
590 n. 17 (Fed.Cir. 1984); Litton Sys., 728 F.2d at 1444, 221
USPQ at 109. Absent the presence of the novel features in the
accused products, a patented design has not been appropriated.
The district court correctly applied the above test for infringement
of the subject patented designs, stating:
Pensa, Inc., 4 USPQ2d at 1021. Thus, the court found that LAG's
shoes had overall similarity to the patented designs and incorporated
the novel features thereof as well. For the '420 patent, those
features included the swirl effect and the pivot point; for the
'301 patent, the novelty consists, in light of the court's analysis
of validity, of the combination of saddle, eyestay, and perforations.
LAG asserts that a patent owner has the burden to prove infringement
by preponderant evidence, Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d
1186, 1187, 5 USPQ2d 1625, 1625 (Fed.Cir. 1988), and that Avia
failed to meet that burden. On a motion for summary judgment,
however, the question is not the "weight" of the evidence,
but the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. A patent
owner must, of course, present sufficient evidence to make a [**22]
prima facie case. Here, besides its patents and the accused shoes,
Avia presented evidence in the form of an expert's declaration
analyzing infringement and deposition testimony of LAG's president,
in which he confused LAG's Thrasher and Avia's Model 750. In addition,
the court performed its own comparison of LAG's shoes to the patented
designs. LAG merely challenges the "weight" accorded
the expert's declaration and the ultimate finding of infringement.
Neither argument raises a genuine issue of material fact which
requires a trial.
Finally, LAG points to undisputed evidence that Avia's Model 750
shoe, made in accordance with the patent, and LAG's accused Models
584 and 588, are intended for different customers. The former
are for tennis players; the latter are for children. That fact,
per LAG, renders the products not "substantially the same,"
as necessary under Gorham. LAG's understanding of Gorham is grossly
in error. To find infringement, the accused shoes need only appropriate
a patentee's protected design, not a patentee's market as well.
See Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1028, 228 USPQ
933, 934 (Fed.Cir. 1986). The products of the parties [**23] need
not be directly competitive; indeed, an infringer is liable even
when the patent owner puts out no product. A fortiori, infringement
is not avoided by selling to a different class of purchasers than
the patentee.
Having considered the above and all other arguments of appellant,
LAG, we are [*1566] unpersuaded of error in the district court's
judgment of infringement.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment
to Avia in all respects.
AFFIRMED.